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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates and demonstrates the value of using
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" (the Rousseaui"tic and
the Nietzschean) to enrich the reading ofliterature in Religious Education
with reference to I.e Guin's A Wizard of Earthsea. Religious Education
has responded in recent decades to developments in pedagogy, theology,
and various other disciplines such as psychology and sociology. However,
religious educators do not seem to have considered the question of the
impact of modern literary theory on Religious Education. Such theories
have influenced the way in which literature is read and studied in the
English classroom. Such developments should be of interest not only to
the English teacher but also to the Religious Education teacher.
The hypothesis underlying this thesis is that the Derridean
common ground of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations will
broaden and enhance the reading of literature in Religious Education by
facilitating both the search for the centre (search for finite meaning) and
the free play of signifiers (pursuit of infinitely deferred and pluralistic
meaning).
Generally, Post-Structuralism, with its emphasis on the
impossibility of absolute meaning, seems antithetical to Religious
Education, with its emphasis on the search for meaning. However,
Dzrrida's common ground of the two interpretative positions suggests a
reading of literature that allows for both the Rousseauistic concern with
centre and definitive meantng and the Nietzschean concern with free play
and provisional meaning. 'rhis thesis, then, establishes that the value of
'story' in Religious Education is considerably enriched by the adoption of
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" as an approach for
reading literature, whether secular or sacred, in Religious Education.
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CHAPfERONE

Introduction to the Study
Overview
In Religious Education considerable effort has been made in recent

decades towards developing teaching methods that are child-centred and
religiously inclusive. Emphasis has been placed both on developing
curricula appropriate to the child's experience and on acknowledging the
plurality of religious traditions (Moore & Habel, 1982; Rossiter, 1981, for
example). Religious Education does not exist in isolation from the rest of
the world. Grimmitt (1978; 1987) has contributed significantly to the
development of Religious Education by acknowledging the relevance of
such disciplines as theology, pedagogy, and sociology to Religious
Education and by demonstrating how they may be adopted and utilized.
However, religious educators do not seem to have considered how modern
literary theory may also impact on Religious Education.
The way in which literature is now read and studied in English has
been strongly influenced by modern literary theory. For example, Cohan
and Shires (1988) discuss the way in which signs can both disrupt and
facilitate the passage of meaning while O'Neill (1993) examines how
critical reading is encouraged by Cultural Criticism. Modern literary
theory can also be of considerable value to religious educators concerning
how literature is read and studied.
Modern literary theory is as rich as it is broad, and even various
developmental strands can be diverse. While it would indeed be wor'".hwhile
to examine the value of other areas of modem literary theory for reading
literature in Religious Education this thesis concentrates exclusively on
one aspect of the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930- ),
whose name is virtually synonymous with Post-Structuralism.
In this thesis the value of using Derrida's "two interpretations of
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interpretation" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292), the Rousseauistic and the
Nietzschean, to enhance the reading ofliterature in Religious Education is
examined in detail. This is demonstrated by a close textual analysis of Le
Guin's novel A Wizard of Earthsea. The area of study undertakBn in this
thesis is considered original as it does not seem to have been previously
explored. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Derridean common
ground of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations will broaden
and enrich the reading of literature in Religious Education by facilitating
both the search for the centre (search for finite meaning) and the free
playofsignifiers (pursuit ofinfinitelydeferred and pluralistic meaning).
The relevance of this thesis is in its examination of the value of
Derrida's two interpretative positions for reading literature in Religious
Education. The Nietzschean interpretation, with its emphasis on the
impossibility of absolute meaning, seems to undermine if not obliterate
the assurance and certitude facilitated by the Rousseauistic
interpretation, with its emphasis on definitive meaning. However, Derrida
points to the common ground of these two irreconcilable interpretative
positions. The Derridean common ground allows for a reading ofliterature
that accommodates both the Rousseauistic concern with absolute
meaning and the Nietzscheao concern with provisional meaning.

Defining Religious Education
Definitions of the term 'Religious Education' are varied, evolve over
time, and are influenced by vroious issues. Alves (1975) considers that
differences in views about Religious Education arise from "different views
of the relationship between the individual and the society into which he
has been born", which subsequently influence general opinions regarding
education (p. 23). While expressing a similar opinion, Moore and Habel
(1982) also emphasize that Religious Education should be multicultural,
8

comparative, open-ended, critical, and affective (pp. 34-36). Horder (1975)
discusses four approaches to defining Religious Education: confessional,
anti-dogmatic, implicit, and explicit (pp. 176-178). The confessional
approach is concerned with the passing on of a belief system, while the
anti-dogmatic approach fosters an objective and dispassionate giving out
of information. Horder considers both of these approaches unacceptable
because either it is, respectively, exclusive or it disallows consideration of
the subjective and emotional nature of belief. Horder suggests a
combination of the implicit (the "quest for meaning and purpose") and the
explicit (the "quest for understanding of religion and religions") (pp. 177178). Similarly, Hull (1982) observes that today religious educators, while
trying to avoid "the inert imparting of facts", also express a desire "that
pupils should learn from religion in ways which will enrich them and
deepen their humanity, rather than merely informing them" (p. xv).
Grimmitt (1978) highlights the need fm· consideration of both the
affective and the cognitive in his two-level conceptual framework for
teaching Religious Education: the existential approach (use of"the child's
feelings, acts and experiences as the basis for developing religious
concepts") and the dimensional approach (presentation of "selected
religious concepts by way of the six dimensions of religion") (p. 50).
Grimmitt (1987), like many religious educators, deplores the
indoctrinational approach insisting that what "religious education ...
seeks to further are pupils' capacities to take responsibility for their own
beliefs and values - to 'own' them" (pp. 215-216).
Marvel (1982) also emphasizes the need for both the 'implicit'
approach (affective) and tne 'explicit' approach (cognitive), which he feels
is facilitated by the phenomenological method (pp. 73-74). 1n a similar
vein, Wilson (1982) suggests that there must be a combination of the
rational and the emotional in Religious Education. ln contrast, Robinson
9

(1982) considers th»t despite any practical aims in Religious Education
its achievements will be small if it does not also enable and facilitate
children to experience the religious, while Attfield (1982) is concerned with
the teaching of age-appropriate concepts (pp. 81-83). Groome (1980),
while writing about Christian Religious Education, does acknowledge the
need for inclusivity in Religious Education generally, which he describes as
"a deliberate attending to the transcendent dimension of life" lp. 22).
Nevertheless, such a definition does not acknowledge the secular nature
of society, which is of concern for many religious educators.
Cox (1982) discusses the importance of critical understanding in a
pluralistic society, describing fr.e function ofReligious Education as being:
to help pupils to understand the nature of our present secular,
pluralistic society, to help them to think rationally about the
state and place of religion in it, to enable them to choose
objectively and on sound criteria between the many conflicting
religious statements ... and to work out for themselves, and
to be able cogently to defend, their own religious position or
their rejection of the possibility of having one. (p. 56)
Finding similar concerns in his research, Rossiter (1981) notes that
various Australian Government reports "recommended broad, openended, descriptive and objective courses in religious studies" (p. 11). These
reports consider that Religious Education is not to be aligned with any
religion or church, is concerned with education in religion and the place of
religion in culture, and provides the "opportunity for clarifying meaning in
life" (p. 12). Rossiter lists the aims of Religious Education as including
learning about "religious aspects of culture, becoming aware of different
belief systems in the community, understanding the different dimensions
of religion, [and] clarification of the individual's own beliefs" (p. 12).
While the term 'Religious Education' can be variously defined, then,
there is, overall, a conser.:;us of opinion on the need for Religious
10

Education to be defined and practised in ways that are broad and
inclusive and to incorporate both the affective (implicit) and the cognitive
(explicit) dimensions. Drawing on such writers the following working
definition of 'Religious Education' is suggested for the purposes of this
thesis:
Religious Education should encompass an exploration of th•'
myriad ways in which meaning and purpose in humdn
existence has been and is sought; such an exploration wou.ld
emphasize (but not exclusively) an examination of religior.
(and religions), philosophy, literature (sacred and secular), and
culture and would incorporate (but not necessarily
concurrently) an overall concern with both the cognitive and
affective dllnensions.
This thesis is concerned exclusively with the use of literature as
one of the many ways in which meaning and purpose is sought. While
both secular and sacred texts constitute the literature that is read and
studied in Religious Education, this thesis uses as an illustrative example
a piece of secular fantasy literature. The use of close textual analysis
emphasizes the cognitive but does not exclude the affective. The value of
the approach to reading a secular text demonstrated in this thesis could,
and should, equally be applied to the reading of sacred texts.

Other Studies
Investigations of published and dissertation material in the area of
Religious Education and modem literary theory indicate that no work has
been attem1>ted in this potentially exciting nexus of subjects. Critical
works on Post-Structuralism, Derrida, and deconstruction are plentiful
and include such topics as: an exploration of literary theory, ideology, and
institutions (Culler, 1988); a theoretical examination of the nature of
change in philosophy, history, and culture (Barker, 1996); discussions
about Derrida and deconstruction (Silverman, 1989; Wood, 1992); and, an
11

investigation of deconstruction, philosophy, and theology (Hart, 1991).
Dissertations (Dissertation Abstracts International) include such topics
as: a critique of the epistemology of Post-Structuralism (Brodribb, 1988);
the contribution of the work of Derrida to ethics (Conlon, 1994);
extensions of Post-Structuralism into contemporary discourses

concerning curriculum (Hwu, 1993); a Freudian critique ofDerridean PostStructuralism (Barbour, 1996); and, Post-Structuralism and literature
education in grade five schooling (Mesheau,. 1991).
Crt tical works on A Wizard of Earthsea have tended to concentrate
on it as literature for young adu1ts. For example, Jenkins (1985) and
Cummins (1990) explore the novel as about coming-of-age while Molson
(1979) discusses it as ethical fantasy for children and young adults.

Dissertations tend to be more vaned and include such topics as feminism
(Clarke, 1992), coming of age (Stevens, 1990), and moral education
(Wayne, 1993).
There seems to be no work, either published criticism or
dissertation, produced in the area of Religious Education and PostStructuralism, or specifically focussing on Religious Education and
Derrida's theories, let alone with reference to A Wizard of Earthsea.
Notwithstanding the worthwhile studies about Earthsea, the important
developments in Religious Education, and the notable work in PostStructuralism, reading a novel like A Wizard of Earthsea from a
background ofDerridean theory can be of significant value for Religious
Education.
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I
CHAPTER TWO

Background to the Study
Developments in Religious Education
Religious Education has changed considerably as it has responded
to changes in society. In the earlier part of this century, it was little more
than indoctrination, either fervently or perfunctorily, and was rightly
criticized and challenged. However, considerable effort has been expended
over recent decades towards developing teaching methods in Religious
Education that are child-centred, religiously inclusive, and abreast of
modern pedagogical and theological developments. These developments
acknowledge that societal changes are relevant to Religious Education
and demonstrate how they may he utilized.
There has been a great deal of research and work produced in the
area of Religious Education in England, reflecting the needs of teachers
working in a country where the 1944 Education Act made the teaching of
Religious Education compulsory in all state schools (Rossiter, 1981, p.
14). 1n contrast, the situation in Australia varies between States. In
Western Australia, for example, Religious Education is provided in State
primary schools by visiting clergy and lay persons. ln State high schools
chaplains provide support for teachers and students. Australian Church
schools provide kindergarten to year twelve Religious Education, with
ethos dependent on the school's denominational background.
Hull (1975), in his examination ofReligious Education syllabuses in
England, indicates how they have ch&nged from those in the 1920's and
1930's concerned with a historical study of Christianity to those in the
1950's that emphasized the "centrality of the experience of the child" (p.
101) to those in the late 1960's and 1970's that recognized the necessity
for religious inclusivity. He also notes that some syllabuses consider the
inclusion of non-religious life stances to be necessary (p. 115). Elliott
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(1982) discusses the problems of producing syllabuses acceptable for use
in a democratic and pluralistic society, emphasizing that their content
"has to be selected for its relevance to problems about religion which arise
at the boundaries of belief and unbelief' (p. 132). Gooderham (1982) also
discusses the need for Religious Education curricula to be inclusive and
open-ended, while Cole (1982) concerns himself with a consideration of the
treatment of religion in schools where students come from a variety of
faith backgrounds.
Moore and Habel (1982) have produced a valuable Australian
contribution in their creation of a typology of religion for use in Religious
Education. Another notable Australian work is Rossiter's 1981 empirical
study which explores approaches to Religious Education in State and
Church schools. Rossiter provides a detailed examination of issues and
developments in :Religious Education practices. As with developments in
England, Religious Education in Australia has moved towards more
inclusive and broader considerations of religion and religious issues.
Hull \1982) considers that, like other educational disciplines,
Religious Education has been dramatically effected by rapid social change
(p. xv). As a result there has been much discussion, even argument, about
what 'should' constitute Religious Education. "Sometimes this ferment of
new ideas and approaches is described as 'confusion' and religious
education is criticized for 'not knowing where it is going"' (p. xv). Such
'confusion', suggests Hull, is actually a sign ofvitalit;y and responsibilit;y in

the meeting "between the religious and the secular outlooks" (pp. xv-xvi).
The need for a balanced, pedagogically sound approach to Religious
Education underlies much of the work produced from the 1960's onwards
and can be particularly seen in the work of Grimmitt.
Grimmitt (1978; 1987) argues for the recognition of the impact of
developments in other disciplines on Religious Education. 1n his 1978
14

study he discusses the failure of Religious Education in England to
function adequately, and examines twentieth century changes that have
impacted on the teaching of Religious Education:
The impetus for change in the teaching of religion ... stems
not simply from our awareness of the failure of traditional
'religious instruction' but also from three aspects of change
unique to the mid 20th century. These are: theological change,
educational change and social change. Together they have
created a force which ... has led to a remarkable revolution in
the field of religious teaching. (p. 5)
In a later book Grimmitt (1987) continues his discussion of the

impact of other disciplines on Religious Education, finding it necessary to
use advances in other fields "which, until now, have not been a particular
feature of the work of religious educators • most notably the sociology of
knowledge and philosophical anthropology" (p. 9). Grimmitt draws on the
work of Berger and other sociologists in discussing the concept that
"human beings construct reality" (p. 25). He observes that humans are
seen as shaped by culture and society, knowledge is seen as a social
construct, and meaning is seen as constructed through language:
the way in which meanings are assigned to a common
'objective' world is through a common interpretational system
. . . . The chief and most powerful way in which these
categories and typicalities are organised or given meaning is
through language. (pp. 25-26)
Grimmitt's examination of the social construction of reality and its
influence on Religious Education indicates how far Religious Education
has developed this century: from the confessional/indoctrinational
approach that tended to position itself in splendid isolation to approaches
that acknowledge, respond to, and utilize developments in other
disciplines. The overall result of such developments is that now Religious
Education is firmly rooted in advances and developments in other fields.
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This thesis very much arises from, and is considered a part of, this
developmental direction.
In particular, Grimmitt's discussions were germinal in suggesting a

possible direction for this thesis. He argues that Religious Education
needs to acknowledge and respond to contemporary theory in other fields.
However, while he examines the social construction of reality he does not
pursue the notion of meaning constructed through language or the ways
in which this may impact on how literature is read in Religious Education.
This thesis studies this relationship oflanguage and meaning by exploring
a particularly influential aspect of Post-Structuralism, namely Derrida's
"two interpretations of interpretation". Through its investigation of the
value of Derrida's two interpretative positions for reading literature in
Religious Education this thesis is very much a part of the continuum of
development in Religious Education championed by Grimmitt.
Story, Imagination and Fantasy in Religious Education
Complementary to these developments have been a burgeoning
interest in, and development of, the place and role of story, imagination
and fantasy in Religious Education. Story is a particularly appropriate
literary form and process for use in Religious Education because, as a
central and vivifYing part of life in all human cultures, it helps to explain,
give meaning, nourish, and sustain. "The impulse to story ... consists in
the need to respond to a challenge; and the challenge is one that lies in the
simultaneous shapelessness and shapefulness of life" (Blishen, 1979, p.
31). Story helps make sense of a seemingly chaotic world by giving
direction, meaning, and security amidst the chaos. "Stories bind us
together; human community depends on them" (Staudenmaier, 1988, p.
314). Stories inform cultures, nations, communities, families, and
individuals about themselves and each other and the interrelationships
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between them. Through stories people can be "validated as persons"
(Bausch, 1991, p. 46). This is why literature, both secular and religious,
has so much value for human society.
Moore (1991) discusses how narrative connects people to each
other, how sharing stories roots people in a cultural background, and how
narrative teaching "gives meaning to abstract concepts" (p. 131). For her,
narrative is "a significant mode of human communication, a bearer and

critic of culture, and a potentially profound and far-reaching educational
method" (pp. 132-133). Moore emphasizes the relationship between
education, narrative, and imagination, arguing for the importance of story

in life and education, and the value of the narrative method in Religious
Education. From a different

pers~ective,

Navone (1977) discusses links

between theology and story, emphasizing "the narrative quality of
religious experience" (p. 9). Story is considered vital to faith and in what
he terms "biblical travel stories of God", Navone explores how "we have a
multiplicity of travel stories that disclose who God is and who we are" (p.
53). Navone suggests storytelling is involvement in several different, "but
interpenetrating, levels of meaning, communicating a fullness of cognitive,
effective [sic], and imaginational experience" (p. 11). For Navone "our
stories and symbols reflect how we grasp ourselves and our world and how
. . . they reflect the quality of our interrelatedness with reality" (p. 34).
Similarly, Bausch (1991) suggests that "every story is religious" in his
discussion of the relationship between faith and storytelling (p. 46).
Crossan (1988) examines parable as 'story' with a subversive
nature. He interprets the parables of Jesus as "intended to shatter the
structural security of the hearer's world" (p. 101). The purpose of
parables is to change us by challenging and upsetting deeply-held
convictions about the way in which the world is ordered (p. 39). Bausch
(1991) also examines the "disturbingly paradoxical and challenging" power
17

II

of parables (p. 117). Crossan (1988) suggests that parable is "necessary,
logically, as the binary opposite of myth: myth proposes, parable
disposes" (p. 47). There seems to be a potentially interesting correlation
between this binary opposition, in which the opposites require each other,
and Derrida's two interpretative positions, which although oppositional
must exist together. For Crossan, the parable shatters the safely
constructed vision of life that myth/religion perpetuate, thereby creating
the possibility of transcendence. Crossan considers it is not possible to:
get outside language and outside story. But one can sail as
close as possible into the wind .... My suggestion is that the
excitement of transcendental experience is found only at the
edge oflanguage and the limit of story and that the only way to
find that eT-citement is to test those edges and those limits.
And that ... is what parable is all about. (pp. 29-30)
Cupitt (1991) explores the importance of story in philosophical and
religious thought. He feels the somewhat bad reputation that story has of
being not 'true' has changed because truth is no longer seen as "outside
the text, but ... is inherent in ... the text" (p. 23). In particular, Cupitt's
discussion of the anti-story is a valuable study of story as 'not story'. He
explores notions of language, reality, and truth from the perspective of
Zen and its use of anti-stories or non-stories:
More than any other faith Zen has recognized the absurdity of
attempting altogether to escape from language. There is
Nothing outside language, there is nothing outside language,
there is nothing outside language ... yet Zen still obstinately
follows nearly all other faiths and philosophies in locating
salvation outside language in an effable Beyond. It is clever,
yet it continues trying to point us beyond the text, even
though it perceives that there is nothing to point to and no
wayofpointingtoit. (p. 136)
The concepts In Zen regarding story and language make it virtually an
Eastern 'version' of the ideas in much Post-Structuralist literary theory.
18

I
Concurrent to developments in Religious Education about story
has been a growing interest in, and concern with, the place of imagination
and fantasy. Imagination has a central place in Religious Education
because, as Fischer (1983) argues, it "provides access to the deepest
levels of truth and allows us to live in the 'real' world" (p. 6). Similarly,
Bausch suggests that in story and storytelling can be seen "the power of
imagination to proclaim the truth"

(19~1.

p. 47). Le Guin (1979) also

points to achieving truth through imagination, maintaining that "it is by
such beautiful non-facts [imaginative 'true' fantasy] that we ... may
arrive ... at the truth" (p. 45). She believes that imagination leads to an
understanding that fantasy, while not factual, is true. Fischer values
imagination in Religious Education because to her it is "essential to
Christian faith" (1983, p. 7). She describes imagination as the "inner
rainbow", a bridge connecting the sacred and the secular (p. 7). This
concept of 'bridge' is similar to Le Guin's ideas concerning the process of
fantasy writing which involves making a bridge between the conscious
and the unconscious so that the "readers can make the journey too"
(1979, p. 79). Imagination, according toLe Guin, is one of the best ways of
making this journey, where reason alone cannot lead.
Le Guin distinguishes between what she calls 'true' fantasy and

'false' fantasy. For her fantasy is not escapism and she observes that
'true' fantasy, like the great myths, speaks "from the unconscious to the
unconscious in the language of the unconscious" (1979, p. 62). To use
Tolkien's terminology, escapist fantasy tells of the 'Flight of the Deserter'
instead of the 'Escape of the Prisoner' (1964, p. 56). Fischer (1983) points
to problems also associated with the UE1 of the word 'imagination', which
stems from fear that it is illusory and unreal because of the tendency to
"associate the imagination with emotion and intuition, and we in the West
are schooled to regard these as sources of error and deception" (p. 5). Zuck
19

(1975) considers that "imagination in the form of the fantasizing process
is one of our primary instruments for seeing beyond" (p. 589). He argues
for the use of imaginative fantasy in Religious Education because fantasy
"can enlarge our sense of what is 'real' or of value, and this movement is a

necessary part of any response to the religious dimension of experience"
(p. 590). Warnock (1976) believes that "the cultivation of imagination ...
should be the chief aim of education" (p. 9). For her imagination "allows us
both to express and to understand ideas" (p. 72) and also to create. While
her discussion concerns education generally her emphasis is on the place
and role of imagination "to go beyond . . . . [which] is an absolute
necessity" (p. 201).
Harris (1987) celebrates "fantasy as an epistemological power, as
a unique form of imagination", and as the "capacity to enter into
inwardness" (p. 8). For ber imaginative fantasy encourages the touching
of "one's own human inwardness" (p. 14). Le Guin (1979) expresses
similar views in her belief that fantasy "is the language of the inner self'
because it allows us to make an inward journey (p. 70). Like Harris,
Robinson (1982) also believes imagination to he essential for religious
experience, "for feeling after the mystery oflife" (p. 87). He is concerned
that "imagination is starved by those who wish to protect children from
any aspects of reality hut the nice" (p. 88). In a similar vein, Le Guin
deplores 'false' fantasy because it sanitates, trying to fix evil as if it were
a problem rather than presenting it as it is: all the pain and suffering that
is part of the human condition (1979, p. 69).
In Religious Education concern with the place and role of fantasy

and imagination adds considerably to the potential dimensions and value
of 'story'. A variety of 'story' can be used and, in particular, the use of
fantasy stories allows for consideration of the human situation in a way
that is non-threatening to all children in an increasingly pluralistic
20

society. 'Story' may be variously used to teach about faith, explore issues
of responsibility, exall'ine meaning, or question belief. It seems clear,
then, that the impact of modem literary theory on how 'su>ry' can be read
and studied should be ofconsider•.ble interest to religious educators.
Modem Literacy Theory

At the turn of the century literary theory was influenced by the
emphasis in Humanism on the logocentric. Eagleton (1983) observes, for
example, that for Husserllanguage was "a secondary activity which gives
names to meanings" that are already possessed (p. 60). Both Leavis, who
devised the literary canon of'great' literature, and Richards, who isolated
the text from its historical context, promoted close reading of the text and
this new critical approach held sway well into the 1970's (Barry, 1995, p.
30). The author's intentions were considered irrelevant to the text's
'meaning', as was the reader's subjective feelings. Although this type of
critical approach to the literary text rejected the God-like status of the
author, the 'essentialist truth' nature of literary theory remained and was
vested in the critic. The critic now became a 'grand interpreter', revealing
'the' meaning of the text for the reader. In the work ofHirsch, for example,
literary meaning is considered "absolute and immutable" only because
"his theory of meaning ... is pre-linguistic" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 67).
Saussure strongly influenced the development of modern literary
theory. In theorizing language as a system of signs he undermined "the
notion that 'man' is the centre, source and origin of meaning" (Rice &
Waugh, 1996, p. 6). For Saussure language did not just record or label the
world but actually"constitutes our world .. -.Meaning is always attributed
to the object or idea by the human mind, and constructed by and
expressed through language" (Barry, 1995, p. 43). The Humanist idea
that language expressed 'existing' meaning was thus severely ruptured by
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Saussurean theory. The "hallmark of the 'linguistic revolution' ... is the
recognition that meaning is not simply something 'expressed' or 'reflected'

in language: it is actually produced by it" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 60). The
effect of new literary approaches "was so powerful as to produce, by the
late 1970's and early 1980's, a situation which was frequently referred to
as a 'crisis' ... in the discipline of English" (Barry, 1995, p. 33). Literary
theory would now stem from linguistic theory in which language was seen
as pre-existing any order that humans make of the world.
Saussure (1996) was the first to posit the idea that "in language
there are only differences" (p. 14). Eagleton (1983) notes that for
Saussure meaning can arise only from difference:
Each sign ... has meaning only by virtue of its difference from
the others. 'Cat' has meaning not 'in itself, but because it is
not 'cap' or 'cad' or 'bat' . ... [Meaning is not] immanent in a

sign but is ... the result of difference from other signs. (p. 97)
A sign is comprised of a signifier (sound/image) and a signified (mental
concept). In Saussurean linguistics "elements of language acquire
meaning not as the result of some connection between words and things,
but only as parts of a system of relations" (Selden, 1985, p. 53). Because
the relation between the signifier and signified is a matter of convention
the sign, and therefore meaning itself, is always arbitrary and relational.
Culler (1981) points out tlhat:
In analyzing signification Saussure and his later followers
insist that forms and concepts do not exist indepen<l·•ntly of
one another but that the sign consists of the union of a
signifier and signified. Moreover - and this is the important
point - both signifiers and signifieds are purely relational
entities, products of a system of differences. (p. 40)

The legacy of Saussure's ideas is most clearly seen in Structuralism and
Post-Structuralism, but also influenced other modern literary theories.
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Structuralists argued "that the structure of language produces
'reality'" (Selden, 1985, p. 68). There is a rejection of the Humanist "myth
that meaning begins and ends in the individual's 'experiencem (Ea~leton,
1983, p. ll3). Langu~e 'pre-exists' any order that individuals make of the
world. Meaning "isn't a kind of core or essence inside things: rather,
meaning is always outside" (Barry, 1995, p. 39). Understanding arises
from knowing what something is not rather than what it is. Structuralists
tried to scientifically dissect language like a specimen. Meaning was then
determined in relationship (difference) of sign to sign. "Meaning is
dependent upon differential relations among elements within a system"
(Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 22). In Structuralism stability is produced, and
play is contained, in the fusing of the signifier to the signified to produce
the sign: like two trains on converging tracks that meet at one point - the
sign. Thus, Structuralism, "while rejecting the idea of a unified meaning
occupying the text, ... still seeks unity or unification in the literary
system as a whole,

r~.course

to which can then 'explain' the individual

work" (Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 23). In practice, then, there is still a 'right
meaning' in application. This 'right meaning' comes from "the operations
and oppositions which govern language" (Selden, 1985, p. 68).
Post-Structuralism grew out of Structuralist theories concerning
instability of signification. There is considerable disagreement, however,
about what constitutes Post-Structuralism and also about its relation to
Structuralism. Nevertheless, it is the radical changes in ideas concerning
language and meaning, stemming from Saussure and Structuralism, that
underpin all Post-Structuralist theories. "Post-structuralists have in
various ways prised apart the two halves of the sign" (Selden, 1985, p.
73). In Post-Structuralism, unlike Structuralism, there is no fusion of the
signifier and the signified to produce the sign: like two trains on parallel
tracks that never meet. "If structuralism divided the sign from the
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referent ... 'post-structuralism' ... divides the signifier from the signified"
(Eagleton, 1983, p. 128). Post-Structuralism. because it views language
as considerably Jess stable than Structuralism does, sits between the
signifier and the signified. "The sign is not so much a unit with two sides,
as a momentary 'fix' between two moving layers" (Selden, 1985, p. 73).
1o Post-Structuralism there are no signifieds, only endless chains of
signifiers. Meaning is apt to slip as signifiers enmesh with each other in
the matrix of language. Post-Structuralists argue "that the sign is not
stable, that there is an indeterminacy or undecidability about meaning
and that it is subject to slippage from signifier to signifier" (Rice & Waugh,
1996, p. 116). In the absence of the signified, Post-Structuralism
applauds the play of textual signification and, unlike Structuralism, does
not propound a monolithic 'methodology'. It operates from the premise
that there are nv referential points by which to determine meaning, hence
it "tries to deflate the scientific pretensions of structuralism" (Selden,
1985, p. 72). Meaning is found not only in difference, as the Structuralists
argued, but is also infinitely deferred. Textual meaning:
is always somehow suspended, something deferred or still to
come: one signifier relays me to another, and that to another
... and although the sentence may come to an end the process
oflanguage itself does not. (Eagleton,1983, p. 128)
Post-Structurlilists relish in digging beneath the surface of t.lJ.e text
as they are concerned with the difference between what a text says and
what it purports to say. Selden (1985) observes that they tend to ask
questions rather than provide answers, make the text work against itself,
and refuse to make it mean something: "We may be irritated by the poststructuralists' failure to arrive at conclusions, but they are only being
consistent in their attempts to avoid logocentrism" (p. 102). In a PostStructuralist world "we can never quite close our fists over meaning,
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which arises from the fact that language is a temporal process"
(Eagleton. 1983. p. 128). In Post-Structuralism "everything is to be
disentangled. nothing deciphered" (Barthes. 1996a, p. 121). Barthes

describes this process as like following a thread in a stocking (p. 122).
There is no beginning and no end, only traces of the journeying. Meaning:
is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain of signifiers: it
cannot be easily nailed down, it is never fully present in any
one sign alone, but is rather a kind of constant flickering of
presence and absence together. (Eagleton, 1983, p. 128)
For Post-Structuralists the restrictions imposed by language
cannot be escaped, hence their emphasis on the decentred (world, self, and
text). There are no points of contact between signifiers and signifieds to
produce signs, resulting in an absence of stable reference points by which
to determine anything with any certainty. With no fixed points from which
to view the world it becomes a "gravity-free universe, without upside down
or right way up" (Barry, 1995, p. 62). Although Post-Structuralism can
seem painfully devastating and rupturing as it undermines logocentrism it
can be viewed positively:
Post-structuralism's iconoclastic nature can be uplifting. One
might grieve the passing of textual absolutes and the tradition
of critical reading they supported, but there must also be room
for the euphoric giddiness produced by Barthesian readings,
which illustrate the potential for creativity unleashed by the
playing oftext. (Moon, 1990, p. 20)
One could also add Derridean interpretations to this PostStructuralist pre-occupation with the giddy play of language within the
text. While the early Barthes is associated with Structuralism, the later
Barthes, like Derrida, is considered a major exponent of PostStructuralism. In particular, Derrida's ideas contributed strongly to the
development of Post-Structuralism, which in some instances "has almost
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become synonymous with the name of Derrida and the mode of analysis
he inaugurates- 'deconstructionm (Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 114). Derrida's
emphasis on the "joyous affirmation of the play of the world" (Derrida,
1978, p. 292) celebrates a liberation of the text from logocentrism just as
Barthes' death of the author celebrates a liberation of the text from the
clutches of the "Author-God" (Barthes, 1996a, p.121). However, PostStructuralism "is not a homogeneous entity" (Moon, 1990, p. 8) and this
makes definition difficult but also facilitates the various, sometimes
antithetical, theoretical directions. For example, according to Barthes
(1996a) it is in the reader that a text's unity lies: "the birth of the reader
must be at the cost of the death of the Author" (p. 122). In contrast,
Foucault (1984b) is interested in what the author ;deologically represents,
warning that "we must locate the space left empty by the author's
disappearance" and watch for what fills these gaps (p. 105).
In addition to Post-Structuralism, some of the many other areas of

modern literary theory include Marxism, Feminism, Post-Modernism, and
Post-Colonialism. The great expanse of modern literary theory is not
contained or static. It continually expands as new ideas are presented,
older approaches are re-appraised, or existing theories are fused together
or split still further. From the plethora of theories available Derrida's "two
interpretations of interpretation" is considered a particularly valuable
approach for reading literature in Religious Education. It has been
demonstrated that Religious Education has responded to developments in
other fields of human learning and there is no reason why it should not
also respond to developments in modern literary theory. This thesis is
very much situated in the literary critical arena.

Developmenta in Engliah Education
The way in which literature is read and studied in English has been
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strongly influenced by modem literary theory. Cohan and Shires ( 1988)
discuss narratives and the way they "structure the meanings by which a
culture lives" (p. 1). In an examination of Saussurean linguistics they
demonstrate that in a discourse a sign can disrupt as well as facilitate the
passage of meaning because "the relation of signifier to signified is
unstable" (p. 19). Medway and Stibbs (1990) argue that because the text
is a signifier it is neither a window on the world nor a reflection of it. They
discuss how deconstruction reveals a text's pretendedness and

encourages an "awareness of the textuality of text" (p. 78).
Gilbert (1991) e':plores narrative as a social practice that needs to
be placed in a socialllanguage framework to see its role in regulating social
meaning. She observes that stories "take place within a particular
cultural semiotic" and discusses the way both narratives and narrators

are "socially and culturally situated" (p. 38). Burgess (1988) is also
concerned with the social framework of language and text and argues for
"renewed attention to classroom discou, se, guided by a social view of
language and development" (p. 167). Freebody, Luke, and Gilbert (1990)
are interested in the social construction of reading, emphasizing the way
in which texts can operate to conceal their ideologies by covertly
positioning readers so that the apparently 'natural' organization of
material "authorizes particular ideologies" (p. 441).
O'Neill (1990) discusses the promotion of resistant readings, and
advocates 'molesting' the text to alert students to the constructedness of
texts and the cultural values endorsed by them (p. 90). Mellor, O'Neill and
Patterson (1990) investigate the need for new types of questions to be
asked in order to show that texts are not a slice of life nor a reflection of it.
Such questions also reveal the wconstructedness' of a text", the "plurality
of a text's meaning" (p. 9), and how "language constructs particular
versions of reality" (p. 4). Corcoran (1992) examines the Cultural Critical
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practice used in :O:nglish to construct critical readers rather than
responsive readers. He considers teaching methods where the teacher
sees his/her role as "unravelling the one true meaning" of the text or as
"curator of canonic treasures" are problematic (p. 72).
O'Neill (1993) investigates Cultural Criticism, which "derives from
post-structuralist literary theory and linguistic theories in which language
is regarded as a construct that assigns meaning arbitrarily" (p. 20).
Language, texts, and readings are seen as culturally constructed:
Practices which promote the capacity see the text as a
construction, rather than as a reflection of reality, allow
readers space in which to challenge the bases of the
construction, rather than accepting it as given. (p. 24)
O'Neill discusses how different readings privilege or suppress particular
ideas or values. "Different ideologies construct different relationships
between the writer, the text, and the reader in terms of production and
legitimation of meaning" (p. 19). Cultural Criticism asks such questions
as: "What are possible readings of the text? How are readings of character
constructed?" (p. 20). O'Neill argues that this approach to literature seeks
to construct critical readers instead of responsive readers because
"responsive readers are prisoners of the text, while critical readers have
the option to resist the text and take up alternative, even oppositional,
reading positions" (p. 24). Cultural Criticism allows for a multiplicity of
meaning. It does not detract from what may be considered the preferred
reading but furnishes a variety of readings. Meaning, in either text or
society, is not final or absolute. The Cultural Critical practice conc'<iers
"reading is a learned practice of making meanings" (p. 19) and !.alps
students to understand that society, text, and meaning are ccnstructs
and meaning is culturally defined. Fnr O'Neill, personal growth towards
wholeness and meaning does not take place in a vacuum but in society:
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Texts, rather than being regarded as the repositories of
putative meanings or as offering universal statements dbout
the human condition, can be perceived as culturally located
artifacts, potential sites for the production of competing or
conflicting meanings. (p. 24)
Understanding the interrelationship between tbe individual and society is
vital in any quest for meaning and purpose in life.

The influence of modern literary theory on how English is taught
impacts directly on English Education in Western Australia. Since the
1980's there has been an emphasis in English Education on developing
critical readers and fostering an understanding that a "text is a

construction, not a reflection of reality that is 'truem (O'Neill, 1990, p. 93).
Intertextuality now forms part of year eleven and twelve literature
courses and is an examinable part of tbe Literature TEE examination. In
tbe Draft Curriculum Framework for Kindergarten to Year 12 Education
in Western Australia (1997) the learning 11rea statement for English
states that language "is influenced by the context of its production ....
[and) influences the context and how it is perceived" (p. 6). In English
"students learn . . . that language operates as a social process" (p. 74).
While English still necessarily includes functional literacy as one of its
main aims, it also includes critical literacy, which involves:
knowledge about language and how it works, . . . . an
understanding that language is a dynamic social process, ...
an awareness that the meaning of any form of communication
depends on context, purpose and audience .... [and an) ability
to reflect on and critically analyse one's own use of language
and tbe language of others. (p. 75)
The Draft Curriculum Framework is indicative of the fact that English
orientates itself towards developing student understanding and awareness
oftbe constructedness oflanguage, text, readings, and meanings.
As with developments in Religious Education, particularly
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Grimmitt's work, developments in English Education concerning
treatment of the text and meaning were also seminal in suggesting a
possible direction for this theois. Through an investigation of the value of
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" for reading literature in
Religious Education, this thesis is very much a part of the continuing
development of the impact of modern literary theory on how literature is
read. There are compelling reasons why modern literary theory should
also be of interest to teachers of Religious Education. A situation where a
student has to 'learn' that reading literature in English means utilizing
certain approaches to texts but has to employ quite different approaches
to texts in Religious Education would be educationally untenable.
Moreover, the application of modern literary theory has the potential to
considerably enrich the reading of literature li1 Religious Education rather
than undermine it or hijack its pre-eminent concern with the search for
meaning and purpose.
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CHAPTER THREE

Methodology: Derridean Post-Structuralism
Derrida's theoretical output is vast and complex and has
significantly impacted on modern literary theory as a whole, though he is
primarily linked with Post-Structuralism. Derrida "has been seen as
almost synonymous with the post-structuralist enterprise ... [and] is
perhaps best known for inaugurating 'deconstructionm (Rice & Waugh,
1996, p. 173). While the methodology utilized in this thesis stems
generally from Post-Structuralism, the particular direction taken is that
ofDerrida's "two interpretations ofinterpretation" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292).
Although Post-Structuralism's concern with the impossibility of final
meaning is contrary to Religious Education's concern with the search for
definitive meaning Dert'ida furnishes an ap;oroach to reading literature
that accommodates both of these oppositional positions. By examining A
Wizard ofEarthsea using Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation"
its value as a methodological approach for reading literature in Religious
Education is effectively demonstrated. In this thesis the methodology also
necessarily incorporates and builds upon recent developments in Religious
Education and English Education.
Derrida is often cited as the instigator of Post-Structuralism.
Indeed, its "starting point ... may be taken as his 1966 lecture Structure,
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (Barry, 1995, p.
66). This lecture was delivered at a conference at Johns Hopkins
University intended to introduce Structuralism to American intellectuals
and academics. "In fact, and prim !lrily in the person of Derrida himself,
the conference was announcing not the advent of structuralism, but its
demise" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 9), and the advent of Post-Structuralism.
For both Derrida and Post-Structuralism in general the world is
considered decentred: there is a decentring of world and self and text: "we
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cannot know where we are, since all the concepts which previously defined
the centre ... have been 'deconstructedm (Barry, 1995, p. 62). Barry uses
an apt analogy to explain how in this decentred world there is a lack of
reference poinL' by which to know anything with certainty:
Without a fixed point of reference against which to measure
movement you cannot tell whether or not you are moving at
dll. You have probably at some time had the experience of
sitting in a stationary train with another train between
yeurself and the far platform. When that train begins to move
you may have the sensation that it is your train which is
moving and only realise this isn't so when the other train has
gone and you again see the fixed point of the platform. (p. 61)
Post-Structuralism is concerned with the textual play of signification and
the provisional nature of meaning. It is considered by both Derrida and
Post-Structuralists that it is not possible to escape the restrictive
parameters of language, hence the impossibility of the existence of both
the signified and absolute meaning. Post-Structuralists occupy their time
and energy"tracing the insistent activity of the signifier as it forms crosscurrents of meaning with other signifiers and defies the orderly
requirements of the signified" (Selden, 1985, p. 73). In the PostStructuralist world-view there can be nothing 'outside' language so
investment in concepts that rely on a logocentric outlook are rejected.
Post-Structuralism and the Derridean position challenge "not only
Saussurean structuralism but aU discourses which purport to be
grounded in values external to their own structures" (Moon, 1990, p. 14).

The Derridean Position
Derrida discusses his two interpretative positions in his prestigious
paper Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences:
There are . . . two interpretations of interpretation; of
structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams
of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the
order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of
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interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned
toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man
and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being
who, ... throughout his entire history - has dreamed of full
presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of
play. (Derrida, 1978, p. 292)
One interpretative position Derrida terms the Rousseauistic
interpretation, which seeks the centre (searches for the signified), and the
other is the Nietzschean interpretation, which affirms free play (free play
of endless chains of signifiers). It is crucial to an understanding of
Derrida's two interpretative positions to follow his movement from a
logocentric world in which the centre of the structure was fixed to a world
where this way of thinking was shattered.
Derrida views the episteme, the entire Western tradition of
scientific and philosophical thought, as caught up in determining
fundamental principles hy fixing centres into every structure. The centre
functioned "not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure ... but
above sll to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would
limit what we might call the play of the structure" (Derrida, 1978, p. 278).
The centre, according to Derrida, permits play of elements within the
structure because it orients and organizes the coherence of the system,
but the centre also closes off play because it stabilizes the structure: • At
the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements ... is
forbidden" (Derrida, 1978, p. 279). The centre is both inside and outside
the structure: it fixes the structure from the inside but authenticates the
meaning of the structure from the outside. The centre "cannot be
implicated in the very languages which it attempts to order and anchor: it
must be somehow anterior to these discourses" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 131).
Because the centre is both foundational to the structure and the source of
authority for meaning in that structure it must be beyond the structure.
The centre "governs the structure but is itself not subject to structural
33

analysis (to find the structure of the centre would he to find another
centre)" (Selden, 1985, p. 84).
Derrida points to the Western preoccupation with the centre as
clearly evident in the drive to find fundamental principles. He views
thought systems as metaphysical if they depend on "an unassailable
foundation, a first principle or unimpeachable ground upon which a whole
hierarchy of meanings can be constructed" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 132). The
centre has historically received different names in the Western concept of
structure and "must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center
for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center" (Derrids,
1978, p. 279). As each new thought system became established a new
centre replaced the old centre but whatever form the centre took it
always centred on the human. In the West there are "innumerable terms
which operate as centering principles: being, essence, substance, truth,
form, beginning, end, purpose, consciousness, man, God, and so on"

(Selden, 1985, p. 84). The Derridean concept of centre always represents
a fixed point and always points to a presence, which is seen as outside the
structure or system. Derrids (1978) argues that the matrix of Western
thought, particularly metaphysics, is "the determination of Being as

presence .... [All] names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the
center have always designated an invariable presence" (p. 279).
For Derrida thought systems are logocentric if they rely on a
metaphysics of presence which validates the centre, thereby fixing
meaning that is beyond questioning. Culler (1983) considers alllogocentric
concepts "involve a notion of presence" and in oppositional pairs such as:
positive/negative, transcendental/empirical, ... the superior
term belongs to the logos and is a higher presence; the inferior
term marks a fall. Logocentrism thus assumes the priority of
the first term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a
complication ... or a disruption of the first. (p. 93)
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The dual function of the centre was to determine meaning and validate it
by referring to a presence outside the structure for its authority, thereby
placing it beyond debate. Logocentrism yearns for the sign which will
furnish meaning to all other signs"- the 'transcendental signifier'- and for
the anchoring, unquestionable meaning to which all our signs can be seen
to point (the transcendental signified')" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 131). Fixing
linguistic meaning within the structure places it beyond play: it becomes
'the' meaning, at lea'"': until a new centre replaces the old one. The centre
operates to restrict "the text's potential to mean" (Moon, 1990, p. 16).
Derrida points to an historical 'event' (the process of decentring
logocentric thought patterns) that ruptured this safe and reassuring way
of thinking, after which language was seen as preceding and producing
meaning and reality. "Derrida sees in modern times a particular
intellectual 'event' which constitutes a radical break from past ways of
thought" (Barry, 1995, p. 66). Derrida (1978) considers this 'event':
was the moment when language invaded the universal
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or
origin, everything became discourse ... that is to say, a
system in which the central signified, the original or
transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a
system of differences. (p. 280)
While Derrida (1978) describes the movement away from a logocentric
way of thinking and seeing the world as an event or rupture he also
considers it symptomatic of an historical era and specifically links it with
a number ofinfluential thinkers, includint
the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the
concepts of Being and truth, for which were substituted the
concepts of play, interpretation, and sign ... ; the Freudian
critique of ... consciousness ...; and, more radically, the
Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics. (p. 280)
Central to Derridean theory are the distinctions made between a
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logocentric world, in which the structure's centre both determined
meaning and referred to a presence outBide the structure for it." authority,
and a world where such intellectual frames of reference were severely
fra~ented.

If there is no direct correlation between the signifier and the

signified, and if the text "cannot be legitimately grounded in external
points of origin, how then can we arrive at final, complete meanings? The
simple answer is that we cannot" (Moon, 1990, p. 16). After the 'event'
the world was decentred, without fixed reference point or absolute
meaning. The centre, which had previously 'operated' the structure like an
axis or drive-shaft and 'fixed' it in place like a lynch pin or key stone, was
no more. In this new world there are "no absolutes or fixed points, so that
the world we live in is 'decentred' or inherently relativistic. Instead of ... a
known centre, all we have is 'free play'" !Barry, 1995, p. 67).
The rupturing of logocentric thought patterns does not indicate
that the centre, which used to exist, no longer exists but that
logocentrism fostered the illusion that there were such things as centres
in the first place. Nevertheless, even rejecting logocentrism it is not
possible to completely move beyond the use of centring principles that
are reflected in such terms as God, Word, consciousness, and truth.
Indeed, "Derrida does not assert the p•ossibility of thinking outside such
terms; any attempt to undo a particular concept is to become caught up
in the terms which the concept depends on" (Selden, 1985, p. 84). It is not
possible to return to a 'before-this-event' position, hence the sadness and
anxiety associated with the loss of the centre. The loss of the ideal of
logocentrism implies the impossibility of the centre and therefore of
meaning itself. After the 'event' Derrida (1978) points to a world where:
it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center,
that the center could not be thought in tlhe form of a presentbeing, tlhat the center had no natural site, that it was not a
fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an
infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. (p. 280)
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Accepting the world as decentred does not mean that logocentric concepts
'cannot' exist, but that they cannot be 'proved' to exist and should
therefore not be invested in. "People desire a centre because it guarantees
bein{!as presence" (Selden, 1985, p. 84). Nevertheless, for Derrida (1987):

Logocentrism is ... fundamentally, an idealism. It is the
matrix of idealism. Idealism is its most direct representation,
the most constantly dominant force. And the dismantling of
logocentrism is simultaneously- a fortiori ·a deconstitution of
idealism or spiritualism in all their variants. (p. 51)
Once the transcendental signified is accepted as being absent the
reign of play marks a new epoch. Play is "equivalent to an absence, the
absence of a founding origin ... [but functions to] cross, somehow envelop
and exceed the question of being" (Haar, 1992, p. 63). Meaning, instead of
being absolute as in a logocentric world, becomes disseminated along
chains of signifiers. For Derrida and Post-Structuralists "meaning is not
something located within a text; rather, it is a thing chased through a
text. It is not an ending but a journeying" (Moon, 1990, p. 17). Derrida
(1978) describes the methodology of play as "the disruption of presence"
(p. 292). The metaphysics of presence demands an escape from play that
is achieved by the centre closing off play other than the play of elements
that forms the invested and transcendentally signified. Bass (cited in
Haar, 1992, p. 63) observes that "the concept of play ... announces ...
the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end". In the web
oftextuality the play of multiple chains of signifiers is never-ending.
It is the contrast between the 'before' and 'after', between the

logocentric and decentred worlds, that is reflected in the contrast between
the 'restricted' play of the Rousseauistic position and the free play of the
Nietzschean position. Although Derrida rejects logocentrism, he does
acknowledge that the human desire for meaning, even security of belief, is
understandable. On the basis of the certitude afforded by logocentric
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thought systems, observes Derrida (1978), "anxiety can be mastered" (p.
279). Nevertheless, Derrida applauds the free play that is only possible at
the edge of the linguistic abyss of Post-Structuralism where play "is
always play of absence and presence" 0978, p. 292). The interpretative
contrast Derrida makes is represented by the binary opposition between
Rousseau and Nietzsche. Hart (1991) observes that this dichotomy could
just as easily have been between the standard oppositional pairing of
Kant and Nietzsche (p. 118) What is import.ant to note is that Derrida is
drawing a contrast between grounded (Rousseauistic) and ungrounded
(Nietzschean) modes of interpretation that are clearly inverse to each
other.
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" ensures a

methodological approach for reading literature in Religious Education that
encompasses both the search for the centre (the Rousseauistic
interpretation) and the play of signifiers (the Nietzschean interpretation).
The Derridean approach fosters a much broader consideration of meaning
and the meaning-making process than would be possible with only
pursuing either the Rousseauistic or the Nietzschean interpretation.
Culler (1981) observes of interpretative entanglements and
disagreements that "to understand the ambiguity or openness of literary
meaning, one must study the reading process. No other area of literary
criticism offers such an interesting and valuable program" (p. 79). By
pursuing two different reading processes, or interpretative positions, a
valuable and challenging encounter with the text is guaranteed that
ensures an accommodation of both the search for absolute meaning and
the play of many provisional meanings.

The Rousseauistie Interpretation
This interpretation dreams of finding the centre. In practice its
application for reading literature results in a process seeking to centre the
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structure of the text. For example, in A Wizard of Earthsea this process
can be seen in centring the novel on the concepts of the Jungian shadow
or Taoist balance. Derrida terms this position Rousseauistic because of
his reading of Rousseau's philosophical stance concerning language and
origins. "Rousseau is preeminently the philosopher of origins, one who
sought by every possible means to restore language to a natural state of
simplicity, innocence and grace" (Norris, 1987, p. 103). Rousseau looked
back to an idyllic time of humans living in a 'natural' state of grace, before
civilization wrought social evils. "Rousseau wants to think that there is
(or once was) a perfect adjustment between man's social and his natural
needs" (Norris, p. 107).
Hence, in his Rousseauistic interpretation Derrida (1978) sees this
position as one that "seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or
an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign" (p. 292). In this
backward looking stance there is a melancholy longing for the lost centre,
for the ideal oflogocentrism. Derrida calls such an interpretative position
sad because he sees it as seeking certainty that is simply not possible
given the constraints of the linguistic world that humans inhabit. Implicit
in this backward looking stance towards the lost centre is the belief in the
existence of a centre in the first place. The Rousseauistic interpretation is
necessarily separated from what it seeks, hence the sad longing for the
centre and the nostalgic dreams of deciphering a truth, "the full presence,
the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play" (Derrida, 1978,
p. 292). Similar to Derrida's view of the Rousseauistic interpretation as
sad and negative is Nietzsche's description of philosophical perspectives
that rely on the transcendental. Nietzsche describes as:
'woeful wisdom' any view that rates life inferior to some
supposed transcendental state. All such views - that is to say,
almost all the great philosophies and religions of the human
past- link life's meaning to fulfillment in an imaginary beyond.
(Novak,1996,p. 19)
39

While Derrida considers the Rousseauistic position sad he is not,
however, actually saying that there is no transcendental signified; there
may or may not be. What Derrida is saying is that it cannot be proved to
exist from within the parameters of Post-Structuralist linguistics. As a
process, then, while a Taoist reading of A Wizard ofEarthsea may appeal

to Taoism as the transcendental signified by which to understand the
text's meaning, Taoism itself cannot be proved to exist outside language.
The Rousseauistic interpretation represents the logocentric impulse that
looks for the centre, or origin, or truth of the structure. Derrida considers:
this Rousseauist mythology of origins and presence still very
much at work in the modern sciences of man. And nowhere
more so, he argues, than in structuralist thinking about
language, society and cultural history. (Norris, 1987, pp. 127128)
In Religious Education there is a heavy investment in reading

literature in a way that affirms foundations and uses the centre to fix a
structure and provide definitive meaning. Such an interpretative stance,
which is rejected by Derrida and Post-Structuralism, operates on "the
idea that texts are validated by something outside themselves, that they
serve as pointers for concepts separable from their own structures"
(Moon, 1990, p. 15). The methodology involved in reading a text from the
Rousseauistic interpretation is a process directed at deciphering 'the'
meaning in its search for the transcendental signified. For example, as
applied to A Wizard of Earthsea this search for the transcendental
signified suggests either a Taoist centre or a Jungian centre. Although
Derrida considers the Rousseauistic interpretation sad he does, however,
acknowledge the human need for fixing centres in structures in order to
give meaning and assurance. The logocentric impulse to centre structures
furnishes certitude which helps master anxiety (Derrida, 1978, p. 279).
The Rousseauistic position necessitates an end to any potential
40

play within the structure. In addition to escaping from play there is also
an escape from the order of the sign since it is presence as Being that is

desired and not affirmation of infinitely variable signs where, in essence.
there is no finite meaning. For Derrida (1978). this interpretation is
turned "towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this
structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened.
negative. nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play" (p.

292). Bernasconi (1992) notes that, for Derrida, Rousseau is seen as
concerned with conceiving and promoting concepts that bear the
metaphysical mark of preoence, hence the Derridean description of the
Rousseauistic interpretation as concerned with the presence of Being:
Derrida regards Rousseau as always wanting to opt for the
chain of concepts that beard the mark of presence . . . .
Rousseau is thus understood in terms of a contemporary
discourse ... that identifies Western metaphysics with the
priority of presence. (p. 144)
The Rousseauistic interpretation relies on a metaphysics of presence
which not only validates the centre but also fixes meaning that is beyond
questioning. Meaning is thus determined by the centre, which also refers
to a presence external to the structure for its authority.
Although human history attests to the drive towards locating a
firm foundation that gives reassurance and stability, Derrida considers
such positioning idealistic. Norris (1987) observes that "bound up with
the :Rousseauist mystique of origins and presence .... [is] the supposed
evils of modern 'civilized' existence cut off from the primitive state of
commtmal grace" (p. 122). In his philosophy Rousseau looks back to an
idyllic state of the 'noble savage', now lost to modern society. Hence,
Derrida's description of the Rousseauistic interpretation as negative
because it is concerned with the presence of what is absent. Moreover, in
seeking that which is now rendered idealistic and absent this
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interpretative position "lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile"

(Derrida, 1978, p. 292). Derrida does not favour this position because he
feels it is sad, negative, and exiled since it is necessarily removed from

what it seeks. However, what religious educators would seek to add is
that there is 'hope' and 'faith' that 'something' beyond this world does exist
even if it cannot be proved to exist; in addition to sadness, exi]e, and

negativity, then, there is faith and within this is affirmation and joy. As a
methodological process the value of this interpretation for reading
literature in Religious Education, as illustrated in Chapter Four with
reference to A Wizard of Earthsea, lies in its pre-eminent concern with
the search for definitive meaning and as such it becomes one of the
"tnyriad ways in which meaning ... is sought" (supra vide, p. 11).
Application of the Rousseauistic interpretation undertaken in this
thesis involves a process of examining A Wizard of Earthsea for ways in
which the text can be centred and definitive meaning sought. ln the
classroom the teacher would direct the reading process. having previously
decided how the text will be read and interpreted. However, in this study
several examples of the Rousseauistic interpretation of the novel have
been selected to illustrate the type ofRousseauistic interpretation likely
to be chosen by the Religious Education teacher and to demonstrate this

Derridean interpretative position in operation. Chapter Four contains a
study of the novel from the Jungian concept of the shadow and the Taoist
concept of balance, which are the most obvious examples of this
interpretation that the reader will encounter.
The Rousseauistic interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea is
accomplished by closely reading and studying the text as either a story
about Ged who finally recognizes and accepts his dark side in his journey
towards wholeness or a story about Ged who learns about the
importance of balance in his journey towards a holistic and balanced life.
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The novel so 'naturally' lends itself to either of these readings that they
'appear' to constitute its 'meaning'. Both examples centre the structure of
the text by appealing to an external authority (Jungian psychology or
Taoism) to validate the sought-after definitive meaning. In centring the
novel in this way any potential play is closed off. The Rousseauistic
interpretation of the novel as exemplified in Chapter Four indicates the
logocentric impetus to search for absolute meaning.
In this thesis the methodological process of applying the
Rousseauistic interpretation is achieved by centring the novel, which
limits the focus, confines the possibilities, and restricts the reading
process. The examples used in Chapter Four demonstrate how the text
can be read and interpreted in a directed, contained, and closed manner.
This methodological process would translate into a teaching process that
is narrowly focussed and directed. Approaching A Wizard of Earth sea as
illustrated in Chapter Four reflects the type of Rousseauistic
interpretative approach that could he utilized by the Religious Education
teacher in selecting and directing the teaching and interpretation of the
novel. This process is a grounded interpretation that closes the novel by
centring the text in the search for definitive meaning.

The Nietzschean Interpretation
Derrida sees in Nietzsche a rejection of logocentrism, of absolute
truths and meanings. For Nietzsche there "is only a perspective seeing,
only a perspective 'knowing' (Novak, 1996, p. 49). Nietzsche was

interested in truth, perception, and language. He considered that "people
first decide what they want and then fit the facts to their aim:
'Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported
into them'" (Selden, 1985, p. 98). Nietzschean philosophy points to the
error of 'false' causality. Although it is generally believed that causation is
understood Nietzsche asks "but whence did we derive our ... belief we
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possessed this knowledge? From the realm of the celebrated 'inner facts',
none of which up till now been shown to be factual" (Novak, 1996, p. 63).
Nietzsche radically upset the Western pre-occupation with causality and
its insistence on providing explanations, reasons, and origins. Culler

(1983) outlines Nietzsche's ideas on "the concept of causal structure [as]
... the product of precise tropological or rhetorical operation" (p. 86).
Nietzsche also undermined the Western historical perspective in his
concept of 'false' causality. Foucault (1984a) discusses Nietzsche's
understanding of history as involving a rejection of cause-and-effect
continuity and instead an emphasizing of its responding to "haphazard
conflicts" (p. 88) and its "affirmation of knowledge as perspective" (p. 90).
Niet.zsche (1977) attacked temporal ideas regarding causality, arguing
that cause and effect as "a duality probably never occurs" and is not a
continuum but "a capricious division and fragmentation" (p. 62).
Nietzsche's renouncement of logocentric thought patterns
constituted a powerful and wrenching influence on subsequent thinking.
Kung (1980) observes of Nietzsche that he "pierced through to the
foundations of human knowledge and questioned them as no one had done
before him. No one has equalled him in the acuteness, depth, and
radioalness of his thought" (p. 410). It is not surprising, then, that Derrida
should call his radical interpretation of interpretation after Nietzsche.
This Derridean interpretative position, as with Post-Structuralist thought
in general, reflects Nietzsche's "famous remark 'There are no facts, only

interpretations'" (Barry, 1995, p. 63). Such interpretations are
"orchestrated by the will to power" (Novak, 1996, p. 11). In Nietzschean
philosophy Derrida found an understanding of the limitations oflanguage:
Every candidate for 'truth' must first be expressed in
language, and language, Nietzsche reminds us, is notoriously
unable to get at reality. It oversimplifies and distorts,
concealing at least as much as it reveals. (Novak, 1996, p.
10).
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Nietzsche's concern with the problems and restrictions oflanguage
can be seen reflected in the playful approach U> language so central to
Derrida's Nietzschean interpretative position. Derrida describes this
position as not concerned with trying to find centres but rather with the
impossibility of meaning contained in the endless chains of signifiers. The
Nietzschean position, "which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms
play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism" (Derrida, 1978, p.
292). There is a rejection of, and movement beyond, anthropocentricism
to a position that neither seeks the centre nor centres on the human but

exhibits a "joyous affirmation of the play of the world" (Derrida, 1978, p.
292). Such play is only possible without the centre. In the concept of play
Derrida refers to the ideas of Nietzsche for whom "reason has no
foundation other than the play of the non-ground ofinterpretation" (Hart,
1991, p. 73). Nietzsche denied the existence of truth considering it "the
name we give to that which agrees with our instinctual preferences; it is
what we call our interpretation of the world, especially when we want to
foist it on others" (Novak, 1996, p. 11). His rejection of 'truth' attacked
the foundations oflogocentric thought. Nietzsche "raises the question of
truth ... more radically than anyone before him" (KUng, 1980, p. 383).
The Nietzschean interpretation does not celebrate a lost centre
but affirms the noncentre: "This affirmation then determines the noncenter
otherwise than as wss of the center" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292). It does not

seek to re-centre the human in another way because such centring is
deemed an illusion. Nor is this position interested in re-gaining the lost
centre because it does not consider there ever was a centre, it just looked
as though there was. Nietzsche challenged the logocentric pursuit of
origins: "What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the
inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of things. It is
disparity" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 79). Derrida sees in Nietzsche's rejection
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of origins a joyous affirmation of the noncentre. For Derrida (1978), then,
the Nietzschean interpretation is positive, an:

affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the
world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a
world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin
which is offered to an active interpretation. (p. 292)
Such positive affirmation in this interpretative position reflects the
Nietzschean

~Joyful

Wisdomm at the rejection of logocentrism and its

investment in transcendental signifieds (Novak, 1996, p. 19). Derrida
considers the 'event' that disrupt€d the logocentric world, as seen from the
Nietzschean position, as a joyous event because it facilitated free play. ln
Derridean terms 'play' enters a new era once the transcendental signified
is accepted as being absent: play is now "the disruption of presence"
(Derrida, 1978, p. 292). No security or reassurance is offered in this
position; play is risky, but is considered productive and pleasurable. The
Nietzschean interpretation "plays without security .... In absolute
chance, affirmation surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the

seminal adventure of the trace" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292).
In the Nietzschean position there is no longer a decipherment

based on a centre, on an authority that translates the meaning. Rather,
the emphasis is on the free play of signifiers. Nietzsche (1977) considered
that truth is entirely a matter of one's perspective and in his time saw a
giving way of absolute truth to a position where truth is relative (p. 9).
Hence the Derridean description of the Nietzschean interpretation as
concerned with deconstructing the text and exposing the free play of
endless chains of signifiers. The methodology involved in this
interpretation is a process concerned not with deciphering 'the' meaning,
as in the Rousseauistic interpretation, but with exploring the text's
multiple provisional threads of meaning. Derrida emphasizes the joy to be
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had in this affirmative position. "The absence of the transcendental
signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely"
(Derrida, 1978, p. 280). For Derrida there is an infinite impossibility of
meaning that underpins the ineffability of the deconstructive process of
the Nietzschean position: "What deconstruction is not? everything of
course! What is deconstruction? nothing of course!" (Wood & Bernasconi,

1988, p. 5).
Deconstruction,

Deconstruction is a typical Post-Structuralist mode of reading. It
seeks to show textual disunity by exposing the "textual 'subconscious'"
(Barry, 1995, p. 73). Deconstruction is concerned with reading the text
against itself and "is created by repetitions, deviatione, disfigurations"
(Culler, 1983, p. 228).

In practice the Nietzschean deconstructive

process fosters an oppositional reading of a text. This "is not a subverting
of the text but rather a demonstration that the text is already subverted
by its own language" (Moon, 1990, p. 18). Deconstruction, rather than
being a body of theories, is a practice, a process, a way of reading, even a

'methodology'. However, Derrida resists calling deconstruction "either a
'method', a 'technique' or a species of 'critique"' (Norris, 1987, p. 18).

Nevertheless, in practice deconstruction discloses itself as concerned with
revelation; that is, a process directed at revealing the unsaid in the text.
Caputo (1989) describes deconstruction as "a parasitic practice":
what it does is to inhabit the discourse of those who have
something to say and to make trouble for them. It needles its
way into the discourse of others and shows them h<>w much
trouble they have br<>ught upon themselves. Dec<>nstruction
does not want to deny that something exists, but only to show
the difficulty we have getting that said. (pp. 30-31)
While Derrida may shy at defining deconstruction, particularly as a
meth<>d, in practice his deconstructive work exhibits certain
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characteristics that are suggestive of a methodological process. For
example, Norris (1987) postulates a definition reflecting Derridean
deconstruction which sounds very much like a method:
deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those 'aporias',
blindspots or moments of self-contradiction where a text
involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic,
between what it manifestly means to say and what it is
nonetheless constraiMd to mean. (p. 19)
Much of Derrida's work involves close attention to texts which he
deconstructs, demonstrating that they are not the holistic and coherent
entities they are generally assumed to be. Derrida feels that his
"grammatological project .... must deconstruct everything that ties the
concept and norms of scientificity to onto-theology, logocentrism,
phonologism" (Derrida, 1987, p. 35). The Nietzschean interpretative
position can be utilized to deconstruct all texts, as well as point to
intertextuality between texts. Culler (1981) points out that although
Derrida's works involve a very close engagement with texts they rarely:
involve interpretations as traditionally conceiveu. There is no
deference to the integrity of the text . . . . Derrida . . .
concentrates on elements which others find marginal, seeking
not to elucidate what a text says but to reveal an uncanny
logic that operates in and across texts. (pp. 14-15)
Post-Structuralism maintains that language, rather than being
'solid', is actually liquid· "signs float free of what they designate, meanings
are fluid, and subject to constant 'slippage' or 'spillagem (Barry, 1995, p.
64). This results in marginal slips and spills which collapse the text
against its 'intended' meaning. Such slips and spills, or textual gaps, are
entrances into the text's sub-conscious. In practice, then, the process of
applying the Nietzschean interpretation results in a methodology that
concentrates exclusively on exposing textual gaps through which entry to
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the underside of any text, such as A Wizard of Earth sea, is facilitated.
Eagleton (1983) describes deconstruction as showing how oppositions
"are sometimes betrayed into inverting or collapsing themselves, or need
to banish to the text's margins certain niggling details which can be made
to return and plague them" (p. 133). It should be emphasized that
deconstruction is not actually destruction of the text and textual meaning.
Rather, it seeks to demonetrate that it is the fluid nature of language
which actually works against itself. Johnson (Salusinszky, 1987 J
observes that deconstruction "is not synonymous with destruction":
It is in fact much closer to the original meaning of the word
analysis, which etymologically means 'to undo' .... The deconstruction of a text ... [proceeds] by the careful teasing out
of warring forces of signification within the text. (pp. 164·165)
It is this unravelling of text that characterizes the deconstructive

process, which is sometimes referred to as "textual harassment" (Barry,
1995, p. 72). The Nietzschean interpretative position deconstructs a text,
for example A Wizard ofEarthsea, by a process of oppositional reading in
which the 'unified' face of the text is undermined by an unmasking of
textual conflicts, paradoxes, contradictions, and inconsistencies. Barry
notes that texts which were "previously regarded as unified artistic
artifacts are shown to be fragmented, self-divided, and centreless. They
always turn out to be representative of ... 'monstrous births'" (1995, p.
68). The previously unnoticed 'chasm' in the text can then be explored.
"Deconstruction can begin when we locate the moment when a text
transgresses the laws it appears to set up for itself' (Selden, 1985, p. 87).
Deconstruction demonstrates the irreducible plurality of text, which
underpins the plurality of textual meaning. This pluralism signals the
impossibility of absolute meaning, something that can give rise to what
Barry (1995) describes as "terminal anxieties" (p. 64). Moon (1990),
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however, tries to emphasize the positive potential of Post-Structuralism,
particularly the deconstructive process:
Deconstruction need not be destruction. What post·
structuralism does is to remind us that our cultural systems
and practices are not the seamless, self-evident entities we
take them for: they embody gaps and contradictions; they
perpetuate injustices even as they seek justice; their surfaces
have been worn sensuously smooth by years of use but their
internal contradictions remain. In language and in our cultural
systems we paper over these cracks so automatically that we
forget they are there. Deconstruction forces us to confront the
gaps, contradictions and inequalities in our society; whether or
not we then do something about them is up to us. (p. 21)
While no definitive meaning is achieved, as in the Rousseauistic position,
the Nietzschean interpretation 'plays' with the text, producing multiple
threads of provisional meaning. In this new Nietzschean world facts have
no guarantee. Instead there are interpretations which have no "stamp of
authority... since there is no longer any authorative centre to which to
appeal for validation of our interpretations" (Barry, 1995, p. 67).
The Nietzschean deconstructive process, by pursuing endless
chains of textual signifiers, facilitates the exploration of many provisional
meanings. Culler (1983) observes that deconstruction is not an end to
distinctions but as the "play of meaning is the result of what Derrida calls
'the play of the world', in which the general text always provides further
connections, correlations, and contexts" (p. 134). Deconstruction burrows
beneath the textual surface, exposing inconsistencies, playing with
meaning, and bringing "out what the text excludes by showing what it
includes" (Silverman, 1989, p. 4). The deconstruction of A Wizard of
Earthsea undertaken in Chapter Five burrows beneath the novel's
surface by looking for gaps and inconsistencies facilitated by such words
as ~sourcem or "power". This process is not something limited to textual
criticism but can be used as a methodological approach for exploring and
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analyzin~

many issues in life. Johnson (Salusinszky, 1987) suggests that

every time one is tempted:
to conclude what seems natural, or what seems satisfYing, or
what seems commonsensically true, you arrest your

movement towards that for a moment, and examine what you
are putting together .... [Even] to the point of as kin~ yourself,
'Could the opposite also be true?' (pp. 159-160)
Practising the deconstructive process in everyday life exposes what lies
beneath the surface of society, its institutions and practices. It could be
said of deconstruction that it is a valuable process, in that it facilitates a
unique method of examination, but in itself is of no particular value, in
that it reaches no conclusions, resolutions, or solutions. Perhaps the value
ofNietzschean deconstruction lies in its being, to return to Derrida, both
"everything" and "nothing" (Wood & Bernasconi, 1988, p. 5).
Deconstruction, then, is the Nietzschean interpretation in practice.
Derrida's reluctance to describe deconstruction as a methodology is
typical of much modern literary theory's aversion to being aligned with
any definitive sort of process or methodology, particularly of a prescribed
or 'scientific' nature. For example, Post-Structuralism rejects the
scientificity of Structuralist methodology. Nevertheless, in execution,
deconstruction can be seen as a methodological approach for textual
reading. As a process it applies the Nietzschean interpretation to the
practice of reading literature, or any 'text'. In application this
interpretation, as undertaken in Chapter Five, involves a process of
examining A Wizard of Earthsea for textual threads of provisional
meaning. In the Religious Education class;·oom both the teacher and
students would individually and corporately expose and pursue these
Nietzschean threads. For the purposes of this thesis, however, of the
infinite number of threads facilitated by the Nietzschean interpretation
this study examines only a sample to illustrate this interpretative
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position in operation. The material in Chapter Five, then, is expressive of
the deconstructive process as may he practised in the classroom and is
not indicative of definitive application.
The process involved in the Nietzschean interpretation of A Wizard
of Earthsea, unlike the process involved in the Rousseauistic
interpretation, is not directed and controlled by the teacher. Rather than
the one voice of the teacher determining how the novel is read and studied
the many voices of the students and teacher would deconstruct the novel
in a plethora of directions, resulting in a playful cacophony of provisional
meanings. Instead of a centred classroom it would be, in the process of
applying the Nietzschean interpretation, a decentred classroom.
As a methodological process the deconstruction of A Wizard of

Earthsea involves DU!'saing threads of meaning by selecting certain words
or phrases through which the text can be examined for gaps,
contradictions, and inconsistencies. In this way the apparent unity of the
novel is thrown into disarray, language is demonstrated to be unstable,
and the meaning-making process is explicated. Deconstruction proceeds
by a close textual analysis of the novel in which slips and oddities are
teased out and examined for a while. In Chapter Five discussions about
the contradictory use of the word "light", inconsistencies in the use of the
word "shadow", confusion over use of the word "dark", and gaps afforded
by the word "cast" facilitate an examination of the unsaid lurking in the
sub-conscious of the novel. As a methodological approach deconstruction
puts into practice the Nietzschean interpretation's emphasis on
decentring, on a playful approach to language, and on a concern with
provisional meaning. This process is necessarily always tentative and
incomplete as, by definition, it is infinite.
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CHAPI'ERFOUR

The Rousseauistic Interpretation in Practice
While Derrida's Rousseauistic interpretation can be used as a
methodological approach for reading any text, whether it be a newspaper
advertisement, a film, a play, or a sacred text, this examination will apply

to Le Guin's fantasy novel A Wizard of Earthsea (1993). From a close
textual analysis of this novel two of the most obvious Rousseauistic
interpretations would be Jungian, in the novel's concern with the concept
of the shadow, and Taoist, in the novel's concern with balance. Both these
Rousseauistic interpretations seek to centre the structure of the text.
The centre both determines meaning (whether the Jungian concept of the
shadow or the Taoist concept of balance) and refers to a presence outside
the structure for its authority (whether Jungian psychology or Taoism).
Such interpretations are extremely attractive to religious educators
because they are implicitly concerned with the search for meaning and
wholeness, and provide e. firm foundation on which to pursue this search.
However, from the Derridean perspective such firm foundations are only
possible in the Rousseaulstic approach because it affirms logocentrism
and denies the decentred world of Post-Structuralist theory.
iJgngian Shadow
In the Rousseauistic interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea that

seeks to centre the structure of the text by referring to Jungian
psychology the shadow would be seen as the centre (the truth) around
which the fantasy story revolves. The presence of the J1mgian concept of
the shadow in the novel has been noted by many critics, though Le Guin
claims not to have read Jung until after the publication of A Wizard of
Earthsea (Bucknall, 1984, p. 49). Nevertheless, having read Jung, Le
Guin agrees with him on the necessity to integrate the shadow and is very
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much concerned about the dangers of people denying their profound
relationship with evil because the shadow "is a tight passage, a narrow
door, whose painful constriction no one is spared" (Jung, 1991, p. 21).
For both Le Guin and Jung the shadow is the means whereby the
individual is able to achieve full potential and wholeness. The guide for this
journey "to self knowledge, to adulthood, to the light" is the shadow (Le
Guin, 1979, p. 65). For Le Guin the shadow "is the animal within us ...
the dark brother, the shadow soul" (p. 67). Echoing Jung, Le Guin deems
the shadow as "not simply evil. It is inferior, primitive, awkward,

artimallike, childlike; powerful, vital, spontaneous" (p. 64). In addition, Le
Guin feels it is her shadow that guides her in the discovery of her fictional
characters and worlds (pp. 59-71). Le Guin's ideas can be seen reflected in
Ged, whose shadow 'guides' him towards wholeness and balance.

Slusser (1976) discusses the origin of Ged's shadow as coming
"from within himself" (p. 36), while Cummins (1990) notes that Ged's
wholeness comes from recognizing both the good and evil within himself
(p. 37). Scholes (1986) observes of Ged that the "shadow was himself, his
own capacity for evil .... To become whole he had to face it ... and accept
it as part of himself" (p. 39). Shippey (1986) also considers that the
shadow is part ofGed, being "equal and opposite to the man who casts it",
and his wholeness comes from accepting it as a necessary part of himself
(p. 106). Lasseter (1979) points toLe Guin's concern with the dual nature
of humankind and the balancing of light and dark as the most religious
theme in her tales (p. 91), while Molson (1979) also comments on the
duality of human nature and the need to accept "oneself as a finite
creature made up of good and evil" (p. 135). Bittner (1984) discusses Ged's
shadow as "a helpful though fearful guide and an integral part of Ged's
Self" (p. 11) and Wood (1986) observes that forGed to control and accept
his shadow "he must journey ... into his own spirit" (p. 207).
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In Jungian psychology the shadow refers to those aspects of

personality and behaviour that are repressed by the ego. These repressed
traits are considered by the ego to be dark, inferior, and unacceptable.
"The development of the shadow runs parallel to that of the ego" (Jacobi,
1973, p. 110). AB the ego develops throughout childhood and adolescence
the shadow also develops. The act of repressing the shadow during
childhood is "a necessary protective function that allows ego development
to take place" (Cannon, 1985, p. 32). Where a problem with the shadow
does arise is when, as an adult, the act of repression is the major defence

mechanism in coping with faults and failings of the ego. There are five
areas that can be explored in terms of the Jungian concept of the shadow
and A Wizard of Earthsea. The shadow in both Jungian psychology and
the novel is dark and inferior, is projected onto others, needs to he
recognized and assimilated, is frightening, and is unrelenting.
(1)

The shadow is dark and inferior
The shadow in Jungian psychology is seen as containing inferior,

repressed, primitive, and vital aspects rejected by the ego. Moreno (1974)
sees the shadow as "the inferior personality made up of everything that
will not tit in with the laws and regulations of conscious life. It is a
darkness ... the hidden, repressed, and guilt-laden personality" (p. 3 9).
Jung describes the shadow as "the face we never show to the world"
(Jung, 1959, p. 304) and as containing "dark characteristics [and]
inferiorities" (Jung, 1971, p. 145). The shadow contains "unknown or littleknown attributes of the ego" and can indicate its existence:
in an impulsive or inadvertent act. Before one has time to
think, the evil rewark pops out, the plot is hatched, the wrong
decision is made, and one is confronted with results that were
never intended or consciously wanted. (Jung, von Franz,
Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, pp. 174-175)
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The shadow contains "repressed dispositions" and "rejected aspects of the
developing ego" which are experienced by the ego as liabilities (Stevens,
1990, p. 43). Nevertheless, the shadow, although a dark aspect of the self,
is an essential part of the individual and is not necessarily an evil entity.
It is "inferior and unadapted, not wholly bad .... but it also displays a

number of good qualities such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions,
realistic insights, and creative impulses" (Moreno, 1974, pp. 39-40).
Ged's shadow consists of his pride, arrogance, temper, and ambition
but also the impetus towards union and wholeness. Ged displays
considerable arrogance and desire for power in his thirst for knowledge.
Both as a new apprentice to Ogion and a student on Roke Ged's actions
indicate that deep within him lurks ambition and greed for power. When
first apprenticed to Ogion, Ged thinks this will be his entrance into a world
of power, but he is bitterly disappointed:
Ged had thought that as the prentice of a great mage he would
enter at once into the mystery and mastery of power. He
would understand the language of the beasts and the speech of
the leaves of the forest, he thought, and sway the winds with
his word, and learn to change himself into any shape he
wished. Maybe he and his master would run together as stags,
or fly toRe Albi over the mountsin on the wings of eagles.
Bnt it was not so at all .... They entered no mysterious
domain. Nothing happened . . . . [Ged) kept back his
resentment and impatience, and tried to be obedient, so that
Ogion would consent at last to teach him something. For he
hungered to learn, to gain power. (p. 25)

As a student on Rake, Ged is still greedy for power. He asks the Master
Hand how to lock changing-spells so that he can perform more than mere
tricks of illusion. However, the Master Hand merely:
looked down at the pebble again. 'A rock is a good thing, too,
you know,' he said, speaking less gravely. 'If the Isles of
Earthsea were all made of diamond, we'd lead a hard life here.
Enjoy illusion, lad, and let the rocks be rocks.' He smiled, but
Gedleftdissatisfied. (p. 48)
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In Ged's relationship to the daughter of the Lord ofRe Albi can also

be seen his desire for power as well as his pride. He is driven by a need to

impress and boast. Ged "had a desire to please her, to win her admiration"
(p. 28). He fears that she is mocking him and that she considers him
afraid. "That he would not endure. He did not say much, but he resolved
that he would prove himself to her" (p. 30). It is thls desire to impress and
not have his pride hurt that sends him off to look in Ogion's Lore-Book.
Ged's pride is also aburrdantly evident in his relationship to Jasper.
Ged desperately wants to show off hls powers to Jasper. "Ged's pride
would not be slighted or condescended to. He swore to prove to Jasper . . .
how great his power really was -some day" (p. 46). Also in his relationship
to Jasper can be discerned his temper. Ged has a dreadful temper that

erupts at the slightest feeling of injury: "The younger boys [were] used to
seeing his black temper break out at the least hint of slight or insult" (p.
61). His barely stifle<! rage at Jasper results in him challenging Jasper to
a duel in sorcery, something strictly forbidden on Roke (p. 60).
Repeatedly Ged's pride is referred to: Ogion says of Ged ,"'your
power is great. Greater even than your pride, I hopem (p. 32); Ged seeks
to "hide his ignorance and save his pride" (p. 46); "bolstering up hls [Ged's]

pride, he set his strong will on the work they gave him" (pp. 46-4 7); and,
Vetch says to Ged '"Pride was ever your mind's masterm (p. 146). This
pride is indicative of Ged's shadow, of his sin of hubris, as is his ambition
and desire for power. Ultimately, this leads to his undoing. After Ged has
released his shadow Lord Gensher severely reprimands him:
'And you were moved to do this by pride and hate. Is it any
wonder the result was ruin? You summoned a spirit from the
dead ... Uncalled it came from a place where there are no
names. Evil, it wills to work evil through you. The power you
had to call it gives it power over you: you are connected. It is
the shadow of your arrogance, the shadow of your ignorance,
the shadow you cast.' (p. 68)
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However, Ged's shadow does not only contain negative qualities. It
also displays live-saving instincts when as a boy Ged saves his village
from attack by the Kargad warriors (pp. 19-22). It is also from the
shadow that arises Ged's enormous power. After the loosing of his shadow
he is ill, and even after he has recovered his power is weak and clumsy:
The boys he had led and lauded over were all ahead of him now,
because of the months that he had lost, and that spring and
summer he studied with lads younger than himself. Nor did he
shine among them, for the words of any spell, even the
simplest illusion-charm, came halting from his tongue, and his
hands faltered at their craft. (p. 69)
It is the shadow's instinct of union with Ged that is strong, not the other
way around. After being released from Ged the shadow desperately clings
to him, but Ged is so terrified he screams (p. 64). The shadow, being
rejected, fought back but still "clung to Ged" (p. 64).
(2) The shadow is projected onto others
In Jungian psychology the shadow is projected onto other people of

the same sex. "The shadow appears ... in projections as when we burden
our neighbours with the faults we obviously have ourselves" (Moreno,
1974, p. 41). Shadow projection results in the opinion that it is the other
person who is lazy, proud, and irresponsible and not oneself. "That is why
the 'other fellow is always to blame' as long as we are not aware that the
darkness is in ourselves" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 113). If the projection of the
shadow continues unchallenged these projections eventually "change the
world into the replica of one's own unknown face" (Jung, 1971, p. 146).
Extreme emotional reaction (hate, jealousy, and the like) indicates
that the shadow has been projected. "We can tell that a weakness of our
own has been projected onto our neighbours when we notice in ourselves a
strong compulsion to correct or criticize their behaviour" (Cannon, 1985,
p. 34). It is only possible to deny that the shadow exists by projecting it
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onto others. In this way the individual denies any faults or failings but is
quick to criticize the other person onto whom has been projected the
shadow. Not only do "we deny the existence of our shadow and project it
onto others .... [but in] this way we deny our own 'badness' and project it
onto others, whom we hold responsible for it" (Stevens, 1990, p. 44). Even
when such projections may be obvious to others, the individual finds it
difficult to acknowledge what is happening. Jung (1971) considers:
No matter how obvious it may be to the neutral observer that
it is a matter of projections, there is little hope that the
subject will perceive this himself. He must be convinced that
he throws a very long shadow before he is willing to withdraw
his emotionally-toned projections from their object. (p. 146)
In his early relationship with Ogion can be seen an inkling of Ged's

projected shadow. He feels that Ogion's teaching makes a fool of him and
he "did not like to be made a fool of' (p. 26). However, Ged's respect for
Ogion prevents a major projection of his shadow. It is onto Jasper that
Ged projects his shadow with great ferocity from their first meeting (pp.
42-43). Ged considers that it is Jasper who is proud, aloof, hateful, and
boastful, not himself. Jasper elicits strong reactions from Ged, so much so
that even on convivial occasions of mirth among the students "like all
Jasper ever said to him, the jest set his teeth on edge• (p. 53). That Ged's
shadow has been projected onto Jasper is clear from his intense hatred
and rivalry towards Jasper. Ged is filled with a burning rage and swears:
to himself to outdo his rival, and not in some illusion match
but in a test of power. He would prove himself, and humiliate
Jasper .... Ged did not stop to think why Jasper might hate
him. He only knew why he hated Jasper .... Jasper stood
alone as his rival, who must be put to shame. (p. 49)
While Ged is still a student on Roke he asks the Master Hand how
to lock changing-spells so that could "put Jasper to shame at last" (p. 47).
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Ged feels Jasper continually makes a fool of him. "Jasper laughed, illhumouredly, and went on .... And Ged followed, sullen and sore-hearted,
knowing that he had behaved like a fool, and blaming Jasper for it" (p. 46).
Ged's reactions to Jasper are driven by powerful negative emotions. After
Jasper has performed an illusion for a visitor, the Lady of 0, all present
are pleased with his efforts and praise him. All that is except forGed who
"joined his voice to the praises, but not his heart. 'I could have done
better,' he said to himself, in bitter envy; and all the joy of the evening was
darkened for him after that" (p. 55).
Ged is so totally blinded by his hatred of aod rivalry towards Jasper
and by his own pride that he is unable to see the situation for what it is or
to realize the danger inherent in his behaviour. Ged would not see, or
refused to see, that "in this rivalry, which he clung to and fostered as part
of his own pride, that there was anything of the danger, the darkness, of
which the Master Hand had mildly warned him" (p. 49). All of Ged's
behaviour in relation to Jasper is totally out of proportion to the reality of
the situation. Vetch's reactions, always moderate and sensible, fail to
bring Ged to his senses. When Ged challenges Jasper to a duel Vetch
e><claims: ~Duels in sorcery are forbidden to us, and well you know it. Let
this cease!m (p. 60). But neither Ged nor Jasper listen to him. Vetch tries
appealing to Ged's sense, but to no avail: Ged ~will you be a man and drop
this now - come with mem (p. 61). Although Vetch is able to see Ged's
hatred and jealousy for Jasper he is unable to stop the fateful event that
willshatt.'" Ged's young life.
(3) The shndow needs to b.- recognized and assimilated

The first step in Jungian individuation, or the process towards
wholeness, is the recognition and assimilation of the shadow. It is
imperative "to distinguish ourselves from our shadow by recognizing its
reality as part of our nature" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 114). For Jung:
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The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole egopersonality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow
without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it
involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as
real and present. This act is the essential condition for any
kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with
considerable resistance. (Jung, 1971, p. 145)
It is only after recognition of the shadow that "the painful and lengthy
work of self-education begins • a work, we might say, that is the
psychological equivalent of the labours of Hercules" (Jung, von Franz,
Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 174). Wholeness and completeness of
the self cannot be achieved without recognition and assimilation of the
shadow. "The goal of the self is wholeness" (Stevens, 1990, p. 41). Since
the shadow will not go away, much as the ego would like this scenario, it
must be lived with. Moreno observes that the "question is no longer how
we can get rid of our shadow, but rather how we can live with our dark side
without becoming dark ourselves. Shadow and consciousness have to live
together" (1974, p. 45). Wholeness of being can only be achieved by a
union of ego and shadow. According to Jung, psychological and spiritual
health are not achievable without learning to live with the shadow. An
individual can "only be well and sane when the quarrel between him and

his shadow ... [is] dissolved and reconciled" (Vander Post, 1977, p. 219).
The shadow, though not necessarily an opponent, may often b,,
viewed as an enemy and must always be lived with. "Whether the shadow
becomes our friend or enemy depends largely upon ourselves .... The
shadow only becomes hostile when he is ignored or misunderstood" (Jung,
von Franz, Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 182). Without recognition
and assimilation of the shadow an individual will not find wholeness. No
matter the pain and difficulty experienced in dealing with the shadow the
"assimilation of the shadow is a crucial step on the way to individuation"
(Stevens, 1990, p. 46).
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After Ged has released his shadow he is much humbled and shaken
by the experience. Although he would like to ~stay. To learn. To undo ...
the evil'" (p. 67) this proves to be a vain hope. While completing his
training on Roke he dreams of the shadow but does ~not know what it was
- the thing that came out of the spell and cleaved to mem (p. 68). Ged's
recognition of the shadow is slow, but at Low Torning he senses the
shadow "was drawn to him" and acknowledges it as "being his creature"
(p. 83). Yet Ged does not know "in what form it could come, having no real
form of its own as yet, and how it would come, and when it would come" (p.
83). Ged's progress toward recognition of his shadow can be seen in his
refusal of the temptations offered by both Yevaud (p. 90) and Serret (pp.
112-113) to provide him with his shadow's name. Ged's behaviour is far
more responsible and he is a much humbler person. It is a very different
Ged who admits his weakness and ignorance to the Doorkeeper (p. 74)
than the Ged who arrived arrogant and angry years earlier (p. 40). It is
also a very different Ged who admits to Ogion that ~I have come back to
you as I left: a foolm (p. 118) than the Ged who "hungered to learn, to gain
power" (p. 26) and wished "for glory" (p. 32).
No one can really tell Ged what to do, though Ogion tells him that
~ou

must seek what seeks you. You must hunt the hunter .... and seek

the very source and that which lies before the source'" (p. 120). Ged fully
realizes that he cannot keep running from his shadow as it "'will surely
fmd me again ... And all my strength is spent in the running'" (p. 121).
Ged decides to follow his master's advice and goes hunting, in search of his
shadow and the source. This is the great Jungian turning point in the
journey towards wholeness: that of turning around and seeking and trying
to recognize one's shadow. However, to begin with Ged hopes to destroy

his shadow, even if it means destroying himself.
Ged recognizes the shadow as his shadow but not that it is an
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essential part of his being. He sees it very much as an enemy to be
destroyed and is still driven by a terror of his shadow. "He knew only the
torment of dread, and the certainty that he must go ahead and do what he
had set out to do: hunt down the evil, follow his terror to its source" (p.
136). Out at sea he thinks that when he meets his shadow he can grasp it
and "drag it with the weight of his body and the weight of his own death
into the darkness of the deep sea" (p. 125). In the middle of the sea, alone,
and hoping to destroy his shadow he summons it: "'I am here, I Ged the
Sparrowhawk, and I summon my shadowm (p. 126). But, finally Ged
recognizes that he cannot destroy his shadow. In the East Reach, Ged
tries to attack the shadow but finds nothing in his empty hands. But this
meeting has a profound effect on Ged and marks a deep recognition of the
shadow and his relationship to it:
All terror was gone. All joy was gone. It was a chase no longer.
He was neither hunted nor hunter, now. For the third time
they had met and touched: he had of his own will turned to the
shadow, seeking to hold it with living hands. He had not held it,
but he had forged between them a bond, a link that had no
breaking-point. There was no need to hunt the thing down ....
When they had come to the time and place for their last
meeting they would meet . . . . He knew now, and the
knowledge was hard, that his task had never been to undo
what he had done, but to finish what he had begun. (p. 138)
As Ged begins to recogoize his shadow it begins to lose its power

over him. Ged eventually recognizes his shadow for what it is; he accepts
it, joins with it, and becomes whole. His journey to this point has been
painful and difficult. Ged's assimilation of his shadow is a slow process
that progresses as his recognition of his shadow grows. In the end Ged
knows not only the shadow's name but also what he must do:
Ged lifted up the staff high, and the radiance of it brightened
intolerably .... In that light ... the thing came towards Ged. It

grew together and shrank and blackened, crawling on four
short taloned legs upon the sand. But still it came forward,
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lifting up to him a blind unformed snout without lips or eyes or
ears. AB they came right together it became utterly black in
the white mage-radiance that burned about it, and it heaved
itself upright. In silence man a'ld shadow met face to face, and
stopped.
Aloud and clearly breaking that old silence, Ged spoke the
shadow's name, and in the same moment the shadow spoke
without lips or tongue, saying the same word: 'Ged'. And the
two voices were one.

Ged reached out his hands, dropping his stsff, and took hold
of his shadow, of the black self that reached out to him. Light
and darkness met, and joined, and were one. (p. 164)
In naming his shadow with his own name Ged assimilates the shadow into

himself, as part of himself, and "made himself whole" (p. 166).
(4) The shadow is frightening
Dealing with the shadow is a difficult and terrifying process. "Bitter
as the cup may be, no one can be spared it" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 114). Jung
describes the initial confrontation with the shadow as "an ethical problem
of the first magnitude" (Jung, 1959, p. 78) and "the first step on the inner
way, a test sufficient to frighten off most people" (Jung, 1959, p. 304).
Recognition of the shadow is strongly resisted by the ego because it has
no desire to associate with the shadow. "To own one's shadow is ... a
painful, and potentially terrifYing experience" (Stevens, 1990, pp. 43-44).
The terror experienced at even glimpsing one's shadow is the reason that
many people repress the shadow. Repression is preferable to recognition,
simply because the individual often "cannot bring himself to accept all
this darkness as a part of himself" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 113). However, "the
less conscious a man is of his shadow, the blacker and denser the shadow
becomes" (Moreno, 1974, p. 41).
Ged is terrified of his shadow and has great difficulty recognizing it.
He also has to overcome his fear and loathing of it and his desire to kill it.
Ged first begins to sense his shadow when still an apprentice to Ogion on
Gont. He reads from a Lore·Book and finds himself fixed upon reading a
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certain spell and is terrified of the darkness he feels closing in on him:
His eyes were fixed, and he could not lift them till he had
finished reading all the spell.
Then raising his head he saw it was dark in the house ....
[The] horror grew in him, seeming to hold him in his chair. He
was cold. Looking over his shoulder he saw that something
was crouching beside the closed door, a shapeless clot of
shadow darker than the darkness. It seemed to reach out
towards him, and to whisper, and to call him in a whisper: but
he could not understand the words.
The door was flung wide. A man entered with a white light
flaming from him, a great bright figure who spoke aloud,
fiercely and suddenly. The darkness and the whispering ceased
and were dispelled. (pp. 30-31)
Ged's initial encounter with what Ogion later describes as "'but the
foreboding of it, the shadow of a shadowm (p. 120) should be enough to
alert him to the dangers of his pride and thirst for knowledge. Ged's first
partial glimpse and sensing of his shadow was a truly terrifying
experience for him, yet he soon forgets this experience. When Ogion
reprimands Ged he says to him, '"You will never work that spell but in peril
of your power and your lifem (p. 31). But Ged does not listen to Ogion's
warning and it is this spell that he later uses on Roke to raise a spirit from
the dead. In defence Ged complains to Ogion that he has been taught
nothing. But again, Ged learns nothing because he does not want to
recognize his shadow and is driven by a lust for power.
While a student on Roke Ged finds that certain spells make him
uneasy for no reason he is able to discern:
There were certain runes on certain pages of the Lore-Book
that seemed familiar to him, though he did not remember in
what book he had ever seen them before. There were certain
phrases that must be said in spells of Summoning that he did
not like to say. They made him think, for an instant, of
shadows in a dark room, of a shut door and shadows reaching
out to him from the corner by the door. Hastily he put such
thoughts or memories aside and went on. These moments of
fear and darkness, he said to himself, were the shadows
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merely of his ignorance. The more he learned, the less he would
have to fear, until finally in his full power as wizard he need
fear nothing in the world, nothing at all. (pp. 57-58)
Ged does not want to recognize his shadow, so dispels his fear and strange

feelings by a foolish and blind certainty that with power comes an
absence offear. However, Ged has to painfully learn that this is not so.
After Ged is sent to Low Torning to protect the village from dragons
he meets his shadow again when, in a foolish attempt to save Pechvarry's
son from certain death, he crosses into the land of the dead and finds his
shadow waiting for him (p. 80). Ged almost loses his life and his dreams
are plagued by the shadow. When he wakes from his dreams he is "weak
and cold" and terrified (p. 83). In both dreams and thoughts of the shadow
"he felt always the same cold dread: sense and power drained out of him,
leaving him stupid and astray. He raged at his cowardice, but that did no
good. He sought for some protection, but there was none" (p. 83).
In his dreams and waking thoughts he sees the shadow as a

shapeless mass of darkness or a creature with no head because he is too
terrified to recognize this 'creature' as his shadow, as a part of himself.
Ged tries to run away from his shadow and leaves Low Torning. He flees

to Roke but finds his path is thwarted by the "high, enwoven, ancient
spells" that protect the mage-island (p. 94). He has dreadful feelings of"a
foreboding of doom" (p. 94) and felt "the doom ... [was]lying ahead on
every road" (p. 95). Ged continues running but is unable to cope with the
shadow's hunting of him. He is exhausted, distraught, terrified, doesn't
know what to do, and discovers to his horror that the shadow knows his
true name so is able to gain power over him (p. 101). Ged's actions and
thoughts are initially driven by his terror of the shadow. Eventually, in his
slow process of recognizing and assimilating his shadow Ged discovers
that "all terror was gone" (p. 138).
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(5) The s4adow is UIU'!llentinc

Although a person may prefer to avoid meeting the shadow, the
shadow is unrelenting in its determination to be acknowledged and
accepted. The journey towards wholeness demands such meetings take
place. Jung observes that there is a "passionate drive within the shadowy
part of oneself that reason may not prevail against it ... [because] the
shadow contains the overwhelming power of irresistible impulse" (Jung,
von Franz, Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 182). How the individual
deals with the shadow's unrelenting impulse will determine, to a large
extent, how the shadow behaves. For Jung (1991):
The shadow is a living part of the personality and therefore
wants to live with it in some form. It cannot be argued out of
existence or rationalized into harmlessness. This problem is
exceedingly difficult, becauGe it not only challenges the whole
man, but reminds him at the same time of his helplessness
and ineffectuality. (pp. 20-21)
It is the shadow that contains the instinct towards completeness and
wholeness, not the ego. Indeed, it is the shadow that is a collaborator in
the interests of the unconscious tendencies and drives of the self.
If an individual continues to repress his/her shadow and refuses to

acknowledge its existence the shadow will find other channels in its
attempts to 'live' as part of the whole personality. The shadow becomes
"pathological only when we assume that we do not have it; because then
it has us" (Whitmont, 1969, p. 168). The ego has to learn that the shadow
cannot by eliminated and has a right to 'live'. As a continually repressed
entity, the shadow "is liable to burst forth suddenly in a moment of
awareness, upsetting the ego and breeding neurosis" (Moreno, 1974, p.
43). Jung attributed neurosis to a refusal to engage with the shadow. The

will is not able to sustain repression of the shadow without it becoming "a
serious and often unsupportable burden" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 112).
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G.ld's shadow is unrelenting in its pursuit ofG.ld because it wants
union with Ged. When Ged first sees a hint of it in Ogion's cabin it "seemed
to reach out towards him ... and to call to him in a whisper" (p. 31). After
G.ld has released his shadow on Roke its immediate reaction is to leap
onto G.Jd and cling to him (p. 64). When he tries to save Pechvarry's son
his shadow "whispered at him, though there were no words in its
whispering, and it reached out towards him" (p. 81). Always the shadow is
trying to communicate with Ged and trying to reach out to him, "seeking

to draw near to him" (pp. 82-83). G.ld admits to Ogion that the shadow's
~desire

is to meet me face to facem (p. 120). Because G.ld cannot bear to

look on his shadow it becomes his enemy and though it remained his
enemy for a long time it also remained unrelenting in its passionate drive
to he united with G.ld. The unrecognized shadow wreaks havoc. The
shadow grows more hostile as G.ld ignores it, flees from it, and fights it.
The more Ged fights against the shadow the more the shadow fights
against Ged. Ged's shadow demands existence, drawing on G.ld's energy
for its 'life' and exhibits the Jungian passionate drive towards wholeness of
being. It is interesting that when G.ld meets his shadow at the wall
between life and death "it stood on the side of the living, and he on the side
of the dead" (p. 81). This is strongly reflective of the ideas in Jungian
psychology that the recognition and assimilation of the shadow is
necessary for wholeness of self and that the shadow's unrelenting drive is
towards 'life' while repression and avoidance of the shadow by the ego will
lead to a type of 'death' or neurosis.

Taoist Balance
A different Rousseauistic interpretation could seek to centre the
structure of the text by referring to the Taoist concept of balance. Taoism
is an important aspect in Le Guin's work and personal philosophy and she
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readily acknowledges the pervasive influence of Taoism in her novels. In
an interview (McCaffrey, 1990) Le Guin explains that she has been
strongly influenced since childhood by Taoism: "I happened to grow up
with Lao Tzu. I read the Tao Te Ching by the time I was thirteen or so,
and it just got under my skin" (p. 174). Cogell (1979) observes that
"Taoist philosophy is a basic pattern" in Le Guin's works (p. 153). While
most critics have noted this aspect, studies with reference to the
Earthsea novels have not been detailed. Le Guin considers that Taoism,
particularly the Yin-Yang balance of opposites, is not only "a central
theme in my work. It's a central theme period" (Bittner, 1984, p. x).
Slusser (1976) observes that Le Guin's exploration of evil in the
Earthsea novels is from a background of "Yin and Yang, not a Manichean
contention between light as good and darkness as evil" (p. 35). He notes
that for Le Guin, who believes strongly in balance and in the dynamics of
polarity, Taoism "has always been the strongest single force behind her
work" (p. 3). Cummins (1990) looks at the concern in the novels for the
interdependency of all things (p. 11) and the centrality of the Equilibrium
in Earthsea (p. 25), pointing out that Taoism is "the only religion Le Guin
has admitted to" (p. 33). Indeed, Le Guin (1979) considers herself to be "a
congenital non-Christian" (p. 55). Bucknall (1981) makes the point that
Le Guin's ideas about the relationship of light and dark are Taoist rather

than Christian (p. 42). She observes that in Earthsea light and darkness
"represent the polarities of life and death, knowledge and ignorance,
wisdom and stupidity, the power to act and the impotence of possession"
(p. 41). Bittner (1984) notes in passing that the foundation ofLe Guin's
ethics is Taoist (p. 4).
Taoism, a Chinese religion, is primarily concerned with balance and
wholeness in all things and is written about at length in the works of Lao
Tzu and Chuang Tzu. The emphasis on balance and relativity is the first
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great principle of Taoism, which is also a means of living and a doctrine
(Waley, 1958, pp. 50-51). Le Guin (1979) considers the Taoist world to be
orderly but its laws "are not imposed from above ... but exist in things
and are to be found -discovered" (p. 49). In Taoism there is a "repeated
emphasis on the eternal, the unchanging" (Smart, 1977a, p. 257). There
are four aspects of Taoist balance that can be explored in Taoism and A
Wizard ofEarthsea: the Tao, Yin-Yang, Wu-Wei and Te.
(1) The Tao

The Tao, or the Way, is a manner of living that is balanced in all
aspects and is both the path that humans follow and the rhythmic pulse
of the universe. Smart (1977a) suggests that the Tao, or true Way, is
"unchanging, eternal, for it exists within and beyond the world of constant
change. It is nameless, for it is the true breath of the universe, not to be
caught and entangled by human concepts, by names" (p. 257). Smith
(1991) looks at the Tao as the "way of ultimate reality" (p. 198), while
Watts (1975) goes further in his observation that the Tao is the "ultimate
reality and energy of the universe, the Ground of Being and Nonbeing" (p.
40). Waley (1958) also considers the Tao to be "the ultimate reality in
which all attributes are united" (p. 50). According to Lao Tzu (1963)
"Turning back is how the way moves; I Weakness is the means the way
employs" (p. 101); in other words, the Tao moves forward by going
backwards (p. 102). The Tao is enigmatic and ineffahle:
You may look at it and not see it ... You may listen to it but
not hear it ... You may touch it but not feel it .... It runs on
and on and cannot be named .... We call it the form that
never forms, the image that never materializes. When the tao
becomes a thing, it ... eludes. (MeN aughton, 1971, p. 11)
There is a recognized difficulty in trying to convey in words what
the Tao is. Cooper (1972) suggests that the Tao "cannot be conveyed
70

either by words or silence" (p. 9). The Tao "is forever nameless" (Lao Tzu,
1963, p. 91). It is also important to realize that there is "no analogy
between Tao and the Western ideas of God, and of divine or natural law,
which can be obeyed or disobeyed" (Watts, 1975, p. 37). The Tao is not a
God who controls creation, rather it is an almost a priori balfmce existing
in the universe. Jochim (1986) describes the Tao as a way of looking at

the universe as "an organismic whole whose essential structure and
energy abide in every constituent part" (p. 8). Cooper (1981) also
emphasizes that the Tao is everywhere and in all aspects of life (p. 22).
In Taoism water is considered to be the natural phenomenon most

closely resembling the Tao and is often used as a symbol of the Way. "The
highest good is like water. Water ... does not strain. It approaches the
tao" (McNaughton, 1971, p. 13). Smith (1991) observes that Taoists:
were struck by the way it [water] would support objects and
carry them effortlessly ... Similarly, one who understsnds the
basic life force knows that it will sustain one if one stops
thrashing and flailing and trusts oneself to its support. (p. 209)
A Wizard of Earthsea revolves around balance and unbalance:
before Ged releases his shadow there is balance; after he has released his
shadow there is unbalance; and, after Ged joins with his shadow there is
balance again. In Earthsea the Balance and the Pattern underlie all
things and are known and served by true wizards, who do not use spells
"unless real need demands" (pp. 16-17). This balance, or Equilibrium, is
the very essence ofEarihsea and is the way a mage lives. However:
'A mage can control only what is near him, what he can name
exactly and wholly. And this is well. If it were not so, the
wickedness of the powerful or the folly of the wise would long
ago have sought to change what cannot be changed, and
Equilibrium would fail. The unbalanced sea would overwhelm
the islands where we perilously dwell, and in the old silence all
voices and all names would be lost.' (p. 51)
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Ogion tries to teach Ged the way of the mage, but he is too full of greed for
glory and power to learn anything. Ged tried summoning the spirits of the
dead while still an apprentice to Ogion, who then warned him:
'Ged, listen to me now. Have you never thought how danger
must surround power as shadow does light? This sorcery is not
a game we play for pleasure or praise. Think of this: that
every word, every act of our Art is said and is done either for
good, or for evil. Before you speak or do you must know the
price that is to pay!' (p. 31)
Later, while still a student on Roke, Ged asks the Master Hand how

to lock changing spells. However, the mage warns Ged about the dangers
of upsetting the balance and using spells unwisely: "'The world is in
balance, in Equilibrium.m (p. 48). Unfortunately, Ged does not Jearn about
balance and the way of the mage and releases his shadow. In so doing he
drastically upsets the equilibrium ofEarthsea:
The shapeless mass of darkness he had lifted split apart. It
sundered, and a pale spindle of light gleamed between his open
arms .... It widened and spread, a rent in the darkness oftbe
earth and night, a ripping open of the fabric of the world.
Through it blazed a terrible brightness. And through the bright
misshapen breach clambered something like a clot of black
shadow, quick and hideous. (p. 63)
Ged is chastised for working a spell "'not knowing how that spell affects
the balance oflight and dark, life and death, good and evilm (p. 68).
Ged finds that being hunted by the shadow and fleeing from it is a
nightmare existence. Exhausted and terrified he has little idea about how

to act. Ogion, like a Taoist sage, suggests that Ged must turn around:
'At the spring of the River Ar I named you,' the mage said, 'a
stream thatfalls from the mountain to tbe sea. A man would
know the end he goes to, but he cannot know it if he does not
turn, and retorn to his beginning, and hold that beginning in his
being. If he would not be a stick whirled and whelmed in tbe
stream, he must be the stream itself, all of it, from its spring
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to its sinking in the sea .... Now turn clear round, and seek
the very source, and that which lies before the source.' (p. 120)
So, Ged turns round and in order to go forward he goes back and seeks the
source of himself and the shadow. Much later, when Ged has begun to
learn about the Equilibrium and to value it, he realizes, after being saved
by his little otak, that all things are related and inter-dependent:
From that time forth he believed that the wise man is one who
never sets himself apart from other living things, whether
they have speech or not, and in later years he strove to learn
what can be learned, in silence, from the eyes of animals, the
flight of birds, the great slow gestures of trees. (p. 82)
(2) Yin-Yang

The Yin-Yang "polarity goes back to very early times" (Smart,
1977b, p. 216) and came to represent the basic and opposite forces in the
universe. These opposite forces cannot exist except in a relationship of
unity, one that is appositively holistic. Yin-Yang is a "cosmic symbol of
primordial unity and harmony" (Cooper, 1972, p. 27). The Tao is reflected
in the Yin-Yang and everything involved in this binary opposition "implies
that which is inseparable, unable to maintain itself except in relationship"
(Cooper, 1981, p. 14). Yin-Yang polarity should not be confused with ideas
of conflicting opposition because it is "an explicit duality expressing an
implicit unity" (Watts, 1975, p. 26). In other words, the Yin-Yang duality
is not an opposition between good and evil but a union of opposites. The

"yang is the active, masculine energy, and the yin is the passive, feminine
one" (Smart, 1977b, p. 216). From these two energies all things arise and
have form. "If two forces are working in perfect balance a unity is
achieved; anything that is out of harmony is to he regarded as a failure in
or disturbance of the balance of the Yin-Yang forces" (Cooper, 1972, p.
39). Lao Tzu (1963) continually refers to the Yin-Yang polarity:
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The way that is bright seems dull;
The way that leads forward seems to lead backwards;
The way that is even seems rough.
The highest virtue is like the valley ...
The great square has no corners ...

The great image has no shape. (p. 102)
Great perfection seems chipped ...
Great fullness seems empty ...
Great straightness seems bent;
Great skill seems awkward;
Great eloquence seems tongue-tied. (p. 106)
The "two great powers at work in the world can be beneficent or
hostile according to the conduct of the individual ... in either maintaining
or disturbing the equilibrium" (Cooper, 1972, p. 40). It is only when the
Yin-Yang balance is thrown askew that the relationship loses its balanced
unity. Through the Yin-Yang balance the Tao operates such that "all
opposites are blended, all contrasts harmonized" (Waley, 1958, p. 52).
Reflected in Yin-Yang is the idea that the "attainment of maturity, of
wholeness, is the acceptance and reconciliation of all opposites, of light
and dark, good and evil, life and death" (Cooper, 1.972, p. 25).
In Earthsea the Yin-Yang balance can be seen in the concept of the

Equilibrium. All things are interrelated and in balance. To alter one thing
can be to disturb other things. Ged, as an apprentice to Ogion, cannot
understand why his master will not stop the rain so they may be dry:
[Ged] wondered more and more what was the gTeatness and
the magic of this great Mage Ogion. For when it rained Ogion
would not even say the spell that every weatherworker knows,
to send the storm aside. In a land where sorcerers eome thick,
like Gont or the Enlades, you may see a raincloud blundering
slowly from side to side and place to place as one sp,gll shunts
it onto the next, until at last it is buffeted out over the sea
where it can rain in peace. But Ogion would let the rain fall
where it would .... Ged crouched among the dripping bra."lches
wet and sullen, and wondered what was the good of having
power if you were too wise to use it, and wished he had gone as
prentice to that old weatherworker of the Vale, where at least
he would have slept dry. (pp. 26-27)
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While village witches and weatherworkers and wicked sorcerers use their
spells with no consideration for the balance, for the Equilibrium of
Earthsea, mages live in respect for the balance. Echoing Ogion's words
and way of living, the Master Summoner explains to his pupils on Roke
the importance of only using spells when necessary and showed them:
why the true wizard uses spells only at need, since to summon
up such earthly forces is to change the earth of which we are a
part. 'Rain on Roke may be drouth in Osskil,' he said, 'and a
calm in the East Reach may be storm and ruin in the West,
unless you know what you are about.' (p. 57)
Ged is also warned by the Master Hand about upsetting the Equilibrium:
But you must not change one thing, one pebble, one grain of
sand, until you know what good and evil will follow the act. The
world is in balance, in Equilibrium. A wizard's power of
Changing and of Summoning can shake the balance of the
world. It is dangerous, that power. It is most perilous. It must
follow knowledge and serve need. To light a candle is to cast a
shadow. (p. 4R)
Ged has yet to learn that in doing little or nothing the mage ruins
nothing and that all things are interrelated and in balance. Ged moans
that when he asks a mage for his secrets "he would always talk, like
Ogion, about balance, and danger, and the dark" (p. 48). In working a
dangerous spell with no thought as to how it may affect the Equilibrium
Ged rents the very fabric ofEarthsea temporarily asunder, and "the stuff
of the world had been tom apart" (p. 65 ). Only the power and knowledge of
the Archmage, who sacrifices his life, and the Masters can restore
balance to Earthsea. But it is only Ged who can restore balance within
himself. Ged disturbs the balance of the Equilibrium because he lets his
pride and arrogance dominate his behaviour and blind his understanding of
balance. He bitterly leams the consequences of his actions. Towards the
end of his journey a much humbled and wiser Ged tells Yarrow about the
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Equilibrium and the power of the world that is in all things, interrelated
and balanced:
'All power is one in source and end, I think. Years and
distances, stars and candles, water and wind and wizardry, the
craft in a man's hand and the wisdom in a tree's root: they all
arise together. My name, and yours, and the true name of the
sun, or a spring of water, or an unborn child, all are syllables of
the great word that is very slowly spoken by the shining of the
stars. There is no other power'. (p. 151)
(3) Wp-Wei

Through Wu-Wei the Tao is expressed as a way ofliving. Wu-Wei,
or non-action, is a Taoist term that relates to how a person is to live in the
world and relate to both self and others. Smith (1991) describes Wu-Wei
as "creative quietude" (p. 207), while Cooper (1972) translates the term
as ~actionless activity"' (p. 75) and McNaughton (1971) argues for ~anti
actionm (p. 85). Jochim (1986) suggests that spontaneity "perhaps best
captures in a positive value what Lao Tzu meant by nonaction" (p. 132).
The least use of energy and absence of force perhaps best describes WuWei (Watta, 1975, p. 82). Wu·Wei is not opposed to action, but purposeful
action is to be avoided as this upsets the Yin-Yang balance. "Do that
which consists in taking no action; pursue that which is not meddlesome"
(Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 124). Interference is considered "the worst product of
wilful activity" (Jochim, 1986, p. 133). The underlying sense ofWu-Wei is
tranquil nonaction by which everything is always effortlessly achieved.
"The way never acts yet nothing is left undone" (Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 96).
Wu-Wei - "never forcing, never under strain - seems quite effortless"
(Smith, 1991, p. 209). Wu-Wei encourages harmony through its aversion
to activity and avoidance of "rebellion against the fundamental laws of
the universe" (Waley, 1958, p. 55).
In the life of the Taoist sage can be seen the lived expression ofWu-

76

Ill

Wei. According to Lao Tzu (1963) the sage does his "utmost to attain
emptiness [and to] hold firmly to stillness .... Returning to one's roots is
known as stillness" (p. 72). The Taoist sage teaches using no words and
extols the virtue "of resorting to no action" (Lao Tzu, p. 104). It "is
because the sage never attempts to be great that he succeeds in
becoming great" (Lao Tzu, p. 124). It is also because the sage "does
nothing [that he] never ruins anything; and, because he does not lay hold
of anything, loses nothing" (Lao Tzu, p. 125). Cooper (1972) observes that
the Taoist sage displaY" "quiet acceptance of life in the world as it comes
and as it is, waiting for the time and the season" (p. 74).
Water is also an important symbol for Wu-Wei. It symbolizes the
sage's ideal behaviour "because, as it does not compete but rather takes
the path of least resistance, it stands for nnninterj,rence" (Jochim, 1986,
p. 133). Water's adaptability to its environment and its ability to change
its environment are indicative ofhow an individual should follow the Tao:
Infinitely supple, yet incomparably strong · these virtues of
water are precisely those ofwu wei as well .... [A person] acts
without strain, persuades without argument, is eloquent
without flourish, and achieves results without violence,
coercion, or pressure .... A final characteristic of water that
makes it an appropriate analogue to wu wei is the clarity it
attains through being still. (Smith, 1991, p. 210)
Ogion the Silent is very much the Taoist sage. "He seldom spoke,
ate little, slept less" (p. 25) and only used his mage power when
necessary. Silence and nonaction are basic to the character of Ogion.
Sometimes it seemed to Ged that the:
mage's long, listening silence would fill the room, and fill Ged's
mind, until sometimes it seemed he had forgotten what words
sounded like: and when Ogion spoke at last it was as if he had,
just then and for the firnt time, invented speech. Yet the words
he spoke were no great matters but had to do only with simple
things, bread and water and weather and sleep. (p. 28)
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Ogion taught Ged by sayin!( nothinp;, somethin!( which Ged is unable to
understand. '"When will my apprenticeship begin, Sir?m asks Ged, who is
simply told in reply by Ogion that ~u has bei(Unm (p. 25). Instead of the
nonaction and silence demonstrated by Ogion, Ged seeks to act. Ged seeks
to gain power to do as he wills. He wants 'something' to happen.

~since

I

have been with you I have done nothing, seen nothin~ complains Ged to
Ogion (p. 31). Ogion responds, "'Now you have seen something ... By the
door, in the darknessm (p. 31). Yet Ged, though horrified by what he saw
and felt, still seeks to act. He considers that a wizard should be able "to do
what he pleased" (p. 48). Ged has yet to understand that a great mage,
such as Ogion or Archmage N emmerle, is great because he never
attempts to be great. Nemmerle seals the rent in the fabric of Earthsea
not by visual acts of great power or loudly spoken spells but by standing
and whispering: "Nearby a voice was speaking as softly as a tree
whispers or a fountain plays .... The night was healed. Restored and
steady lay the balance of light and dark" (p. 64).
Nor does Ged learn anything of the mage's way from the masters
on Roke. He is repeatedly warned by them about the dangers of upsetting
the Equilibrium and why a mage rarely uses his power. It is only after he
has released his shadow that he begins to understand what the mages
had been trying to teach him. The Master Summoner gently tells Ged:
'You thought ... that a mage is one who can do anything. So I
thought, once. So did we all. And the truth is that as a man's
real power grows and his knowledge widens, ever the way he
can follow grows narrower; until at last he chooses nothing,
but does only and wholly what he must do'. (p. 73)
Slowly Ged begins the painful lessons ofbeing a true mage. It is not about
power and glory and action, as he had thought, but about silence and
humility and nonaction. Nevertheless, he uses considerable energy first
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fleeing from his shadow and then trying to destroy it before realizing that
he is neither "hunted nor hunter", and 'knows' that when the time comes
for their last meeting "they would meet" without hurried exertion on his
part (p. 138). Ged sensed that "southward the shadow had gone. He need
cast no finding-charm to know this: he knew it, as certainly as if a fine
unreeling cord bound him and it together" (p. 141). Ged comes to learn
that there is much wisdom in the natural world and he "strove to learn
what can be learned, in silence, from the eyes of animals, the flight of
birds, the great slow gestures of trees" (p. 82). A much wiser Ged is able to
say to Murre and Yarrow that ~for a word to be spoken ... there must be
silence. Before, and afterm (p. 152).
Far out at sea, on water that, for a while, is water no more Ged
meets his shadow in silence and stillness:
All sounds of water, wind, wood, sail were gone, lost in a huge
profound silence that might have been unbroken forever. The
boat lay motionless. No breath of wind moved. The sea had
tuned to sand, shadowy, unstirred. Nothing moved in the dark
sky or on the dry unreal ground that went on ... into gathering
darkness .... Ged stood up .... [and] strode forward from the
boat, but in no direction. There were no directions here, no
north or south or east or west, only towards and away. (p. 163)
At last Ged has learnt what it means to be a great mage. He had taken
Ogion's advice to be

~the

stream itself, all of it, from its spring to its

sinking in the seam (p. 120). Ged had followed his course from Gont to the
sea and there, in silence and stillness, he had returned to his 'source' and
become whole. On water that is not water and in profound silence seems a
particularly Taoist locale to find wholeness of being.
(4) T11

Te, or virtue is "the realization or expression of the Tao in actual
living• (Watts, 1975, p. 107). Te is another Taoist concept that also
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relates to the living out of the Tao in a harmonious and positive way. "One
could say that te is a natural virtue, based on inner feelings, as distinct
from artificial virtue, based on a following of rules" (Watts, 1975, p. 108).
Te refers to avoidance in life of any type of excess. Harmful qualities that
can lead to an upsetting of the equilibrium include excesses such as hate,
pride, envy, greed, and the like and also "greed of possession [and] worship
of status and luxury" (Cooper, 1981, p. 38). Te emphasizes avoidance of
worldly values such as wealth, status, assertiveness, and competition.
"People should avoid being strident and aggressive not only toward other
people but also toward nature" (Smith, 1991, p. 212).
In living out Te there is avoidance of unbalance in emotions and life:

This is why excessive meanness
Is sure to lead to great expense;
Too much store
Is sure to end in immense loss.
Know contentment
And you will suffer no disgrace;
Know when to stop
And you will meet with no danger. (Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 105)

In Taoism sin is seen as "a violation of the harmony of the universe ...

and as such it creates disharmony and, therefore, disquiet in the individual
in particular and in society in general" (Cooper, 1972, p. 22). To avoid
upsetting and violating the harmony of the universe, in self and others
and the natural world, the individual's behaviour should encompass Te.
Although a central part of Taoist life and philosophy, Te often goes
unnoticed because it seems so ordinary (Watts, 1975, p. 108). Te is to be
seen in always following the Tao: "In his every movement a man of great
virtue I Follows the way and only the way" (Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 78).
Ged exhibits an excess of emotions that upsets the balance within
himself, and in Earthsea anythi11g that threatens the Equilibrium is
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considered unwise and foolish. The true mage serves only the "Balance
and the Pattern" (p. 16) and acts out of need not desire.

~A wizard's

power

.... must follow knowledge, and serve need'" (p. 48). In this sense, Ged's
sin, stemming from his pride, arrogance, and greed for power, leads to
disharmony in himself and in Earthsea. The greed for "mystery and
mastery of power" (p. 25), the "wish for glory, the will to act" (p. 32), and
the desire "to be powerful enough to do as he pleased" (p. 48) drive Ged's
thoughts and actions with no regard for himself or others. Ged comes to
experience considerable disgrace and danger because he does not know
contentment and balance in himself nor does he know when to stop his
unwise behaviour. The balance between light and dark is disrupted by his
reckless actions. Ged seeks glory, status, and power and has to painfully
learn the importance of behaving only as a true mage. In the end, he
finally achieves maturity and wholeness through his acceptance and
reconciliation with his shadow.
Ged's growing responsibility for his behaviour is reflected in his
refusal to gain the name of the shadow from either Yevaud (pp. 88-90) or
Serret (pp. 108-112). As much as he wanta to know the shadow's name
he is all too aware of the danger of the temptations offered to him. In
addition to refusing knowledge of the shadow's name, Ged also refuses
what could be considerable personal gain. He rejects Yevaud's offer of
jewels and bargains instead for the dragon's promise "'to never come to
the Archipelago'" (p. 90). He also refuses Serret's bribe of becoming "'a
king among menm with her at his side (p 112). However, Ged is slow to
learn the virtue in always serving the balance no matter the particular
circumstances. When Ged tries to save Pechvarry's son he disregards the
natural harmony of the Equilibrium (oflife and death) resulting in further

illiury and danger to himself. Ged broke "the first Jesson and the last of ...
[healing lore]: Heal the wound and cure the illness, but let the dying spirit
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go" (p. 80). In desperation to try and help Pechvarry and his wife by
saving their son he "mistrusted his own judgement, and thought perhaps
the child might be saved" (p. 80). By the conclusion of the novel, however,
Ged has mastered the way of the true mage in both his thoughts and
actions, now fully understanding why this way must be followed at all
times. Vetch sees the truth in Ged's assertion that "'it is done. It is overm
(p. 166) and sings from "the Creatinn of Ea which is the oldest song, it is
said, 'Only in silence the word, only in dark the light, only in dying life:
bright the hawk's flight on the empty skym (p. 166).
Value of the Rousseauistic Interpretation

These two examples of the Rousseauistic interpretation are
extremely appealing to religious educators because they use the vehicle of
the text, in this example a delightful fantasy tale, as a means for teaching
about the importance of balance in self and the world or the importance of
incorporatating into the self the dark side of one's nature. Nevertheless,
Derrida would consider such Rousseauistic interpretations sad and exiled
because they seek to decipher textual meaning as definitive and to explain
the human situation in terms of absolute doctrines. This is achieved by
referring to an external authority, Taoism or Jungian psychology, for its
meaning. The logocentric impulse in the Rousseauistic interpretation is
attractive to religious educators because, in stabilizing the structure of
the text, it seemingly affirms foundations, seeks definitive meaning, and
provides certitude and principles by which to live, thereby reducing
anxiety. For Derrida a text can only be interpreted in this way by closure
and cessation of textual play. It can be seen from the two preceding
examples how 'natural' the Rousseauistic interpretation seems. The
meaning looks obvious, intended. Yet, in Derridean terms this is merely
representative of the ideal of logocentrism, of the seeking of the lost
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centre, that is not possible in a Post-Structuralist world. However, there
is a heavy investment in Religious Education of the Rousseauistic
interpretation because its essence is concerned with seeking "meaning

and purpose in human existence" (supra uide, p. 11).
A Rousseauistic interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea that
centres on the Jungian shadow would be favoured by religious educators
as helping students to come to terms with the question of evil in
themselves. The shadow is Ged's darker side which he does not recognize
as his and which he empowers by his negative, destructive feelings. By
uniting with his dark side Ged becomes whole again. Through Ged's
journey the student can come to understand the pi ace of the shadow in life
and the folly of ignoring it. Related discussions could also pursue the
Jungian notion of the collective shadow, expressions of which can be seen
in discrimination, racism, and group prejudice. The greatest danger of not
assimilating the individual shadow is the possibility of infection by the
collective shadow. "If we could see our shadow ... we would be immune to
any moral or mental infection and insinuation" (Jung, von Franz,
Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 73). At the core of the collective
shadow is "the archetype of the enemy, the treacherous stranger, the evil
intruder" (Stevens, 1990, p. 45), that are dehumanized into monsters who
must he destroyed. Jung's concern with the personal and collective
shadow led I>Jm to a consideration of evil, which he saw as "the necessary
opposite of good" (Jung, 1991, p. 323). Jung viewed evil to he as real and
necessary as good, seeing them as opposites in a relationship of
psychological polarity. For Jung the true meaning of Christ "was that
every individual should live out fully his own natural and specific self as
truly as Christ had lived his ... and this was only possible if man were
reintegrated with the shadow" (Van der Post, 1977, p. 240).
Religious educators would also favour a Rousseauistic
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interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea that centres on the Taoist concept
of balance as encouraging students to consider the necessity of balance in
all things, in both self and in relationship to others and to the world.
Through Ged's story the student can come t.o an understanding of the
absolute necessity of balance. In his arrogance and greed for power Ged
does not understand that lack of self-discipline and knowledge without
true wisdom can threaten the Equilibrium. He does not even recognize
that upsetting the balance is wrong. Nor can he see that even with the
power to do so he must not. Through Ged students are encouraged to
understand why self-discipline and responsibility are necessary prerequisites for deeply appreciating the inter-relatedness of all things in a
unified balance and for living as caring people within the complexity of
human and cosmic life. The Rousseauistic interpretation that centres on
Taoism can be used as a starting point for discussions regarding the
differing concepts of good and evil in different religions. Le Guin points out
that "not many critics have been willing to notice that the view presented
of!ife and death in Earthsea is not only non-Christian but anti-Christian"
(McCaffrey, 1990, p. 168). In Le Guin's emphasis on the polarity of light
and dark, good and evil, is seen reflected the Taoist emphasis on universal
balance in all things. This is very different to the Christian position in
which good is seen as ultimately triumphing over and destroying evil.
Through these Rousseauistic interpretations of A Wizard of
Earthsea religious educators can also explore other issues of importance
to Religious Education. For example, topics such as responsibility,
respect, and friendship can be isolated for study. Ged displays complete
disregard for others and acts in an irresponsible way that brings about his
own downfall. Yet, he does eventually learn about the importance of selfresponsibility and grows to wholeness and maturity. Ged experiences the
warmth, love, and trustworthiness of true friendship in Vetch and comes
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to both understand and appreciate what it means to be trusted by a
friend and how to trust that friend himself. Ged also learns the necessity
of caring for, respecting, and valuing all life. In possibly his most
vulnerable state Ged is saverl from dying by his otek.
The Rousseauistic interpretative position is immensely important
in Religious Education because of its overall concern with divulging a
specific meaning. There may be more than one meaning, in this study the
concepts of balance or the shadow, but each meaning is pedagogically
specific, teaching about balance or the shadow, and is considered
putative. Such interpretations are inherently valuable in discussions of
the journey towards wholeness. In addition, religious educators would cite
Le Guin's strongly professed views on Taoism and the Jungian shadow as
greatly supportive, if not the raison d'etre, for pursuing such examples of
the Rousseauistic interpretation of her novel. Necessarily, the style and
process of teaching using this interpretative position is one directed,
however gently and encouragingly, by the teacher. It is a reading of the
text controlled and determined by the teacher to provide textual
exploration to specific ends.
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CHAPTER FIVE

The Nietzsehean Interpretation in Practice
Through a close textual analysis of A Wizard ofEarthsea using the
Nietzschean interpretation it is possible to pursue endless threads of
provisional meaning contained within the text. However, the plurality of
meaning facilitated by language, and any related slippage, is inherent in
the words themselves. Words are not forced to me !ill certain things:
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful
tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor
less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words

mean different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be
master- that's ali.' (Carroll, 1974, p. 197)
Humpty Dumpty, while exhibiting a playful approach to language,
actually assumes the Rousseauistic interpretative stance since it is not
possible in the Nietzschean interpretation to restrict the meaning of
words to precisely one thing or to be a master of language. It is most
certainly not a case of 'making' words

~m2an

different thingsm but tha.t

from the perspective of the Nietzschean interpretation the 'meanings' of
words themselves are apt to slip and slide in all sorts of odd directions and
metamorphose into all sorts of strange creatures.
In the Rousseauistic interpretation, of course, words are seen as

conveying the intended authorial meaning, which then furnishes definitive
textual meaning. The Nietzschean interpretation, however, points to the
instability and fluidity of language from which arises the impossibility of
meaning. This is not a denial of meaning per se, but is a rejection of
absolute meaning (that is, there is an infinite deferral of meaning). In this
position, Derrida sees the plurality of provisional meaning at play in the
language of the text. Even though the Rousseauistic position may give
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rise to more than one meaning in A Wizard of Earthsea such meanings
are putative and absolute in themselves, such as the Taoist concept of
balance or the Jungian concept of the shadow. In the Nietzschean
position there is an impossibility of finite meaning; all that is ever possible
is an infinite abundance of provisional meaning. These threads of
provisional meaning are not centres that fix the structure of the text, as
in the Rousseauistic sense, but actually constitute a multiplicity of
aspects drawn from the language of the text through deconstruction.
The Nietzschean position uses textual gaps and contradictions to
deconstruct Le Guin's novel to show what lies lurking beneath its surface.
In this way language is demonstrated to be not straightforward, and tc be
actually problematic, in communicating meaning. What appeared to be a
unified text conveying a particular absolute meaning, as in the
Rousseauistic interpretation, is shown to be a fragmented text that works
against itself, giving up a plethora of provisional meanings. While Humpty
Dumpty boasts that when he makes ~a word do a lot of work ... I always
pay it extra'" (Carroll, 1974, p. 197), the Nietzschean interpretation
simply utilizes the instability and fluidity of language to carefully trace
provisional meanings that the words themselves freely furnish. Rather
than the reassurance, certitude, and guidance that can come from the
Rousseauistic position, in the Nietzschean position what results can be
unsettling, confusing, and disconcerting. Indeed, the familiarity of the
logocentric impulse, as represented in the Rousseauistic position, feels so
natural that there is often resistance to the Nietzschean position because
it seems so threatening and upsetting. The logocentric idea that concepts
pre-exist language, which are then conveyed by language, is totally
rejected. Language is seen as pre-existing any sense that is made of the
world. In the Nietzschean interpretation rather than sadness and fear at
what this position undermines there is joy and excitement at the infinite
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possibilities of textual play.

As a methodological approach the Nietzschean interpretation is a
potentially indefinite process in which the role of the teacher changes
from one of directing students to one of facilitating their active and equal
participation. Pedagogically, deconstruction places its emphasis on
limitless questioning. Johnson (Salusinszky, 1987) suggests that "in order
to be truly deconstructive, you would have constantly to move the locus
of your questions, not just move onto another text" (p 158). Derrida also
acknowledges this emphasis on questioning that characterizes the
Nietzschean interpretation. However, in wanting to emphasize the
affirmation facilitated by this position he adds that deconstruction is not
totally interrogative but "is affirmative rather than questioning; this
affirmation goes through some radical questioning, but is not questioning
in the final analysis"(Salusinszky,1987, p. 20).
The Nietzschean interpretative position is an affirmation of the
free play of endless chains of signifiers. There is no end. to the questions
and there is no end to the infinite possibilities ufinterpretation facilitated
by incessant textual play. In addition, there is also no 'control' or 'order' or
'system' or external 'imposition', as characterized by the Rousseauistic
approach to the text. Rather, it is an infinite, ever-changing, and everevolving maze that characterizes the Nietzschean interpretation, where
strange questions about "'whether pigs have wingsm (Carroll, 1974, p.
169) may well be asked. Any utilization of this interpretative position is
necessarily incomplete and centrifugal, and can only ever be abysmally
partial and fragmented. What can be positively and successfully
achieved, however, is the provision of a taste, a delicious inkling, of what
constitutes the Nietzschean interpretation in practice. Nevertheless,
even these inklings are also necessarily incomplete, representing only a
sampling of various aspects that provide no resolution or end-point.
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Both concomitant and subsequent to these discussions is the
'organization' (disruption) of material in this chapter. Numbering of
threads in the following section is purposely jumbled and non-sequential to
emphasize the essence of the Nietzschean interpretation; that is, the
multiplicity of play, the fabric like textual structure of innumerable
interweaving threads of provisional meaning, the non-privileging of one
thread over another, and joyful playfulness. Wl:at follows, then, is a
limited pulling of textual threads, a sampling of the weft and warp of the
text, a farrago of eclectic thoughts arising from textual deconstruction.
Threads of Meaning
Numerous threads of provisional meaning can be pursued through
a Nietzschean interpretation of Le Gain's A Wizard of Earthsea (1993).
The deconstructive process explores the chasm in the text by exposing
textual contradictions and inconsistencies. For example, by focussing on
specific words or phrases the points of textual betrayal can he highlighted
and the provisional nature oflanguage and meaning demonstrated.

Thread 25: "'light"'
By concentrating on the word 'light' it is possible to demonstrate
the confusion that exists in the text concerning the concepts oflight and
dark. Ged tells Yarrow and Murre that "'Light is powerm (p. 150), '"All
power is one in source and endm (p. 151), and '"There is no other powerm (p.
151). Such statements clearly indicate that light is the only power and is
both the source and end of all things. Light, then, is three things: it is
unitary, alpha, and omega. Yet, only a few pages later the reader is
informed that when Gedjoined with his shadow "Light and darkness met,
and joined, and were one" (p. 164). This phrase contradicts the previous
statements in its description of the relationship between light and dark. If
light is the one power from which all things arise and is the only power
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how, then, can it meet and join with darkness and become one? It is not
possible for A (light) to meet and join with B (dark) and become C (one) if
A is already 'one' and both the beginning and the end of everything,
including B. Now it appears that light is part of a binary relationship that
when fused produces a third element, that which is unitary. In addition,
light clearly cannot be alpha and omega because it is not the source, only
part of it, and is not the end, only a means to the end.
Moreover, to add to the confusion the reader is informed, almost at
the conclusion of the novel, that "'only in dark the lightm (p. 166). This
phrase is one line from a poem also located on the facing page of the novel
before commencement of the story proper (p. 12). It is from the Creatinn
of Ea, which in Earthsea is considered "the oldest song" (p. 166). Its

repetition at the conclusion of the novel and its description as old, given
the value attached to the ancient in the Earthsea story, are suggestive of
some importance. This phrase seems to indicate that it is only possible
for light to exist in darkness or at least that dark is a necessary
precondition for light. Without dark it can be deduced that light could not
exist or function. Light, then, is conveyed as a separate 'contained' entity
within dark, and whic!: .-equires the dark to be

~inm.

The word

~only'"

stresses the absolute needfulness of light for dark, while the word

~in'"

indicates that light actually exists within the dark. This implies that dark
is the originating factor within which light can only be found. This is
obviously contradictory to the description of dark and light meeting and
joining and becoming one when Gedjoins with his shadow, clearly the focal
point of the story of Ged's journey towards wholeness. :;;·dark contains
light, and light is only possible within dark, then how can dark and light
meet and join and become one? It is not possible fer A (dark) and B (light)
to meet ifB (light) is already contained within A (dark). Nor is it possible

for A (dark) and B (light) to become C (one) if B (light) is already a
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constituent within A (dark) and therefore in a sense already •C (one).
Conversely, whether dark needs light to eXist and function raii;'es some
other interesting questions about the relationship of light and dark so
bewilderingly referred to in the text.
There is considerable confusion and contradiction regarding the
relationship of light and dark in A Wizard of Earthsea. What from the
Rousseauistic position seemed straightforward and meaningful is from
the Nietzschean position obfuscating. Students can consider how the
confusion and contradiction over the word 'light' and 'dark' may be
reflected in Western society and culture, and even in sacred texts.

Thread 7,490: "had sent him to read that spell"
When Ged meets Serret at the Court of the Terrenon he does not
initially realize that he knows her. It is only when they are trying to
escape from the wrath of Lord Benderesk that he remembers her:
there was a fierce witch-look to her beauty; and Ged knew her
at last • the daughter of the Lord of Re Albi ... who had
mocked him ... long ago, and had sent him to read that spell
which loosed the shadow. (p. 114)
In these few words the entire narrative structure of A Wizard of Earthsea

collapses in on itself. Ged is suddenly expiated of responsibility for
releasing his shadow. What, from the Rousseauistic interpretation, is a
story about owning one's shadow or the necessity of balance is now, in the
Nietzschean interpretation, irretrievably decimated by the admission
that the fault lies with a girl who "had sent him to read that spell". This
little phrase occurs about half way through the novel and effectively
contradicts all that has preceded it and all that follows it. The story,
"

having lost its coherence and direction, no longer makes any sense.
It would be so easy to overlook this phrase in the context of the

novel as a whole, but to do so would be to ignore one of those little niggling
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details to be found in the margin of the text. Not only does Ged now seem
to possess little will of his own but, of all people, it is a little girl who "sent

him to read that spell"! This minuscule vestige of the patriarchal order
brings with it long-standing Western ideas that women are inherently evil
and are always to blame. It is impossible not to see through this tiny
textual gap the Eve narrative of blame and guilt. It is all the more
surprising that this phrase slipped in at the hands of a female author.
Nevertheless, this indicates the insidious influence of cultural belief that
can still inform and exert its influence through language when the ideas
themselves have long been questioned and rejected as not having a
rightful place in the social order. What has been overtly challenged and
'removed' in society is demonstrated, by the Nietzschean interpretation of
A Wizard of Earthsea, to be still in evidence beneath the textual surface,
subversively disturbing the veneer of apparent societal consensus and
intention. Pursuing such a thread of provisional meaning obviously
interweaves with other strands of meaning to do with women and power.
Thread 343: "'that which lies before the source"'
Ged is advised by Ogion that to deal with his shadow he must wtum

clear round, and seek the very source, and that which lies before the
sourcem (p. 120). Source means beginning or that from which something
originates. How then can there be something behind the origin? From the
Rousseauistic interpretation this type of statement 'sounds' as though it
is very meaningful, but linguistically looks rather nonsensical.
Nevertheless, in pursuing this thread it is possible to follow the
analogy begun in the text. That is, Ogion is talking about a stream that
rises as a spring in the mountain and runs down to the sea. Spring water,
though subterranean, originally collects from rainfall, so perhaps this is
"'that which lies before the source'". But, rainfall originates from
evaporation of ground and sea water. So, is this "'that which lies before
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the source"'? But, that means that the mysterious "'that which lies before
the sourcem is actually itself before it becomes itself; that is, it is spring
water before it has been evaporated and falls as rain which is then
collected as water in the spring. What does such circularity say about the
shadow? What is it before it's a shadow and what. is it after? Is the shadow
Ged, both before and after it becomes a shadow, or is it something else?

Well, after all Nietzschean interpretations are playful and do
confound! Such circular discussions reflect linguistic entanglements where
meanings seem to loop together into nonsensical infinity. Similar
conundrums can also be seen echoed in religious/philosophical issues to do
with arche or telos, and what lies before the beginning or after the end,
where the problematic nature oflanguage is much in evidence.
Thread 454: "'argue"'

Pondering whether his shadow has a name or not Ged observes
that "'where mages argue, dragons may be wisem (p. 148). This seems
such an innocuous little word in a seemingly simple statement, but in
considering it carefully in relation to the text as a whole throws the
apparent unity of the text into disarray and raises some very interesting
and poignant threads of meaning. The impression given to the reader
through a surface reading of the novel indicates a very strong cohesive
view concerning the Equilibrium as the interrelated balance by which all
things in Earthsea exist. The Archmages, the Masters, GOO., and Vetch,
representative of the controlling hierarchy in Earthsea, display a general
consensus of opinion regarding the Equilibrium. Yet, Ged indicates that
mages do argue and Vetch also supports this in his statement,

~Infinite

are the arguments of magesm (p. 148). It must be concluded, then, that
there is actually no cohesive view amongst mages. Perhaps the text tries
perpetuating the 'party line' but betrays itself, betrays its whole
structure and meaning, by several little slips. It is precisely such slips

93

that deconstruction utilizes to expose the textual 'subconscious'. Indeed,
Ged, in a moment of doubt, even wonders whether "'there is no true power

but the darkm(p. 152). The reader is left to ponder whether Serret, who
tried to tell Ged that only darkness can be defeated by darkness (p. 112),
may be right and perhaps the wizards have got it all wrong.
'fhread 6,921: "'balance"'

The Master Hand explains to Ged that the

~world

is in balance, in

Equilibriumm (p. 48). By focussing on the word 'balance' and its centrality
to both the structure of the novel and Earthsea some interesting
questions about power and gender are raised. The type of questions asked
of texts in Cultural Criticism in the English classroom can be fruitfully
applied to texts used in the Religious Education classroom. For example, it
is possible to gain different insights into A Wizard of Earth sea by asking
such questions as: How is balance maintained in Earthsea? Who pays for
the maintenance of this balance? What values, aspects of society, laws,
and concepts are marginalized or privileged? and, What roles are available
for women? These type of questions encourage the reader to be critical,
rather than responsive, and to see the text as something that is
constructed, rather than as something that reflects reality (O'Neill, 1993,
p. 24). This deconstructive approach to reading the text in an oppositional
manner challenges the apparent 'unity' of the text.
Unlike either of the Rousseauistic interpretations that have been
discussed the Nietzschean interpretation deconstructs the Equilibrium
exposing it to be a balance that maintains the existing hierarchy and
which requires the individual to behave in certain ways so as not to
disturb this balance. The student is encouraged by such an oppositional
reading of A Wizard ofEarthsea to consider the place of the individual in
relation to the existing power structures. Instead of the existence of a preordained balance that must be understood as necessary for all life and
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must not be disturbed, as in the Rousseauistic interpretation, balance
from the Nietzschean position could be interpreted as existing only
because of the subjugation of the individual and of women generally. If the
individual tries to exert independence or individual action that runs
counter to the ordained order (as Ged does) the result will be puuishment
and alienation. In this interpretation the joining of Ged with his shadow is
the sad failure of the individual to break the immensely powerful bonds of
society that hold him in subjugation.
Thread 525: "perilous"

The word perilous appears a number of times in the novel. The
occurrence of the same word in different contexts is intriguing and draws
attention to its use. For example: there are ancient spells "that kept the
perilous island [of Roke] safe" (p. 94); without Equilibrium the
"'unbalanced sea would overwhelm the islands where we perilously dwellm
(p. 51); and, a wizard's power "'can shake the balance of the world. It is
dangerous .... [and] most perilous'" (p. 48). It seems odd that mages live
on a perilous island, possess perilous and dangerous powers, serve the
Equilibrium, but can potentially upset this balance and cause destruction
of the islands on which the folk of Earthsea perilously live. Are these
things connected? It is suggested in the novel that those who serve the
dark powers, such as sorcerers or village witches, do not serve the
Equilibrium, yet nor do they seem able to greatly disturb it. It is only the
mages, who do serve it, that are considered able to do this. Perhaps, then,
it is the mages who are guilty of the greatest threat to Earthsea, not by
their serving of the Equilibrium but by their power to shake and rupture
it. The perilous state ofEarthsea seems inextricably linked to those who
profess to be its guardians. Pursuing this odd textual thread raises
questions to do with the power, responsibility, and betrayal.
In society, the church, or family are those who have the
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responsibility to serve and protect, but by virtue of their trusted position
can cause immense damage to those in their care, also potentially guilty
of the same 'crime' as the mages? Victims of abuse, whether in the family,
church, or state, would answer 'yes'. Any position of power, or access to

power, necessitates great responsibility, as the mages are well aware of
and as Ged bitterly learns. Such power is perilous because those who are
subject to it live, by virtue of their suhject position, perilously. Such,
issues, however unpalatable and threatening to society's structures, need
to be addressed. Those who assert that 'others' are dangerous because
they serve the 'dark' are likely tc be potentially far more dangerous
themselves. The deconstructive process ·forces confrontation with the
contradictions and inequalities in both the novel and society that can be
so easily smoothed over by language and may often go unnoticed. In
particular, the Nietzschean position can help the student examine and
understand how societal structures use language to maintain authority
and control and to 'deal' with 'issues' that threaten its privileged position,
and also how that same language betrays what is hidden beneath its
surface. Of Derrida's two interpretations it is only the Nietzschean
interpretation that can facilitate such a linguistic and textual expose.

Thread 9: "dark"
A consideration of the use of the word 'dark', or its derivatives, is
suggestive of another provisional thread of meaning that betrays
apparent textual integrity. This thread of thought obviously crosses and
intertwines with threads of thought to do with 'light'. There are some odd
statements about 'dark' in the novel than indicate a puzzling use of the
word. When Ged first glimpses his shadow, while still an apprentice to
Ogion on Gont, it is described as "darker than darkness" (p. 30). What
precisely this statement means is difficult tc ascertain. The word 'darker'
means to darken or make dark, which itself means to make or be without
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light or to obscure, while 'darkness' refers to the characteristic of being
dark. Strictly speaking it is questionable whether that which is already in
the state of being dark can actually be more so.
Balance is continually represented as the essence ofEartbsea. For
example, after Archmage Nemmerle has returned Earthsea to
Equilibrium "restored and steady lay the balance of light and dark" (p. 64).
However, there is also evidence of an oppositional conception of light as
good and dark as evil. The phrase "never in the service of ... dark" (p.
166) is suggestive of dark being evil and to be avoided, not merely a
balance to light. This establishes an oppositional relationship with light
that places dark with evil and light with good. The use of the word 'dark' to
describe that which is evil or wicked, and therefore antithetical to light
and good, has a long linguistic history in the West: "And God saw the light,
that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness" (Gen. 1:4,
King James Version, KJV). Although Le Guin claims to be Taoist not
Christian in her philosophical outlook, the division of light and dark and
the view of light as good have heavily influenced the West for many
centuries and this cultural background cannot easily be dispensed with.
The influence of this dichotomous division, and its inherent
labelling, is perhaps far too pervasive and insidious to avoid. Even in
trying to resist a particular attitude the linguistic weight of centuries of
Western meaning makes its appearance in the text as niggling details
which plague the text and upset authorial intention. It is through such
troublesome trifles that deconstruction is able to dig down to the hidden
depths of the text and harass it, by disturbing the apparent smoothness
of the textual surface. In A Wizard of Earthsea the use of the terms 'light'
and 'dark' sometimes suggests a balancing of equal opposites and
sometimes the linking of dark with evil and light with good. Students could

be encouraged to examine how they use the terms 'light' and 'dark', what
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meanings they attach to the use of these words, and whether they use
them in a confused and inconsistent manner as evident in Le Guin's novel.
Another phrase worth examining is:

~danger

must surround power as

shadow does lightm (p. 31). Once again, dark and its characteristics are
deemed undesirable, linked to danger while light is deemed, by associated
deduction, to be linked with not only good but also power. Such strands of
enquiry intersect at vario·1s points with other discussions about power.

Thread 3,254: "'not the powe!l'S I servem
Ogion reprimands Ged for reading a certain spell, explaining to him
that the ~girl herself is half witch already. It may he the mother who sent
the girl to talk to you. It may he she who opened the book to the page you
read. The powPrs she serves are not the powers I servem (p. 31). In such a
statement Ogion indicates a separation between powers in Earthsea. The
mages, such as Ogion, serve the Equilibrium where.;', those such as
Serret serve the "Old Power" (p. 148). The hierarchical order ofEarthsea,
with the mages on Roke holding both power and prestige, is dependent on
the

~owers

that I [the mages) serve'" constituting both the generally

accepted and authoritative power. Those like Serret, who do not serve the
same power, are necessarily seen as oppositional and therefore
threatening, dangerous, and to be avoided.
Roke, a male enclave where only boys are trained to be wizards, is
a segregated world of mages and boys that rarely has a female presence:
That night the Lord ofO was a guest of the school .... [and]
with him was his lady, slender and young, bright as new
copper, her black hair crowned with opals. It was seldom that
any woman sat in the halls of the Great House, and some of
the old Masters looked at her sidelong, disapproving. But the
young men looked at her with all their eyes. (pp. 53-54)
The implied celibacy and virtual exclusion of women and all things female
indicates a very closed existence and world-view. It is perhaps noteworthy
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that while both men and women are born with power 'uch as Ged and
Serret, it is only boys that need years of training. This may well be
another thread of meaning to pursue: female power grows to fruition while
male power must be trained. The Nietzschean interpretation exposes
that the 'other' must remain 'other' if the extant powers wish to retain
their position. This segregated world of the mages feeds their fear and
suspicion of women since it is not possible to understand something of
which one has no knowledge. That which is not understood tends to be
feared, and that which is least understood tends to be most feared. In
society, too, it is those not understood that are feared and rejected. Only in
recent decades have lesbians and homosexuals become more understood
and accepted and therefore less feared and marginalized.
Ged says that ~the Old Powers of earth are not for men to usem (p.

111). Strictly analyzing the words of this statement indicates that the Old
Powers, which are not for men, may, by inference, actually be for women.
The resistance, fear, and rejection that Ged and Ogion display toward this
'other' power seems indicative that it is part of the general fear of, and
separation from, women that characterizes the mages' world. That this
'other' power is always referred to as old is suggestive that the powers
which women such as Serret and h"r mother serve predate the powers
that the mages serve. In this oppositional positioning of powers served by
the mages and those served by, but not exclusively, women is perhaps a
linguistic echo of Western history in which very early matriarchal
societies were usurp..:d and replaced by patriarchal societies, which have
generally held sway until relatively recent times. Students could be
encouraged to extend their Nietzschean examination of A Wizard of
Earthsea in terms of these divisions of power allegiance to an
examination of contemporary society. The advent and growth of women's
issues and women's groups this century were a retaliation against the
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long-standing Western patriarchal society and an attempt to empower
the female position. Within this context what does the recent advent and
growth of men's issues and men's groups signify?

Thread 2,011: "'eastm

On Roke the Master Hand explains to Ged the importance of
balance, the Equilibrium, in Earthsea and says to him, "'To light a candle
is to cast a shadowm (p. 48). A surface reading of this statement seems
~b·rious

enough: when a candle is lit it casts a shadow. A Rousseauistic

interpretation is likely to 'extract' from this the idea of causation in that
all actions and thoughts imply effects, quite possibly imbibing such an
interpretative stance with a sense of religiosity. The approach taken in
the Nietzschean interpretation, however, is quite disparate in intent,
manner, and result. The word 'cast' seems an innocent enough word, but it

actually facilitates an entry point into the text that causes all sorts of
problems and difficulties, demonstrating very clearly the fluid nature of
language. Indeed, the paradoxes and unintended meanings arising from a
deconstructive approach to the use of this word amounts to what some
(particularly those of a vehemently Rousseauistic interpretative
persuasion) may term considerable textual harassment.
From a perusal of several dictionaries the word 'cast' has a
considerable variety of meaning. For example, among other meanings, it
can mean to throw, mould, twist, direct, hold, secure, overthrow, search,

shed, form, and discard. If the text as a whole is considered in the light of
even some of these other definitions it begins exhibiting some quite
startling I.IIld thought-provoking strands of provisional meaning. Cast, as
in 'to mould', can have positive as well as negative connotations. It can be
a creative process as in the act of moulding in sculpture or cooking where
something is poured, placed, or packed into a mould to create a specific
form. However, it can ale1o be a destructive process as in the act offorcing

100

different things or people to conform to a Rpecific design so it appears they
have all been 'cast' from the same mould. The School on Roke trains boys
to be wizards. This can be seen positi'lely, as in creating mages able to
live and work in accordance with the rules ofRoke. This is likely to be the
favoured Rousseouistic interpretation as it supports the status quo and
does not threaten the controlling hierarchy that undertakes the casting of
adepts. It can also be seen negatively, as in the enforced destruction of
individuality in a process that casts all manner ot boys ir. the same
wizard mould. Those who do not make the grade and prove unsatisfactory,
such as Jasper, are 'casf aside, discarded.

On Roke those students who are successfully moulded are admitted
to the ranks of mages while those who are not are discarded or cast aside.
Such a process does not allow for individual expression of opinion or
behaviour that runs contrary to the authorities. In this sense, casting of
the individual, as in to 'mould' and 'twist' the student, prevents the casting
or 'overthrow' of the controlling mage elite. Ged does prove to be suitably
moulded in the end, because he acts and thinks in accordance with the
teachings of the mages on Roke. There is little or no scope for individuality
in the 'cast' process of producing wizards. Nor is there much scope for
women who are either cast as ignorant village witches, like Ged's aunt
(pp. 16-17), powerful but evil sorceresses, like Serret (105-113), or
domestic, like Yarrow (pp. 149-152). Since boys only are trained on Roke
females are never cast in the mould of mages. Does this mean they are
less 'cast' than males or simply that their casting options are fewer?
Cost, as in to 'hold' or 'secure', suggests a restrictive confinement
that not only prevents individual action hut also ties or bonds a person,
preventing movement. In this sense, it is possible to view the text as a
whole as concerned with restricting the role and options open to
individuals by casting them, as in to 'hold', to prevent unwanted
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movement within a prescribed structure. There is also the sense of
casting them tightly, as in to 'secure', to prevent escape from the social
and hierarchical order. It is interesting to note in passing that phonically,
the words 'cast' and 'caste' are identical. Caste, in meaning a rigid social

system that separates and distinguishes between different classes,
echoes the hierarchical, restrictive, and divisional structure of Earthsea
that has been explored through the word 'cast'.
Another phrase in which 'cast' is used can be found in the
• eprimand given to Ged by Archmage Gensher who describes Ged's
released shadow as "'the shadow you cast'" (p. 68). Given previous
discussions about the impact and influence of possible meanings of the
word 'cast' on the novel as a whole, Ged's shadow could be explored as
something moulded or formed by him, as something discarded or rejected
by him, or as something held and secured by him. All of these raise many
questio'ls about the shadow and the relationship between it and Ged. For
example, the idea of the shadow being 'cast' by Ged and thereby stripped
ofits individuality in the process of moulding shifts the power structure in
the novel from a mage/Rtudent scenario to a Gedlshadow scenario. The
shadow tries both attacking (p. 102) and fleeing (p. 127) from Ged, but to
no avail. In addition, it has been so stripped of its personhood that it
barely has any form (p. 64) and often takes the form of other people, such
as Skiorh (pp. 100-101) or Ged (p. 141).
The shadow initially expresses some autonomous actions but
succumbs to Ged's completion of the casting process in which Ged realizes
that "his task had never been to undo what he had begun, but to finish
what he had begun" (p. 138). In this context the shadow is very much the
product of an incomplete casting. In being not completely 'cast' perhaps
explains its lack of form, though it certainly posses~es an embryonic
personality. That the shadow is bonded to Ged is clear from the
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description ofGed having"forged between them a bond, a link that had no
breaking-point" (p. 138). This binding of the shadow to Ged is ve1·y strong
and eventually the casting line is pulled in. Who does the pulling, though?
Ged or shadow or both? Although Ged is terrified of his creation he
eventually overwhelms it and completes the moulding process, casting
the shadow to himself securely.
It is very tempting to ask: what if the casting of the shadow had

not been completed? How would this have affected the shadow, Ged,
Earthsea? Students could pursue these ideas in relation to society. Does
society, the family, or church cast individuals to fit the prescribed order?
And what of those who are incompletely or not properly cast: are they
cast aside like misshapen misfits or discarded as unsuitable? Are such
rejects less moulded, confined, restricted, or bound than those who have
been successfully cast? What advantages or privileges do the
'successfully cast' have in society, the church, the community, the
family? Can society function without the casting process, without the
socialization of its members? Is it only the 'successfully cast' who impact
on the world? Are Chuang Tzu, Jesus Christ, and Buddha representative
of the successfully cast or the cast aside, the rejected misfits of the world?
And what of Hitler or Stalin or Pol Pot? The pursuit of provisional threads
of meaning and the innumerable questions raised, both to do with the text
and life in general, are typical not only of the Nietzschean position's
refusal to arrive at conclusions but also of its incessant asking of even
more questions instead. Definitive textual meaning is always infinitely
deferred, but provisional meanings are inevitably thought-provoking, if
not somewhat disconcerting, and always playful.
The execution of the Nietzschean interpretation of the text through
the window of the word 'cast' facilitates an extraordinary and stimulating
view of the novel from completely different perspectives. An entirely
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different approach to the use of the word 'cast' would be to concentrate on
the textual selection of a lighted candle casting a shadow, when a lighted
candle could equally be said to cast light, not shadow. In pursuing the
Nietzschean reading of a text students can be encouraged to explore how
words actually work to mean something and how the context in which
words are lodged influences how those words are read and meaning
attributed. In the Nietzschean interpretative approach an understanding
of how language works to communicate ideas and make meaning is
facilitated. It also alerts students to how the surface reading of a text
remains ignorant of the enormous currents and cross-currentA of

provisional meauings that lurk hidden beneath the surface. Reading the
text in light of these other meanings of the word 'cast' facilitates a broad
consideration of textual communication and meaning that fosters a high
level of critical textual engagement on the part of the student. In the
Nietzschean interpretative position students are challenged and provoked
in ways not possible in the Rousseauistic interpretative approach.
Thread 108: "high, ancient, enwoven spells"

When thwarted in fleeing from his shadow to Roke, Ged realizes
that he could not go there because he is "forbidden by the high, enwoven,
ancient spells that kept the perilous island safe" (p. 94). The use of"high",
"ancient" and "enwoven" to describe the most powerful and ancient spells
in all of Earthsea are indicative of binary opposites. That which is
low/common, new/revolutionary, and loose/unravelled/separated is
necessarily placed in an oppositional position to the ancient spells that
protect Roke. In other words there seems to be a division between the old,
aristocratic, traditions!, and closed (Roke and all it stands for) and what is
low, new, and open (that which is oppositional to Roke).
The thrust of the novel, revolving around Ged and his journey
towards becoming "one" (p. 164) and "whole" (p. 166), indicates that
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finished, closed, and completed is the ultimate and highest goal to be
sought after and achieved. The emphasis is on ordered fusion, a bringing
together, that by its very process restricts and prevents other
possibilities. By contrast, the oppositional position is lowly/mundane,
new/revolutionary, and open/loose. In pursuing such a strand of enquiry
the Nietzschean interpretative characteristic of isolating the opposite to
that which is stated in the text facilitates an exploration of the 'unsaid'
textual discourse. In this way the deconstructive process encourages an
examination of what the text actually says and promotes by
concentrating not on what it says but on what it does not say. The
'unsaid' in society and its institutions can also be similarly explored by
locating oppositions in the textual fabric of society.

Thread 869: "shadow"
There is considerable confusion and contradiction over the use of
the word 'shadow' in the novel. The shadow is obviously a central motif,
but it is so variously described that, when carefully examined, its use
raises more questions than answers. Some of the numerous descriptions
include: "a shapeless clot of shadow" (p. 30); "something like a clot of
black shadow, quick and hideous" (p. 64); ~has no namem (p. 68); ~one of
the powers ofUnlifem (p. 68); ~the shadow of your arrogance, the shadow
of your ignorance, the shadow you castm (p. 68); "it stood on the side of the
living" (p. 81); "having no real form of ita own as yet" (p. 83); "like a bear
with no head" (p. 83); "the gebbeth" (p. 101); ~my shadowm (p. 126); and,
"crawling on four short taloned legs .... lifting up to him a blind unformed
snout without lips or ears or eyes .... [or]lips or tongue" (p. 164). Picking
up on even several of these, the shadow cannot be a power of 'Unlife',
Ged's creature, a 'gebbeth', and a shapeless clot all at the same time.
Certainly, the novel indicates the sh&dow is able to change shape
which suits the narrative process and the apparent authorial intention.
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However, the Nietzschean interpretative position is able ro probe the text
for meanings that the author did not intend, but slipped in unnoticed. For
,example, in describing the shadow as a power of Unlife, a gebbeth, Ged's
creature, and the shadow he casts displays uncertainty about whether it
is a separate creature of evil and ill-will or an aspect of Ged that
represents his darker side. Within the context of the srory the shadow
represents some aspect of Ged that is released, proves dangerous, and is
united with Ged so he can be whole. However, the inconsistent
descriptions of the shadow betray a hesitancy to fully commit ro the idea
that the shadow is actually a part of Ged, representing his dark side.
From such discrepancies concerning descriptions of the shadow an
unease with the shadow, with what it is, and with what it represents can
be discerned. If the shadow is supposed ro be Ged's darker side that he
must unite with in order to achieve wholeness then it would seem
reasonable to expect consistency in descriptions of the shadow as
actually being Ged's dark side. Many references to the shadow clearly
position it as being a part of Ged, related ro Ged, connected to Ged, an
aspect of his darker side, his creature, the shadow he casts, and so on.
However, there are also references ro the shadow that equally clearly
describe it as a very separate entity, a 'gebbeth', a power of'Unlife', or a
shapeless clot ofblackness. These descriptions of the shadow are fewer in
number compared with descriptions that indicate a relationship between
Ged and the shadow. Nevertheless, their existence provides gaps for a
deconstruction of the text that exposes ~onfusion chout the shadow.
Textusl examination from the Nietzschean interpretative position
indicates a speculative consideration of the question of evil which is
unresolved. Le Guin professes an anti-Christian life-stance and
agreement with Jung's concept of the shadow and the need ro assimilate
the dark side of one's nature, so foundational to the Rousseauistic
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interpretation of the novel that centres on Jungian psychology. However,
inconsistencies in descriptions of the shadow as being representative of
Ged's dark side indicate that authorial belief did not completely obliterate
references to the Western concept of evil as something contrary to good.
Echoes of Western ideas concerning evil can be seen in the descriptions of
the shadow as a terrifying type of monster or as a power that threatens
life, seeking to do evil. From such a deconstructive analysis of the text
students are able to examine the way in which language functions both to
construct meaning and to undo that meaning, and the way it carries with
it centuries of cultural baggage that are not easily discarded.
Thread 484: "true name"

In Earthsea names play such a vital role that no one knows a
person's "true name but himself and his namer. He may choose at length

to tell it to his brother, or his wife .... Who knows a man's name, holds
that man's life in his keeping" (p. 70). People are known by their 'use'
names, hut th.eir 'true' names are secret, given by wizards in a naming
ceremony, and are generally not shared with any other person. Knowledge
of an individual's 'true' name gives a person power over that individual.
Only the shadow has no name until Ged names it with his name.
Nevertheless, at sea Ged and Vetch find it difficult to catch any fish
because "even when they called out fisherman's charms they caught very
little, for the fish of the Open Sea do not know their own names and pay
no heed to magic" (p. 166). Serret also makes mention of names, but she
refers to '"things not named in the Namer's listsm (p. 110).
The shadow is described as coming ~from a place where there are
no namesm (p. 68). That the shadow is considered a threat indicates some
sort of correlation between name and danger. Only after Ged has named
the shadow "with his own name" (p. 166) does it cease to be a threat. If
the Equilibrium were to fail then '"in the old silence all voices and all
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names would be lost'" (p. 51). Why are names so important in Earthsea,
particularly 'true' names? If fish live in the Open Sea not knowing theh·
true names then why are 'true' names so vitally important to most of
Earthsea. Clearly knowledge of one's true name is not necessary for
existence. This then leads to questioning about what it is necessaryfor.
Is the system of true names, for example, tied to the wizard's
power over Earthsea? Or is it that one's true self is generally kept from
others, with people rarely interrelating on anything but a superficial level?
Does this situation become problematic for Ged because he separates
from part ofhimself, the part that is kept hidden from others? Is the novel
actually talking about the need to keep one's true self absolutely hidden
from most other people? Is it the true self that is actually given a
separate name, not known to others, which represents a separate hidden
identity? Does the system of 'true' names protect individuality or coerce a
population into submissive and obedient behaviour? Such questions
rather upset the Rousseauistic interpretation that sees the novel as a
story about integrating one's dark side to achieve a balanced, whole
personhood. Nevertheless, the incessant questioning of the Nietzschean
interpretative position assists students to be radically critical of the text,
and also of society, to discover what has been left unsaid amongst the
words on the 'page'. The pedagogic value of the Nietzschean interpretative
position is that in affirming free play it directs student attention to the
multiplicity of meaning contsined in the ever-shifting fluidity of language
and to what is hidden beneath the textual surface.

Thread 277: "'change what cennot be changed"'
The Master Namer tells his pupils that even a mage only controls:
'what is near him, what be can name exactly and wholly. And
this is well. If it were not so, the wickedness of the powerful or
the folly of the wise would long ago have sought to change
what cannot be changed, and Equilibrium would fail.' (p. 51)
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Either something can be changed or it cannot. How is it possible to
change something that it is not possible to change? There seems to be
confusion over what can be changed and what cannot be changed. This is
one of the many contradictions in terms that frequent A Wizard of
Earthsea. Other examples would include "only in silence the word ... only
in dying life" (p. 12). From the Rousseaui.stic interpretation such phrases
take on a religious sense in which the seemingly impossible or mystical is
being communicated. The Nietzschean interpretation, however, examines
the words themselves. Why do certain words seem to be so profound and
carry such a weight of meaning when the words themselves carry no such
profundity? How can words mean more than they mean? 1n asking such
questions the Nietzschean interpretative position directs students
towards a critical understanding of the functioning of language,
particularly within a cultural and religious framework.
For example, in Christianity phrases such as "But many that are
first shall be last; and the last first" (Mark 10:31, KJV) or "He that
findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find
it" (Mt. 10:39) do not make a great deal of sense or furnish any profound
meaning if the words alone are carefully studied. Likewise, in Taoism
neither do phrases such as "You may look at it and not see it .. You may
listen to it but not hear it ... You may touch it but not feel it"
(McNaughton, 1971, p. 11) make much sense. Indeed, they are not
necessarily any less nonsensical or more profoundly meaningful than
phrases such as: "The sun was shining on the sea ... [but it was]/ The
middle of the night" (Carroll, 1974, p. 167), ""!heir shoes were clean and
neat ... [but]/ They hadn't any feetm (p. 168), or "'I only wish I had such
eyes .... To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too!m (p. 206).
It is no more possible to adequately explain, understand, or
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interpret such words as "He that findeth his life shall lose it" or "touch ...
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I
and not feel" than such words as '"The sun was shining ... [in]the nightm.
However, what makes the former (Christian and Taoist words) seem
profound as words of meaning and the latter (Carroll's words) amusing as
words of nonsense is the religiosity attached to the former, which is
lacking in the latter. Religious/philosophical phrases can seem
nonsensical when the textual words are closely examined, but as part of a
broader context of an 'on-high' delivery of'definitive meaning' they assume
a status that suggests such words actually convey something of profound
importance. They also suggest a certain veneration: that which appears
confusing, baffling, or contradictory is actually conveying 'great' or
'ancient' wisdom that seems obfuscating only because 'mere mortals' are
unable to fully understand.
Similarly, it seems 'natural' to invest certain words in non-religious
literature, such as poetry, with 'meaning' because of their implied
'religiosity' or profundity. Hence, phrases such as ~change what cannot be
cbangedm (p. 51) or "only in dying life" (p. 12) do not mean a great deal
linguistically but as part of the novel's contextual framework they
'appear' to mean something profound. The transcendent nature of
religious thinking and its treatment of sacred texts historically affected
approaches to secular texts. Such texts were judged and studied by what
they appeared to 'mean'. That is, there is an approach to secular
literature that involves the Rousseanistic search for the transcendent.
This impulse is rejected by the Nietzschean interpretation which seeks to
expose such logocentric approaches to all texts, disclose the instability of
language and meaning, and reveal how meaning is constructed.
Words used in a certain context carry with them not just linguistic
meaning but also cultural and religious meaning that elevate those words
to mean more than they actually mean. The deconstructive process uses
such words to expose the underground meanings of the text. Conversely,
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the words themselves can be examined to see how discourses can be
made to function through them. For example, the word 'fall' can open up
the Christian discourse of the fall of man (humankind), not to mention the
Eve discourse. Use of the Nietzschean interpretation encourages
students to be critical of what they read, how they read, and how they
invest words with meaning. This interpretative position helps students to
become critical readers rather than responsive readers, and therefore
critical members of society rather than responsive members. In alerting
students to how language can be used to communicate certain meanings,
that lead people to interpret the text in a specific way and to invest in a
specific meaning, fosters literary criticism that is open and challenging.

Thread 666: "Weak as woman's magic"
In Earthsea the options open to women are strictly limited. A
woman may be a common village witch such as Ged's aunt, or an evil
sorceress such as Serret, or assume a housewife-type role such as
Yarrow. Indeed, Yarrow, is the only female in the novel who is described,
while not in glowing positive terms, at least not in a negative way or a
way that concentrates on her looks alone: she cooks, spins, keeps house
for her older brothers, and is "mistress of' her house (p. 149).
One of the longest descriptions in the novel of a woman concerns
Ged's maternal aunt:
There is a saying on Gont, Weak as woman's magic, and there
is another saying, Wicked as Woman's magic. Now the witch of
Ten Alders was no black sorceress ... but being an ignorant
woman .... she often used her crafts to foolish and dubious
ends. She knew nothing of the Balance and the Pattern which
the true wizard knows and serves.... Much of her lore was
mere rubbish and humbug, nor did she know the true spells
from the false. She knew many curses, and was better at
causing sickness, perhaps, than curin!( it. ( pp. 16- 17)
This village witch has limited power, is ignorant, and more troublesome
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than evil. Like her male counterpart, the weatherworker, she is seen as
no threat by the mages on Roke. In the characters of Lord Benderesk and
Serret the evil that both men and women are capable of, from the mage
point of view, can be seen. However, the linking of female magic to
'weakness' and 'wickedness' indicates a binary opposition that necessarily
places male magic as powerful and good. Individual males, such as Lord
Benderesk, may be evil but magic associated with the male population, as
a whole, is not described as 'weak' or 'wicked'. This textual gap furnishes a
view of the novel's sub-conscious where women's magic has been given a

secondary and inferior role to that of the primary place of male magic, and
is conceived from the dominant male perspective to be a complication or
disruption, or at worst a threat, to their privileged position.
In asking what happens if these positions were to be reversed
exposes the dependence of the narrative on the opposition of male and
female magic. If women's magic is seen as powerful and good what does
this do the text as a whole? To begin with, it means that it is now men's
magic that is weak and wicked. This indicates that in order for the male
population, and particularly the mages, to maintain their position they
must reduce women and their magic to both a lowly and contrary position.
In this way the threat that women constitute to the social order is kept in

check and under control. So, from the male point of view women either
know nothing of the balance like Ged's aunt, ignore it like Serret, or
willingly uphold it like Yarrow. Women's magic is considered 'weak' and
'wicked' only because to view it in any other way is a threat to men in
general and to the mages in particnlar.
The narrative structure depends on the sublimation of women to
the 'lower' half of the opposition. If, for example, both men's and women's
magic were described as powerful and good or weak and wicked this would
indicate a very different structure. The Nietzschean practice of seeking
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oppositions and then reversing them facilitates not only a radical
exploration of the oppositions themselves hut also of how they function in
the text. The 'weakness' and 'wickedness' of women's magic draws

attention to the unsaid in the novel. Students can also explore society and
its institutions for examples of oppositional structures, how these

operate, and who is privileged or marginalized by them. In this way, the
underbelly of the societal 'text' can be exposed and examined. In the
Nietzschean interpretation it is always the unsaid in the text that proves

to have the most to say and to be the most provocative and challenging.
In 'rocking the boat' the Nietzschean position demonstrates to students

how and why the boat seemed steady in the first place.
Value of the Nieb ""hean Interpretation
The Nietzschean position facilitates interpretations that are both
challenging and playful, and also infinite. Deconstruction of A Wizard of
Earthsea is a mode of reading that can proceed indefinitely. The sample of
threads that have been pursued are merely illustrative of the endless
tapestry of provisional meaning that is possible from the Nietzschean
position. Moreover, such discussions themselves are also potentially
indefinite. Any Nietzsche an interpretation, therefore, a! ways remains
partial and evolving because the very process itself is infinite. It would be
in keeping with the Nietzschean position to deconstruct the text of a
previous deconstruction, creating even more textual play and provisional
meaning. The possibilities of this interpretative position, as illustrated in
this chapter, are quite literally limitless, inevitably raising more and more
questions and conundrums. The relentless questioning that characterizes
the Nietzschean position is where Derrida situates "the pedagogic effect
of deconstruction" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 158). Answers and final
resolutions are not part of the makeup of the Nietzschean interpretation,
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as they are of the Rousseauistic interpretation. This process encourages
and challenges critical reflection and response as the reader has to
'discover' threads and th€n choose which onet! to follow.
While it is obvious why the Roussetmistic interpretati'Jn, in its
concern with finding meaning, is attractive to religious educators it may

not be as immediately obvious why the Nietzschean interpretation should
also be attractive to religious educakrs. Pedagogically, this position could
be seen as potentially problematic because having students explore the

absence of finite meaning in literature, the absence of the transcendental
signified, is possibly not helpful to students grappling with growing up and
finding meaning in their lives. Nevertheless, this position farilitates a failsafe mechanism that forestalls religious (or sectarian) chauvinism and
messianism. Thus, the situation where a religious educator 'teaches' that
a text is only about a particular thing, divulging a particular 'message', is
an impossibility in the Nietzschean position. The call for Religious
Education to be "practised in ways that are broad and inclusive" (supra
vide, p. 11) is affirmed and enabled by the Nietzschean interpretation.

Moreo,·er, it is only the Nietzschean interpretative position that
helps the reader to understand the constructedness of text and of
meaning. In pointing to the instability of language, this Derridean
interpretation demonstrates how words are used and how meaning is
made. Derrida considers deconstruction to be an important part of
education and, indeed, feels that it "must have effects on teaching at all
levels. I would say this without hesitation" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 14).
Students can be encouraged to relate what they have explored in a
deconstruction of A Wizard of Earthsea to society generally, to
themselves, to the church, and to other texts (secular and sacred). While
the Rousseauistic position is valuable because of its concern with the
search for definitive meaning, the Nietzschean position is valuable in its
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denial of definitive meaniiljl;. The Nietzschean interpretation affords a far
greater scope for meaning than does the Rousseauistic interpretation
because it enriches the reading of literature in Religious Education hy
Lroadening awareness e.nd understanding of texts and life, by
demonstrating the constructed nature of language and texts, and by
investigating the process of making meaning. Johnson considers that:
The kind of truth that the text was conveying was much more
complex and profound than a simple determination of meaning
could possibly suggest. It seems to me that the most effective
teaclring that would derive from deconstruction would begin by
emphasizing how much more meaningful the text might
potentially be, rather than how much Jess meaningful it cou!d
be, by deciding to respect its silences, or respect its forking
paths. (Salusinszky, 1987, pp. 162-163)
The teaching style employed in the Nietzschean interpretation
could well be described as a democratic journey without end. Although the
teacher may have specific aspects he/she wishes the students to explore,
the nature of this interpretative position is that original input from the
students is as vital and privileged as that of the teacher. If students are
to develop into critical readers and come to understand the
constructedness of language, text, and meaning their involvement in the
deconstructive process is essential. In the Nietzschean position both
teacher and students corporately own the journeys of textual exploration,
whether the text be a novel, a sacred writing, a social structure, another
culture, or a different belief system. In the classroom such corporate
ownership would arise from individual, group, and class work.
The possibilities for the reading of literature in the Religious
Education classroom from the Nietzschean position are endless, fun, and
'meaningful'. Nor is deconstruction something that can ouly be applied to
texts. Bradbury (1985) considers that deconstruction "offers us not so
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utilized by the Nietzschean position. Crossan's description of the parable
as testing the limits oflanguage and the excitement involved in sailing "as
close as possible into the wind" (1988, p. 29) are reminiscent of joy and
lack of safety in the Nietzschean position. The emphasis on imagination
and faotasy in Religious Education provides an excellent foundation upon
which to pursue the Nietzschean interpretation, and is a natural
extension of their use. The possibility of the 'other' is a pre-requisite hoth
of seeking the transcendental and using the Nietzschean interpret&tion.
Le Guin (1979) observes that some people "are afraid of dragons because

they are afraid of freedom" (p. 44). Likewise, it could be observed of some
people that they are afraid of the Nietzschean interpretation because
they are afraid of the freedom it furnishes, afraid of the freedom to pursue
the free play of endless chains of signifiers.
The value of the Nietzschean position is immense. The time has
come in the reading ofliterature in the Religious Education classroom to
not only talk ahout the search for meaning, what Derrida would describe
as the Rousseauistic seeking of absolute meaning. The time has also
come to talk about the many possibilities, the often extraordinary and
startling possibilities, of other sorts of meaning, what Derrida would term
the Nietzschean play of provisional meanings:
"The time has come", the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes- and ships- and sealing-waxOf cabbages - and kings And why the sea is boiling hotAnd whether pigs have wings." (Carroll, 1974, p. 169)
And what does such Nietzschean 'talking' constitute in the final analyeis?
To return, yet again, to Derrida: "What deconstruction is not? everything
of course! What is deconstruction? nothing of course!" (Wood &
Bernasconi, 1988, p. 5). Johnson, an eminent practitioner of
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deconstruction in the United States of America, very much echoes
Derrida's thoughts: "When I give a talk that is asking certain questions,
and Ym asked after it 'Was that deconstructive?' I always have to answer
'Yes, and no, and I don't knowm (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 173).
Reading a text from the Nietzschean position is a kaleidoscope of
possibilities. It is a fun exercise in generating successive threads of
meaning, none of which are considered preferred, superior, or the most
true. The Nietzschean interpretation does not 'make' words '"mean

different thingsm (Carroll, 1974, p. 197) but, in revealing the instability of
language, exposes the different meanings already inherent in the words
themselves. For Derrida the Nietzschean deconstructive process is
ineffable yet it effortlessly facilitates both relentless questioning and
joyous affirmation, furnishing an infinite array of provisional meanings
and a veritable melangery of never-ending possibilities. The emphasis on
questioning forms part of a guiding principle for Derrida: "that we should
question, that we shouldn't sleep, [and] that we shouldn't take any
concept for granted" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 17). The Nietzschean
interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea stimulates the creative
imagination producing a plethora of textual threads. Reading the novel
from this position there are no signifieds, as in the Rousseauistic position,
only endless chains of signifiers. Rather than an emphasis on
essentialism, so systemic in the Rousseauistic position, there is an
emphasis on multiplicity in the Nietzschean position. It may seem
problematic to the religious educator that the Nietzschean and
Rousseauistic interpretations are so oppositional but Derrida suggests a
way forward that is immensely valuable for those involved in teaching
Religious Education.
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CHAPTERSIX
Relevance and Value of the Study
The Derridean Common Ground

In the irreconcilable nature of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean
interpretations Derrida contrasts grounded and ungrounded modes of
interpretation as represented by the polar opposition between Rousseau
and Nietzsche. Derrida is pointing to the diametric opposition between
decipherment and play, theism and atheism, and logocentrism and
deconstruction (Hart, 1991, p. 121).The theories of Rousseau assume a
ground or centre or presence, producing a natural theism, whereas the
theories of Nietzsche reject any metaphysical concept of true Being or
presence or centre, producing atheism and the doctrine of God's death. For
Derrida, there is a binary opposition between Rousseau's belief in the
transcendent, representing a logocentric outlook, and Nietzsche's radical
decentring, representing free play.
Derrida's theories have "often been read as urging us to choose the
second interpretation of interpretation" (Culler, 1983, p. 132). However,
Derrida (1978) suggests not choice between two alternatives but common
ground: he is calling for the act of conceiving "of the common ground" (p.
293). It is this "common ground", this 'co-existence' of opposites, that
makes Derrida's interpretations so valuable as an approach for reading
literature in Religious Education. Although Derrida prefers the
Nietzschean position he claims that there is no question of choosing:
For my part, although these two interpretations must
acknowledge and accentuate their differences and define their
irreducibility, I do not believe that today there is any question
of choosing . .. because we must try to conceive of the
common ground, and the differance of this irreducible
difference. (Derrida, 1978, p. 293)
These two positions, then, are not reducible to other elements from which
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a common ground may be found and the differences between them must
be noted and highlighted. Nevertheless, although the interpretations "are
absolutely irreconcilable", 'seeming' to prohibit each other, Derrida insists
on conceiving of the common ground and the "differance of this irreducible
difference" (p. 293). Indeed, differance "disallows our choosing between the
Rousseauistic and the Nietzschean theories of interpretation" (Hart,
1991, p. 122). Derrida (1978) emphasizes that even "to live them
simultaneously", to seek the common ground, they remain absolutely
irreducible and irreconcilable (p. 293 ).
Derrida applauds the free play that is facilitated by the
Nietzschean interpretation but also acknowledges that "even today the
notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself"
(Derrida, 1978, p. 279). The common ground of the irreducible
Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations furnishes a pluralistic
approach that is multifaceted, challenging, and stimulating. Derrida's two
interpretations look toward a common ground that accommodates both:
one that satisfies the need for centres and one that challenges and
encourages play. In Chapter Four, the Rousseauistic emphasis on the
centre was explored through the Jungian concept of the shadow in which
Ged's story is seen as a journey to wholeness culminating in the
assimilation of his shadow when they "met, and joined, and were one" (Le
Guin, 1993, p. 164). Alternatively, in Chapter Five the Nietzschean
emphasis on free play was explored with reference to a number of
provisional meanings such as "had sent him to read that spell" (p. 114) in
which the apparent unity of the novel collapses when Ged blames a girl
for releasing his shadow. The Derridean common ground does not require
choice between these two interpretative processes but facilitates both:
centres, such as the Jungian concept of the shadow, and play, such as the
textual gap "had sent him to read that spell".
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The neologism differance was coined by Derrida to indicate that
meaning is found in difference and is infinitely deferred. "To spell differaoce
with an a instead of an e is of course to press against the limits of a

logocentric language" (Culler, 1981, p. 41). In French the 'a' can be
discerned only in the written word, not in the spoken word. Derrida intends
"that differance should function not as a concept ... hut as one set of
marks in a signifying chain which exceeds and disturbs the classical
economy of language and representation" (Norris, 1987, p. 15). While
Derrida accepts the Saussurean emphasis on difference he rejects
Saussure's fusion of signified and signifier:
Dif{erance . .. designates both a "passive" difference already in
place as the condition of signification and an act of differing
which produces differences. An analogous English term is
spacing, which designates both an arrangement and an act of
distribution or arranging. (Culler, 1983, p. 97)

There is an endless chain of signifiers never fused to signifieds. Meaning is
permanently and infinitely deferred. In this space between the signified
and the signifier there is endless play. For Derrida (1987) differance is "the
systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing
by means of which elements are related to each other" (p. 27).
With respect to the two interpretations, Derrida is suggesting that
the common ground is one of differance. It is in differance (comprising both
difference and deferral) that the two interpretations of interpretation,
which "must acknowledge and accentuate their differences and define
their irreducibility", can co-exist (Derrida, 1978, p. 293). Caputo (1989)
comments that the role of differance is to:
establish the conditions within which discourse functions. It
founds (and un-founds, undermines) languages, vocabularies,
showing how they are both possible and impossible, that is,
incapable of a closure which would give them self-sufficiency
and a feeling of success in nailing things down. (p. 28)
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It is Derrida's "common ground" of differance that furnishes such
positive implications for reading literature in Religious Education.
Meaning is found not only in difference but is also infinitely deferred. For
Derrida (1991) in "a language, in the system oflanguage, there are only
differences" (p. 64) which "are 'produced'- deferred- bydifferance" (p. 66).
The particular value of Derrida's theoretical position is that it seeks a
common ground that acknowledges anxiety at the loss of the logocentric
but joyously affirms free play. Choice is not permitted between these
dichotomous interpretetions and the Derridean common ground facilitates
e reading of literature that allows for both interpretetions (seeking the
centre and playing with signifiers). The intertwining of difference and
deferral is all encompassing. Within the Nietzschean position is the
implicit presence of its opposite, the Rousseauistic position, and vice
versa. Deconstruction, the Nietzschean position, affords marginal
readings and endless threads of provisional meaning; while the
Rousseauistic position affords the search for, and examination of, the
centre, of many possible centres. In this way, it is possible to read A
Wizard ofEarthsea from both the Rousseauistic interpretation concerned
with a centre of Taoist balance, as explored in Chapter Four, and the
Nietzschean interpretation concerned with chains of signifiers to do with
"light", as explored in Chapter Five.
V!!lue of the Derrideap Approach
It may be argued that Post-Structuralism (particularly

Nietzscbean deconstruction) with its emphasis on the impossibility of
final meaning is contrapositive to Religious Education with its emphasis
on the search for definitive meaning. Barry (1995) observes that linguistic
"anxiety ... is a keynote of the post-structuralist outlook" (p. 65) that
unfortunately tends to result in what could be described as "terminal
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anxieties about the possibility of achieving any knowledge through
language" (p. 64). The impossibility of definitive meaning may produce
anxiety, as seen in the wake left by Hartman, the American
deconstructionist, "who plunged into deconstruction with gay abandon and
left ... a recklessly scattered trail of fragmentary texts" (Selden, 1985, p.
94). Nevertheless Post-Structuralism generally, and deconstruction in
particular, can prcduce anxiety due to the lack of stable reference points.
The universe is one of "radical uncertainty, since we can have no access

to any fixed landmark which is beyond linguistic processing, and hence we
have no standard by which to measure anything" (Barry, 1995, p. 61). In
addition, the impossibility of absolute meaning and the incessant asking
of questions that produce no answers but only more questions means that
it can no longer be asked of a text "'What does it mean?' without
simultaneously asking, 'What are the conditions by which it means? What
does its meaning mean?m (Moon, 1990, p. 14).
The influence of modern literary theory becomes potentially
dubious if it furnishes no 'useful meaning' in the real world of suffering and
pain, joy and happiness. Eagleton humorously observes of one strand of
Post-Modernism, which could equally apply to Post-Structuralism, that
living in a world that has moved beyond logocentrism is to:
live dangerously, decentredly, without ends or grounds or
origins, letting rip the odd snarl of sardonic laughter and
dancing ecstatically on the brink of the abyss. It is hard to
know what this would mean in practice - how exactly one
would live 'decentredly' in Chipping Norton, and whether
dancing on the brink of the abyss is compatible with, say,
wearing hom-rimmed spectacles or returning one's library
books on time. (1996, p. 64)
The unsettling effects of any modem literary theory and its relation
to a person's lived experience oflife are serious issues that impact directly
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on the theory's value and relevance to hum,m life. Such considerations
are vitally importsnt to Religious Education with its emphasis on "the
myriad waya in which meaning and purpose in human existence has been
and is sought" (supra vide, p. 11). However, in Derrida's "two

interpretations of interpretation" i• a positive yet challenging theoretical
stance for reading literature in Religious Education that both reassures
and unsettles at the same time. Reading A Wizard of Earthsea from
Derrida's two interpretative positions both reassures, as in the concept of
Taoist balance seen reflected in the "Equilibrium" (illustrated in Chapter
Four), and unsettles, as in threads of meaning to do with "argue"
(illustrated in Chapter Five).
The Derridean common ground facilitates an approach that not
only advocates playfulness, characteristic of the Nietzschean
interpretation, but also recognizes anxiety associated with the loss of the
centre. Derrid• acknowledges the human need for fixing centres into
structures in order to explain, provide "reassuring certitude", and

overcome anxiety (Derrida, 1978, p. 279). The value of the Derridean
approach is that it emphasizes the common ground of both interpretative
positions, and not the selection of one to the exclusion of the other. To
choose only one interpretation is not only to severely limit the potential of
any interpretative process but also to misunderstand Derrida's two
interpretative positions. Choosing to read the Le Guin novel, for example,
from either a Rousseauistic interpretation concerned with Taoist 'balance'
or a Nietzschean interpretation concerned with threads of meaning about
'balance' not only drastically confinee and restricts the interpretative
possibilities but totally misconstrues the Derridean common ground.
In practice, it is the Rousseauistic position that dominates reading

practices in Religious Education because of the emphasis on the search
for meaning. In Chapter Fout the two examples of this interpretation
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(Jungian and Taoist) likely to be adopted by religious educators in reading
A Wizard ofEarthsea, because of their concern with providing definitive
explanations and meaning, were discussed. Developments in Religious

Education mean that now, on the whole, the meaning extracted from a
text is no longer championed as the 'Truth'. Instead there are a variety of
truths or centres or origins that can be found in the text; but there is still,
in Derridean terms, a centre. For example, in A Wizard of Eartbsea it is
possible to examine it as pointing to Taoist philosophy or Jungian
psychology. This approach to reading literature still seeks to understand
the structure by giving it a <"entre, and bringing to an end play and the
order of the sign (at least temporarily until the next truth is sought). Such
reading practices, while valuable as a means of exploring meaning, do not
do away with or move beyond seeking the centre.
There is also value to be gained in the Nietzschean position, which
affirms the noncentre. Marginal readings are encouraged and in pursuing
multiple threads of meaning it is demonstrated how meaning is both
constructed and invested in. In Chapter Five, exploring the use of the
words 'dark' and 1ight' in the novel revealed the instability oflanguage in
communicating meaning and indicated how certain meanings are

constructed and invested in to the exclusion of others. Taken singularly,
the Nietzschean position prohibits the value to be gained by seeking the
centre, by pursuing Taoist or Jungian concepts; and the Rousseauistic
position prohibits the value to be gained by pursuing endless threads of
provisional meaning about 'dark' or 'light'. However, taken together, as
Derrida insists, the common ground of the irreducible Rousseauistic and
Nietzschean interpretations furnishes multiple interpretations that are
rich, nourishing, thought-provoking, and meaningful. There is both centre
and play, both reassurance and challenge, both the Jungian concept of
the shadow (as discussed in Chapter Four) and threads of provisional

125

I

meaning such as "dark" (Gs explored in Chapter Five).
The place of story ir, Religious Education is well-established, and
the emphasis on fantasy and imagination as tools of transcendence have
been passionately pursued by a number of writers and educators. These
fruitful approaches in Religious Education to the role of story,
imagination, and fantasy can be greatly enhanced by Derridean theory.
Imagination and fantasy, by their very nature, challenge and transcend
the mundane and cognitive world. The scope for endlessly creative, open,
stimulating, questioning, and even dangerous play afforded by the
Nietzschean interpretation immensely enriches the already potent force
of imagination and fantasy to speak of mystery, 'meaning', and enigma.

Exploration ofNietzschean threads to do with "cast", for example, enable
a reading of A Wizard of Earthsea that is both creative and stimulating
as well as challenging, even frightening.
Derrida considers that centring a structure belongs to a logocentric
view of the world. There is obviously a human need for centres, and even
Derrida accepts that structures cannot exist without centres, which no
doubt explains the extraordinary place of story in all cultures. Stories help
make sense of this seemingly chaotic world by demonstrating the
shapefulness within the shapelessness. This is why literature, both
religious and secular, has so much value for human society. And this is
why Derrida's two "interpretations of interpretation" are so important for

the reading of literature in Religious Education: they provide a way to read
literature that allows for the shapefulness to form out of the
shapelessness and then dissolve back into it, infinitely. The Derridean
approach facilitates a reading of literature that not only seeks absolute
meaning by centring the structure, such as ou the Jungian concept of the
shadow in Ged's journey towards wholeness, but that also deconstructs
the structure by playing with threads of provisional meaning, such as
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that undermine the surface unity of the text. In practice, then,

learning about the human situation and concern with the search for
meaning (the foundational position of Religious Education) are greatly
enhanced and extended by pursuing the Derridean common ground that
incorporates both the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations one that satisfies the need for centres, by centring the novel on the Taoist
concept of balance, and one that questions and encourages play, by
playing with words such as 'perilous'.
As a methodological approach for reading literature in Religious

Education the Derridean common ground facilitates a rich, rewarding, fun,
serious, finite, and infinite search for meaning. As illustrated in this thesis,
it will be possible to read A Wizard of Earthsea, or any text, finding
centres and following threads without having to choose between one
interpretative position or the other, between one that is closed and one
that is not. Hence, for example, in A Wizard of Earthsea the
Rousseauistic interpretation allows for exploration of different centres,
such as Taoism or Jungian psychology, while the Nietzschean
interpretation facilitates free play in the text in its pursuit of various
threads of meaning, no one of which is seen as dominant or preferred over
another. The inclusivity of the Derridean common ground, incorporating
both l(ousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations, allows for both
centres and play. Therein, lies the value of Derrida's ideas for reading
literature in Religious Education. The reading practices in Religious
Education that commonly only pursue the Rousseauistic interpretation
can be significantly broadened by the addition of the Nietzschean
interpretation. Derrida advocates the common ground of these two
irreconcilable interpretations, one that accommodates both the
Nietzschean impossibility of transcendent meaning and the
Rousseauistic search for absolute meaning. As a methodological process
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for reading literature in Religious Education the Derridean common
ground supports the concerns of religious educators like Grimmitt (1978;
1987), Horder (1975) and Hull (1982), as discussed in Chapters One and
Two, that Religious Education be broad, open, and inclusive.
Application to other Texts
From an initial study of A Wizard of Earthsea students could be
encouraged to explore the intertextuality of some of the issues raised by
examining other texts, sacred or secular, that deal with the idea of the
shadow or dark side of human nature. The surface reading of such stories
as Andersen's The Shadow, Stevenson's The Strange case of Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde, Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray, and the Old Testament
story of Cain and Abel suggests they are concerno)d with the perpetual
duality of human nature. For example, a Rousseauistic interpretation of
The Shadow could read it as a cruel story about a man who loses his
shadow, finds the roles reversed as the shadow becomes the man and the
man becomes the shadow, and in the end dies as the shadow completely
becomes the 'man'. Le Guin (1979) describes Andersen's fairytale as a
story that "says that a man who will not confront and accept his shadow
is & lost soul" (p. 62). Unlike A Wizard of Earth sea, however, in this tale
there is no union with the shadow. Rather, the shadow triumphs,
marrying the princess, and the man is executed. Examining how texts
explore similar issues can lead to a broader discussion of issues than is
possible from study of a text in isolation. The variety of ways of dealing
with the 'shadow' in different stories (positive union, death) provides
considerable scope for discussing how humankind deals with its dual
nature and the uneasy co-existence of good and evil.
However, as with A Wizard ofEarthsea, it is possible to interpret
these stories from a Nietzschean position. In deconstructing the texts to
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see what is hidden beneath the surface the textual subconscious can be
explored for provisional meanings. For example, in The Shadow the use of
the word 'clever' provides a Nietzschean gap by which to dig beneath the
textual surface: the man considers that the shadow "ought to be clever
enough" (Andersen, n.d., p. 372) to carry out the man's request to
separate from his body; and, the princess describes the shadow, who has
now become the man, as "a clever man" and the man as "a clever

shadow" (p. 380). Such descriptions present an interesting corollary to
descriptions of both Ged and his shadow. In both stories the shadow is
clever and cunning, but one leads to union and one leads to death of the
man. Likewise, in Stevenson's The Strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hvde there can be found gaps and silences by which to pursue
Nietzschean deconstruction. The phrase "Cain's heresy" (Stevenson,
1984, p. 645) is suggestive of an entrance into the subterranean depths of
the novel to play with the intertextuality of the Cain and Abel discourse.
Use of the Derridean common ground does not always have to
result in reading stories that deal with similar issues, although parallels
furnish useful discussion points and will often present themselves as a
matter of course. Wells' enigmatic tale The Door in the Wall follows the
story of a man filled with regret for not entering the door in the wall "that
goes into peace, into delight, into a beauty beyond dreaming, a kindness no
man on earth can know" (Wells, 1974, pp. 159-160). Worldly concerns and
demands prevent him from entering this special world, which he had
glimpsed as a child. A Nietzschean interpretation that concentrates on
the words "door" and "wall" facilitates a playful deconstruction of the text
that raises questions about life, destiny, responsibility, freedom, and
choice. A Rousseauistic interpretation could explore the Christian notion
of worldly duty and success and the presence of 'mystery' in life that
speaks of another world beyond this world.
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The parables and stories of Jesus provide material that can either
be examined from both Derridean interpretative positions or as, Crossan

(1988) su!Q(ests, there can be an exploration of parable as the antithesis
to myth and religion. Parable destabilizes, fragmer.ts, upsets, and
threatens much as the Nietzschean interpretative position does, while
religion and myth stabilizes, unifies, reassures, and supports much as the
Rousseauistic interpretation does. Derrida's ideas concerning the

co~

existence of two irreconcilable interpretative positions are similar to

Crossan's ideas about 'story' in which parable and religion/myth are
"binary or polar opposites" (p. 40). Crossan interprets the stories of Jesus
as parables "which shatter the deep structure of our accepted world" (p.
100). He argues that some of the stories of Jesus, originally intended as
parables, were transformed by the early Church "into moral examples or
exemplary stories andlor historical allegories" (p. 101). There is much
scope for applying the Derridellll interpretative approach and Crossan's
ideas to a textual analysis of the Biblical stories and parables of Jesus.
Myth and the Rousseauistic interpretation tend to be on a grand scale,

provide overarching meaning, and are universalistic. Parable and the
Nietzschean interpr.etation might be described as iconoclastic and
subversive, localized and particular, and individually interpretative.
The approaches to reading literature suggested in this thesis can
be modified for use with younger students. Indeed, children often have less

resistance to looking at something in a new way than older
adolescents/adults, because they are less 'schooled' in convention. For
example, with children the folk tale of St. George and the dragon could be
read from the two Derridean interpretative positions. Exploring it as a
tale about St. George who rescues the princess and kills the evil dragon
would constitute the Rousseanistic interpretation. Such a reading is
centred on the Christian ideas of good and evil. Approaching the text from
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the Nietzschean interpretation alerts children to the fun that can be had
in playing with the other stories 'behind' the story. Questions could be
asked and scenarios presented that suggest alternative ways of viewing
the story, of finding hidden stories behind the traditional version of the
tale: What happens if St. George is scared of dragons? Suppose the dragon
had turned himself into a princess and turned the princess into a dragon
so the dragon-as-princess would get to live in a castle with St. George.
In this way, such a folktale can be used as a way of leaning about

the Christian idea of good triumphing over evil and also about how stories
and meanings are constructed. Issues such as how good and bad are
represented in stories, what it means to be good or had, what it means to
be male or female, and what it means to be different can be discussed at a
basic level. Beginning with the tale of St. George, children could also
explore Eastern tales about dragons which tend to be depicted, unlike
those in Western tales, as good. While the methodology remains
essentially the same the material and approaches can be age-modified.
GenemJ.Application in Religious Education
The value of Derrid.a's two interpretative positions in Religious
Education is not restricted as a methodology to only reading literature.
The utilization ofliterary critical theory in the field of religious studies is
well established. Culler (1988) observes that the critiquing of religion is:
the proudest heritage of comparative literary studies, and
certainly one region in which literary criticism has helped
transform Western culture. At the beginning of the eighteenth
century, one might say without greatly oversimplifying,
Protestants took the Bible to be the word of God; by the
beginning of the twentieth century, this belief was untenable in
intellectual circles. What had been responsible for this change
was scholars' and critics' h1sistence that techniques of textual
and critical analysis which had been developed for classical
literature be applied to Biblical writings. (p. 79)
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The impact of modern literary theory on theology is part of this
continuum of textual criticism. It behoves religious educators to also
encompass modern literary theory in the critical study of literature.
Religion has had a pervasive influence on all cultures so the "role religion
plays in the discourse of ... culture makes it imperative that it not
escape serious intellectual challenge" (Culler, 1988, p. 82).
Application of Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" to
exploring general religious and life issues is concomitant with current
theological trends. There are many theological issues pertinent to
Religious Education which may benefit from the application of the
Derridean common ground as a methodological approach. For example,
there have been developments in the area of Christology, in the concern
for Christology'fi-om below' as opposed to Christology 'from above', and in
the area ofMariology, with the contrast between the virgin/holy discourse
and the Eve/sioful discourse.
O'Collins (1977) observes that Christology 'from above' is no longer
entirely tenable in the changed climate of twentieth century liberal
scholarship, and almost "all contemporary thinking about Jesus Christ
begins not 'fi-om above' but 'from belowm (p. 13). Christology 'from below'
is a more acceptable expression of the person and work of Jesus Christ in
contemporary society. O'Collins suggests that Christology 'from below':
may follow Kttng's lead and study the experience, ideologies
and faiths of human beings in the late twentieth century
before going on to consider what the gospels indicate about the
earthly existence of Jesus .... [or] may simply go straight into
the hmnanicyofJesus. (1977, pp.13-14)
The inherent value of Christology 'from below' is that it focusses on Jesus
in relation to the human condition. Nolan (1976) notes that it was in
Jesus' acceptance of people, particularly the poor and sinners, that he
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became the very human face of God because in treating them as friends
he "had taken away their shame, humiliation and guilt .... They were
now acceptable to Gnd. Their sinfulness, ignorance and uncleanness had
been overlooked" (p. 39). Cbristology 'from above' stresses creeds and
dogma whereas Christology 'from below' stresses the stories about Jesus
in the synoptic gospels. O'Collins (1977) observes that both Christologies
have their difficulties, however, "most contemporary theologians prefer to
attempt a Christology 'fro_a below' and practise Augustine's principle,
'Through the man Christ you move to the God Christm (pp. 17-18).
Bausch (1984) uses the term 'high Christology' to refer to
Christology associated with the divinity of Jesus. For Bausch, high
Christology, or Christology'from above', is concerned with "the Jesus who
walks on water, performs miracles, speaks long Johannine sentences.
This is the imperial Pancrator [sic]" (p. 21). Emphasizing the divinity of
Jesus creates a separation between the divine and the human. Nolan
(1976) stresses the bringing together of the human and divine Jesus:
We cannot deduce anything about Jesus from what we think
we know abo••t God; me must now deduce everything about
God from wt•..c. we do know about Jesus .... To say ... that
Jesus is divine does not change our understanding of Jesus; it
changes our understanding of divinity. (p. 137)
The tensions between Christology 'from above' and Christology
'from below' can be usefully approached using Derrida's interpretative
positions. Just as the Derridean common ground allows for the human
need for the transcendent and the plurality of infinitely deferred meaning
so Christologyfrom above and below, when taken together, acknowledges
both the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ.
The figure of Mary is central to Christianity, particularly to Roman
Catholicism, but her influence extends far beyond the Church:
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Whether we regard the Virgin Mary as the most sublime and
beautiful image in man's struggle towards the good and the
pure, or the most pitiable production of ignorance and
superstition, she represents a central theme in the history of
western attitudes to women. She is one of the few female
figures to have attained the status of myth - a myth that for
nearly two thousand years has coursed through our culture.
{VVarner, 1990,p.xxv)
An examination of Mary in the Matthean and Lukan birth narratives
from the Rousseauistic interpretative position presents an understanding
of Mary as the 'mother of God', which can then be further explored
through developments in Church ideology and litsrature. Whereas, a
Nietzschean intsrpretation could deconstruct the Marian mythology from
the starting point of the 'Virgin Mother', unleashing a deconstructive
process that could lead to an examination of the place of women in the
Church and the roles available to them. A particularly important aspect
of any study of Mary is the dichotomy between eviVsexuality and
holinessfvirginity. Warner (1990) observes that "it is almost impossible to
overestimats the effect that the characteristic Christian association of
sex and sin and death has had on the attitudes of our civilization" (p. 50).
Alternatively, beginning with an examination of the position of
women from the Rousseauistic &nd Nietzschean interpretations in A
Wizard ofEarthsea an exploration could then be extended to the historical
place of women in the Church. The point in the text where Ged recognizes
Serret as the girl "who had mocked him ... and had sent him to read that
spell which loosed the shadow" (Le Guin, 1993, p. 114) becomes in a
Rousseauistic 0\nalysis an example of the 'unacceptable' female (as
opposed to the 'acceptable' female in the person of Yarrow) and from the
Nietzschean position an entry point into the Eve narrative. The binary
relationship between Eve and Mary, the second Eve, provides much
material for discussions about good and evil, men and women. Adams,
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quoted by Warner (1990), indicates that the "study of Our Lady ... leads
directly back to Eve, and lays bare the whole subject of sex" (p. 49).
Although these examples are from the Christian faith there is no
reason why the Derridean approach to reading literature and examining
issues should not also be used in relation to other faith systems. For
example, Cupitt (1!191) discusses 'story anti-story' in relation to Zen
Buddhism, in which he sees there being a search for the unknowable and
ineffable even though this search is acknowledged as impossible given the
constraints of the linguistic world we inhabit:
Zen itself recognizes ... the paradox of trying to use language
to speak of or gesture towards an un-thing outside language ..
. . Like other Eastern religions it dreams of escape. The escape
from textuality ... is enlightenment. There is no way 'out' of a
chain of written signs like this one .... Each sign relates only
the others that come before and after it. (p. 134)
Cupitt's study suggests that approaching Zen Buddhism from the
Derridean perspective would be a fruitful and fascinating

encow~ter.

Cupitt notes that for any religion the belief in transcendence or God was a
belief "in the possibility of mastering language from a standpoint outside
it. Hence the traditional emphasis on silence, stillness, concentration and
the control of one's thoughts" (p. 142).
Like Zen, aspects of Taoism seem particularly suited to the
Derridean common ground. While Taoism as a religion expresses a
logocentric concern with the centre it also emphasizes 'unknowing' as a
way of 'knowing', and in its "philosophy, language, knowledge, and being
are at odds with one another" (Pon, 1996, p. 331). The Tao is both a goal
and a way ofliving, and cannot adequately be expressed in either language
or silence. In particular, the stories of Chuang-Tzu embrace "a much
more personal and individualistic form of mysticism than that of' Lao Tzu
(Hinnells, 1984, p. 90). His work exhibits anarchic characteristics that
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are suggestive of the Nietzschean interpretative position. Pon (1996)
explores these stories "as a radical suspension of ... human-centered
reality or consciousness" (p. 333). She suggests that Chuang-Tzu
combines an uncertainty about language and reality and "plays with the
conventions of language and subverts its purposes and functions" (p.
332). In Chuang-Tzu's concern with the limitations of language that
creates distance from the Tao can be seen the tension between the
Derridean common ground of the two irreconcilable interpretations (play
oflanguage and seeking the Taoist centre). Pon sees language for ChuangTzu as being "both inherently limiting and inexhaustible" (p. 331).
Religious Education can utilize many avenues for exploring religion
and religious issues and, in addition to literature, could include theatre,
music, fine art, and film. The value of the Derridean approach can be
utilized to study film, parUcularly documentaries where the unspoken text
can be explored to great profit. The Derridean common ground can also be
applied to visual arts in an examination of the way in which artists play
with the foreground/focus (positive space) and background (negative
space). In much ofEscher's work, for example, neither the foreground nor
the background can exist without the other, and indeed, trying to decide
which is which is impossible (infra vide, p. 154). In sculpture the very act
of making casts is an intriguing entry point for discussions raised in A
Wizard of Earthsea about cast, space, shadow, balance, and so on.
Students could actually work in clay, producing their own moulds for
casting. The process of creation requires playing with positive and
negative, cast and space, shadow and balance. In printmaking, too, there
is a positive and negative reversal in the construction of printing blocks
from which to take prints. Humans see in 'relationship'; in art, as in
language, meaning is found in difference and, in being variously
'cor.structed', meaning is also infinitely deferred. There are many
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possibilities in the visual arts for exploring the issues raised by reading
literature in Religious Education from the Derridean common ground.
Sometimes, 'hands-on' can explicate understanding in ways that are not

possible from purely mental gymnastics.
New Horizons: An "unnameable ... infant"

Derrida describes trying to conceive of the common ground of the
two irreconcilable interpretations as a:
conception, formation, gestation, and labor we are only
catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit,
with a glance towards the operation of childbearing- but also
with a glance toward those who ... turn their eyes away
when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming
itself and which can do so ... only under the species of the
nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form
of monstrosity. (Derrida, 1978, p. 293)
Such a description could equally apply to the 'birth' of the conjoining of
Derridean theory (or any modern literary theory) and Religious Education.
This 'common ground' can be viewed positively or negatively. Some may
find it terrifying and look on it as a monstrosity. Others, even though
perhaps averting their eyes, may recognize it as a formless 'infant' having
as yet no 'category', but which is, nevertheless, proclaiming its arrival. In
this sense (in the Derridean sense of the common ground, of pushing
against boundaries, and of conceiving of that which is in the process of
becoming) this thesis is very much an "as yet unnamable ... infant".
Looking into the abyss, peering at the "as yet unnamable which is
proclaiming itself', trying to conceive of the common ground of the
Derridean interpretations, and also of Religious Education and Derridean
theory, is a difficult task. It is rather like looking at Escher prints in
which, for example, a step-ladder is to be seen both outside and inside the
building at the same time (infra vide, p. 155). In a sense it is impossible to
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fully 'perceive' both versions at the same time - perception must be
switched between the two possibilities. Nevertheless, when perceiving one
version, awareness of the alternative possibility remains. It seems that in
much of Escher's work that undermines perspective can be seen a visual
version ofDerrida's two interpretative positions in application and also of
the nexus of Religious Education and Derridean theory. Although Escher
manipulates his images they nevertheless hold together as some sort of
decentred yet centred 'unnamable creation' that is proclaiming its right to
exist. The common ground in these images is the 'union' of two

irreconcilable perspectives. Ail with these images so also with the two
interpretative positions and with Religious Education and Derridean
theory. There is a switching back and forth of 'mental perception' from
one perspective/interpretation/area to the other and from this interplay
and exertion arises the common ground.
Derrida, in his "two interpretations of interpretation" suggests a
way of 'simultaneously' reading literature in all its difference, in both the
Rousseauistic and Nietzschean positions, by pinpointing "the di{ferance of
this irreducible difference" (1978, p. 293). This is, indeed, to be found
dancing on the edge of the abyss. But it is a dance that is both
Rousseauistic and Nietzschean, both decipherment and free play, both
centred and noncentred, both reassuring and frightening, both grounded
and ungrounded, both closed and not closed. In other words, it is to be as
fully human as possible with all the contradictions. The Derridean
common ground provides a rich, rewarding and challenging way of peering
"through a glass, darkly" (1 Cor. 13:12, KJV) to catch a glimpse both of
reassuring certitude and oflabyrinthine meanderings. The value inherent
in the Derridean common ground is that it facilitates a movement away
from a limited position of restrictive reading practices to a position that
fosters a much wider potential for meaning.
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Drawing together what at fli"St seems antithetical areas (Religious
Education and modern literary theory) is a potentially hazardous
endeavour. There are no signposts or landmarks to assist with navigation.
Such a journey is both terrifying and exhilarating. The teaching process is
also potentially hazardous. Using the Derridean common ground as a
methodology for reading literature, or for approaching religious and life
issues, results in a classroom that is partly decentred. While lessons using
the Rousseauistic interpretation are likely to be centred on teacher·
directed study, lessons using the Nietzschean interpretation would require
redevelopment and a different mind-set for both teacher and students.
The teacher would assume a decentred role that facilitates student
exploration and students would assume a very active role. Many changes
are likely: teaching roles and strategies altered, programming and
preparation re-formatted, assignments and assessment revised, lessons
remodelled, and new types of questions generated. In practice, this may
involve much greater class time devoted to individual work, an increased
use of paired and group work, and 'round-table' discussions by the class as
a whole. The teacher may initially suggest 'possible threads' to
demonstrate the deconstructive process, particularly if students are not
familiar with this methodology, but equally the students would be both
encouraged and e><pected to produce their own deconstructions. Teaching
may seem uncertain using the Nietzschean position, but only because
teachers are accustomed to directing, controlling, and determining.
Utilizqtion of the Derridean approach means that in practice some
lessons, tho•e using the Rousseauistic interpretation, may resemble
'normal' teacbe,·-centred teaching but other lessons, those using the
Nietzschean interpretation, will be decentred jow·neys undertaken by
teacher and students. In teaching terms, the Derridean common ground
combines the irreconcilability and irreducibility of centred and decentred
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teaching. Fantasy stories like A Wizard of Earthsea are well-suited to
initial student contact with any modern literary theory. By its very
nature fantasy is 'removed' from reality and is therefore a safe vehicle by
which to begin studies of the constructs of text, society, and belief.
The studies of A Wizard of Earthsea undertaken in Chapters Four
and Five furnish data clearly indicating that reading the novel from the
Derridean common ground reveals it to be reflective of the tensions,
complexities, and contradictions of life. Indeed, from the Derridean
perspective it is no longer a novel that neatly 'explains' life/issues. Rather,
in highlighting the ambiguities and struggles of life, it has the potential to
alter how students engage with and respond to the text and life. In this
thesis the interpretation of material in Chapters Four and Five suggests
considerable scope for the religious educator in pursuing how "meaning
and purpose in human existence ... is sought" (supra vide, p. 11).
The value and relevance of this thesis lies in extending the
boundaries of the influence of other disciplines on Religious Education, as
already achieved by Grimmitt (1978; 1987), to new horizons. This thesis
demonstrates the enormous value to be gained by using Derrida's "two
interpretations of interpretation" as a methodological process for reading
literature in Religious Education, which can also be used for exploring
general religious issues. Use of the Derridean common ground provides an
approach in Religious Education underpinning the consensus view in
contemporary approaches in Religious Education that emphasizes the
necessity ofinclusivity, plurality, and openness and the rejection of closed
and exclusive positions (supra vide, pp. 8-11 & pp. 13-16).
However, in true Nietzschean style, the 'end' of this journey is not
an end, but merely a point in a journey. This thesis, an "unnameable ...
infant", implies new horizons of infinite journeying. Some of these are

hinted at in Appendix B.
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CHAPrERSEVEN
Conclusion
BeoommenclatioPB for Further Re!!earcb
Further research could embody a number of different directions.
Indeed, the plurality of potential future developments in this exciting
nexus of modern litsrsry theory and Religious Education seems to be,
given that this thesis appears to be the only study undertaken in this
area, very much in its infancy. A combination of additional theoretical
study and empirical research is considered necesssry.
One possible area for further research could involve the application
of the methodology used in this thesis to the other three Earthsea novels.
Given that A Wizard ofEarthsea, the first novel, was first published in
1968 and Tehanu, the fourth and last novel, was first published in 1990
means that the four novels were written over a twenty-two year period. A
comparative examination of the four novels in terms of Derrida's "two
interpretations of interpretations" could prove an interesting study. For
example, the strong hint in Tehanu of the new Archmage being a woman
and the lack of closure at the end of the novel indicates the possibility of
exploring altogether different Rousseauistic and Nietzschean
interpretations than have heen explored in A Wizard of Earthsea.
One of the initial directions of further research could involve the
creation of a curriculum package based on the conceptual framework
outlined in this thesis. This could then he utilized in the Religious
Education classroom as part of an empirical study to test the validity of
the hypothesis theoretically examined and demonstrated in this thesis.
The curriculum package would need to be carefully constructed so as to
provide a balanced reading of the text from both the Rousseauistic and
Nietzschean interpretations. Consideration would also need to be given to
possible student resistance to radically different reading practices and to
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critical rather than responsive reading.
While the discussions in this thesis are indicative of use in upper
secondary highschool, the methodological approach can be adapted for
use in both lower secondary and upper primary. Curricula could be
produced and empirical studies undertaken across a variety of agegroups. The creation of a comprehensive framework, such as devised by
Grimmitt (1978), for use across both upper primary and secondary years
is recommended as another aim of further research and work.
Further research cvuld at some stage also involve examination of
the value of other literary theoretical approaches, such as those
discussed in Appendix B, for reading literature in Religious Education. This
is likely to be an enormous undertaking as modern literary theory
constitutes a vast, pluralistic, and ever expanding discipline.
Conclusion

Words, spoken or written, are liable to greater misunderstanding,
according to Post-Structuralists, than is ever admitted. Yet, people seem
so 'normalized' by this type of experience that it becomes 'natural' and
therefore 'invisible'. Meaning is considered obvious: yet disagreement,
upset, even war, attest to the monotonous regularity of human
miscomprehension and misconstruction. Embedded in this appalling
linguistic mire is the special status attached to meaning and truth. Not
only is meaning often considered obvious and natural, but it is then
privileged as 'Truth'. These troublesome issues are no more evident than
in 'stories' (whether individual stories or stories that developed into potent
religions, myths, and philosophies), and can be particularly scrutinized in
literature. Derrida's concern with the logocentric impulse in Western
thonght pinpoints a problematic tendency of giving centres to structures
in order to furnish definitive meaning, to ultimately explain. Although the
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Derridean position rejects such logocentric attitudes to meaning and truth
the Derridean common ground of the two interpretative positions
facilitates both the search for the centre and the free play of signifiers.
Moreover, this cummon ground forestalls and alleviates problems
associated with both the messianic certainty of absolute meaning and
truth in text and life (the Rousseauistic interpretation at its worst) and
despair and anxiety associated with the hopelessness of ever achieving
absolute meaning in text or life (the Nietzschean interpretation at its
worst). As one aspect of modern literary theory Derrida's "two
interpretations of interpretation" facilitates a valuable approach for
reading literature and to life in general.
The legacy of modern literary theory can be seen surreptitiously
influencing our lives. Today many people are able to recognize the
'constructed' nature of advertisements and that the 'truth' contained in
them are constructions of reality in order to sell particular products. In
the English class students analyze the texts of literature, film, television,
and the media to develop an understanding of how language and images
are used to communicate certain meanings, how such messages (and

therefore the meanings contained within those messages) are
constructed, and what social or cultural discourses are operating that
marginalize or privilege certain groups or individuals. In Religious
Education, too, modem literary theory should be making its presence felt.
Religious Education does not exist in splendid isolation. It has
responded to developments in theology, pedagogy, psychology, and
sociology, to name but a few disciplines. Religious educators have
emphasized not only the importance of acknowledging developments in
other areas of human learning, and how these may impact on and
influence Religious Education, but have expressed the necessity of
responding to such changes. However, religious educators do not seem to
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have explored the potential of developments in modem literary theory to
also impact on Religious Education.
Modem literary theory has developed a plethora of approaches to
language, society, and literature, and in particular, such theories have
vast implications for how literature is read and studied. English Education
has responded to such literary critical developments by devising new
methods of reading, studying, and teaching literature. Such changes
emphasize the creation of critical readers and the development of
awareness for, and understanding of, the constructed nature of text,
society, and meaning. There is no reason why modem literary theory
should not also be examined for its impact on reading literature in
Religious Education. The already central and valuable place of 'story' in
Religious Education, and the associated richness of fantasy and
imagination, can be considerably expanded by acknowledging and
responding to developments in modern literary theory and their propitious
implications for the reading of literature. Modern literruy theory has the
potential to facilitate pluralistic avenues for exploring meaning, which
collectively provide a multifaceted, potent, and beneficent methodological
tool and process for reading and studying literature in Religious Education
and for examining religious and life issues. The Derridean approach to
reading literature facilitates an excellent way in Religious Education to
appreciate how "meaning and purpose ... is sought", which though
concentrating on the "cognitive" dimension does not preclude the
"affective" dimension (supra vide, p. 11). The use of Derrida's "two
interpretations of interpretation" for reading and studying A Wizard of
Eartbsea has effectively demonstrated its value as a methodological
approach for reading literature in Religious Education.
The contribution of this thesis is its exrunination of the valuable
impact ofDerridean theory on reading literature in Religious Education. It
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I

would seem this area of study has not previously been undertaken. PostStructuralism's emphasis on the impossibility of absolute meaning seems
antithetical to Religious Education's emphasis on the search for final
meaning. However, Derrida's common ground of the two irreconcilable
interpreu.tive positions suggests a reading of literature that allows for
both the Rousseauistic concem with centre and definitive meaning and
the Nietzschean concern with free play and provisional meaning.
The hypothesis of this thesis that "the Derridean common ground
of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations will broaden and
enhance the reading of literature in Religious Education by facilitating
both the search for the centre (search for finite meaning) and the free
play of signifiers (pw'Suit of infinitely deferred and pluralistic meaning)"
(supra vide, p. 8) has been exemplified by a close textual analysis of A

Wizard of Earthsea. It has also been briefly explored that such an
approach to reading literature in Religious Education may equally apply

to sacred and religious texts as well as to theological and religious issues.
Looking into the linguistic abyss of Post-Structuralism and
searching for absolute meaning and provisional meaning, trying to
conceive of the Derridean common ground that encompasses both the
Rousseauistic search for the signified and the Nietzschean free play of
signifiers, is rather like looking "through a glass, darkly"

(1

Cor. 13:12,

KJV). As an act of faith, which in no way undermines the reading of

literature from a Derridean perspective or the value therein, one could add
"but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12).
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APPENDIX A

M.C. Escher's "Circle Limit IV (Heaven and Hell)"

© 1997 Cordon Art- Baarn- Holbwd. All rights reserved.
(Boo!, Ernst, Kist, Locher & Wierda, 1992, p. 322)
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•

M.C. Escher's "Belvedere"

© 1997 Cordon Art- BIUll'Jl -Holland. All rights reserved.
(Boo!, Ernst, Kist, Locher & Wierda, 1992, p. 318)
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APPENDIXB
Value of Other Modern Literary Theoretical Approaches
While Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" is a valuable
methodological process for reading literature in Religious Education it
would be anathema and contrary to the ethos of modern literary theory
generally and Post-Structuralism in particular, let alone Derridean
theory, to suggest that there are not also other equally valuable literary
theoretical approaches. Bartbes (1996b, p. 195) uses a Biblical quotation

to describe textual plurality, which could equally describe theoretical
plurality: "My name is Legion: for we are many" (Mark 5: 9, KJV).
The plurality of literary theoretical approaches facilitates a variety
of ways of exploring text and meaning. It would be a logocentric attitude
indeed to champion one particular approach as somehow 'the' valuable
modern literary theoretical approach for reading literature in Religious
Education. Barthes (1996b) observes of textual plurality that the "plural
of demoniacal texture which opposes text to work can bring with it
fundamental changes in reading, and precisely in areas where monologism
appears to be the Law" (p. 195). Likewise, the "plural of demoniacal"
literary approaches which oppose pluralistic reading practices to
logocentric reading practices can also bring with it fundamental changes

to reading practices that result in a broader and richer consideration of
the quest for meaning. In this way, monologism gives way to pluralism in
the practice of reading literature in Religious Education.
There is an enormous range of different theoretical positions in
modern literary theory. All these positions have, in their own way, the
potential to enhance and enrich how literature is read in Religious
Education, thereby contributing, also in their own way, to the "exploration
of the myriad ways in which meaning and purpose in human existence
has been and is sought" (supra vide, p. 11). Nevertheless, it was
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considered that an examination in depth was preferable to a cursory
overview, hence the necessity of making a single choice from the plethora
of possibilities. As a result, this thesis examines only one small aspect of
modern literary theory. Even Derrida's theory is expansive and close
attention to his ideas regarding 'supplement' (words always supplement or
substitute reality) or 'phonocentrism' (the privileging of speech over
writing) would be profitable studies in themselves. In particular, given the
value assigned to the spoken word in A Wizard of Earthsea the Derridean
concept of phonocentrism would furnish a fascinating approach to the
novel. It needs to be emphasized that rather than Derrida's two
interpretative positions this thesis could have focused on the value for
reading literature in Religious Education of any rmmbeJ' uf other modern
literary theoretical approaches, including other aspects of Derridean
theory.
For example, an examination ofBaudrillard's ideas concerning the
culture of'hyperreality' and 'the loss of the real', which he sees as arising
from a loss of distinction between 'real' and 'imagined' brought about by
the pervasive influence of film, television, and advertising (Barry, 1995, p.
87), would have heen particularly interesting. For a feminist approach a
study of Cixous' ideas concerning the masculine economy of profit and the
feminine economy of gift (Cixous, 1996) would have been worthwhile. Or a
more general approach combining various theoretical ideas, as evidenced
in Cultural Criticism used in English Education, could have been explored.
Indeed, there are many strikingly interesting and challenging modern
literary theories to choose from, all of which could variously and positively
impact on how literature is read and studied in Religious Education. As a
taste of the value to he found in the multiplicity of modern literary theory
for reading literature in Religious Education a brief overview of some of
the ideas of Foucault, Althusser, and Bakhtin in relation to AWizartl of
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Earthsea will illustrate the imperative of not privileging, by an act of
isolation, one theorist over other theorists.

Foucault
Foucault represents another tangent of Post-Structuralist thought
whose ideas, unlike Derrida, focus on the relationship of discourse and
power, and history and ideology. "Like other post-structuralists Foucault
regards discourse as a central human activity, but .... is interested in

the historical dimension of discursive change" (Selden, 1985, p. 98).
Foucault points to the observation that discourses are always involved
with power. A 'Hitler' or the Irish Republican Army or the Australian
Goverrunent exercise real power through discourse that has real effects
on many people's lives. Also sometimes called New Historicism,
Foucault's ideas are concerned with personal freedom and state control.
Foucault's "pervasive image of the State is that of 'panoptic'
(meaning all-seeing) surveillance .... [maintained] not by physical force
and intimidation, but by the power of its 'discursive practices'" (Barry,
1995, p. 176). The panopticon was designed by Jeremy Bentham in the
eighteenth century as a prison which allowed for hitherto unprecedented
surveillance of prisoners and isolation of the prisoners from each other. It
was a circular prison that "consisted of tiered ranks of cells which could all
be surveyed by a single warder positioned at the centre of the circle"
(Barry, 1995, p. 176). Whereas Derrida is interested in textual discourse
and interpretation, Foucault is interested in the political structures that
limit the freedom of the individual and maintain the power of the state.
"The Panopticon ... must be understood as a generalizable model of
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life
of men" (Foucault, 1992, p. 87). An analysis of this Foucauldian concept
as it impacts on how A Wizard ofEarthsea is read and meaning achieved
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raises some thought-provoking issues.
For example, the hierarchical structure of Earthsea could be seen
as reflecting Foucault's panopticon. The wizards, who themselves have a
rigid hierarchical structure, represent the centre of the panopticon and
from their privileged position they control and monitor all of Earthsea.
Their power of control is maintained by what Foucault terms "discursive
practices" (Barry, 1995, p. 176). For the wizards, particularly the
Archmage and Masters, their discourse comprises a special and privileged
knowledge of spoken and written words that exercise enormous power. No
other inhabitants of Earthsea have access to such power except the
dragons or those who dally with the Dark Powers. Such characters, like
Yevaud, Serret, or Lord Benderesk, are represented in the novel as
threats to the balance and order of Earthsea. The dragons are feared by
the wizards and mages because not only do they possess awesome power
but they operate totally outside the power structures on Roke. Such
'outsiders' to the Earthsea-panopticon threaten it because they
undermine the discursive power of those who control it.
It is interesting to observe that the wizards have considerably
reduced powers of observation and surveillance over those who exist
outside their discursive realm. In addition, it might be argued that only
those outside the panopticon exercise individual freedom. Those who live
under the control of the wizards in the panoptic state of Earthsea may be
seen as existing only in accordance with the power structures of the
wizards and as actually experiencing little freedom because anything that
threatens the structure of Earthsea is considered subversive and is not
accepted. In this sense, tt.:ey are isolated from each other in their lack of
knowing anything other than the status quo.
In Earthsea there is very much a sense of'insiders' and 'outsiders'.

Those 'outside' include marauding pirates, witches, dragons, and the like
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(those who exist in a contrary fashion to the dictates of the Earthseapanopticon and are hence considered dangerous or evil). While those
'inside' include a variety of lords, wizards, farmers, merchante, seafarers,
and so on (those who exist in a compliant way to the State control exerted
by the mages). Ged's journey takes him from inside the panopticon to
outside it and then back again. His shadow is very much representative of
the 'outsiders' who often exercise power over aspects of Earthsea or those
in it, but ultimately succumb to the enforced structure of the mages.
Indeed, the shadow could be seen as championing the New Historicist
concerns with the "liberal id:.;a\s of personal freedom and accepting and
celebrating all forms of difference and 'deviancem (Barry, 1995, p. 175).
Reading the novel from such a Foucauldian perspective facilitates a
different aspect to the examination of the human quest for meaning and
purpose than is afforded by the Derridean position.
Alth!!!lser
Althusser considers that "it is through ideology that individuals are
constituted as 'subjects' - (mis)recognizing themselves as free and
autonomous beings with unique subjectivities" (Rice & Waugh, 1996, p.
52). His theories concern ideology and the interpellation of the individual
as subject (who thereafter becomes a subject who is also 'subject to'),
Althusser postulates that "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete
individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the
subject" (A!thusser, 1996, p. 58). Althusser asserts that ideology:
'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects
among the individuals ... , or 'transforms' the individuals into
subjects ... by that very precise operation I have called
interpellation or hailing. (Althusser, 1996, p. 58)
For Althusser, interpellation describes the situation were it appears that
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choice is possible but in fact it is not. Interpellation or hailing is "the way
the individual is encouraged li.o see herself or himself as an entity free and
independent of social forces" (Barry, 1995, p. 165).
These theories may prove very useful as a methodological
approach for reading literature in Religious Education because they are
concerned with the place of the individual in society and how the individual
is both situated in and subject to that society by ideology. For example, in
A Wizard of Esrthsea th!J existence of true names which are not generally
shared with anyone else makes for some interesting discussions in light of
Althusser's concept of interpellation. In Earthsea no one has power over
an individual without knowledge of that person's true name. The shadow
has power over Ged only because it does know his true name and can
therefore transform Ged from individual into a subject that is subject to
the shadow's will.

Bakhtin
Bakhtin's theories are particularly interesting because he lived in
Stalinist Russia and was unaware of post-Saussurean developments in
the West. For Bakhtin language "was a field of ideological contention"
(Eagleton, 1983, p. 117). In contrast to Derrida, Bakbtin is not interested
in abstract linguistics "but rather language conceived as ideologically
saturated" (B1ikhtin, 1996, p. 232). For him words are not only linguistic
signs but also socio-political signe t'llat attribute value. At any "moment
of its evoluti,on, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects, ...
but also ... into languages that are socio-ideologicallanguages" (Bakbtin,
1996, p. 232). Bakhtin suggests there are two opposing forces

simultan<.l<lusly operating in language, the centripetal and the centrifugal.
He does not historically situate a Derridean-type eruption in the life of
languat~e

but points to historical literary developments in which these
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forces can be examined. For example, Bakhtin sees in the epic the
functioning of the centripetal force and in the 'novelizing' novel the
functioning of the centrifugal force. Bakhtin considers that the 'unitary
language' (the single 'official' language) operates in the midst of
heteroglossia (the many 'other' languages). The unitary language
"constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical process of
linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the centripetal
forces oflanguage" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 231). The heteroglossia, containing
centrifugal forces, operates in an "uninterrupted process of
decentralization and disunification" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 233).
Bakhtin, working in a socio-political framework, is concerned with
the interaction of opposing forces within language in relation to the social,
historical, and ideological. "Ail a living, socio-ideological concrete thing ...
[language]lies on the borderline between oneself and the other" (Bakhtin,
1994, p. 77). Meaning, in both literature and life, is determined by the
relationship between 'self and 'other'. While meaning for Derrida is
concerned with provisional meaning in the Nietzschean position or the
search for absolute meaning in the Rousseauistic position, Bakhtin is
concerned with meaning as inextricably bound up with addressivity.
Bakhtin situates meaning in the relationship between the addresser and
the addressee. "The word ... is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a
future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures
itself in the answer's direction" (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 76).
A great deal of information about character identity in A Wizard of
Earthsea comes from character interplay. For example, much is learnt
about Ged from his relationship to other characters, such as Jasper,
Vetch, or Ogion, as well as from his relationship to his shadow. The
tellBion between the centripetal and centrifugal forces can a! so be seen in
addressivity. Whether characters function centripetally or centrifugally,
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however, is dependent on which characters are in dialogic relationship.
Ged initially functions as a centrifugal force against the centripetal force

of the School ofRoke. However, after he has released his shadow, it is now
the shadow that functions as the centrifugal force and Ged who functions
as the centripetal force. Meaning is only achieved in the dialogue between
the addresser and the addressee and not, as with Derrida, in textual
linguistic structure. Bakhtin emphasizes the social and historical
contexts in which such dialogues take place. For Bakhtin (1994) all
utterances take "meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in
a socially specific environment" (p. 76).
Although both Derrida (in the Nietzschean position) and Bakhtin
view meaning as something that is not fixed and as being infinitely
potential and open rather than finitely completed and closed, it is Bakhtin
alone who suggests that meaning is shared: that is, meaning belongs to
everyone. "The word in language is half someone else's" (Bakhtin, 1994, p.
77). For Bakhtin the locus of meaning is in the dialogue between the
speaker and the recipient rather than, as with Derrida, in the signifier.
The conflicting tensions between the centripetal and centrifugal forces
can be seen in the tensions between the heteroglossia and the unitary
language. Every word, and therefore meaning, "participates in the
'unitary language'... and at the same time partakes of social and
historical heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 233). In Bakhtin's theory the
novelist re-works the heteroglossia so that a plethora oflanguages can be
discerned from within the novel's dialogues. His emphasis on the dialogic
discourse encompasses concerns with addressivity and meaning and the
underlying dialogic nature ofexistence.
In A Wizard of Earthsea the dialogic discourse can be
examined in the different languages evident in the novel. Traces of the
unitary language (the centripetal forces) can be discerned in references to
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the maintenance of the Equilibrium by the Master Hand (Le Guin, 1993,
p, 48) while the heteroglossia (the centrifugal forces) can be seen in
references to the usurping of the Equilibrium hy Serret (p. 112). Bakhtin's
interest in language as a socio-ideological phenomenon inevitably
furnishes an approach to reading literature that is less concerned with
linguistics and semiotics than is Derrida's approach.
Both Derrida and Bakhtin express considerable interest in
language and meaning. Derrida, in his two types of interpretation,
advocates a simultaneous reading of literature in all its difference: one
that, from the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean positions, seeks centres
and follows threads. Bakhtin suggests a socio-ideological approach to
literature that encompasses an understanding that meaning is shared
and is inextricably tied up in the dialogic relationship of the addresser and
the addressee. Both Derrida and Bakhtin are concerned with the common
ground of diametrically opposed but simultaneously lived positions: for
Derrida the common ground of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean
interpretations and for Bakhtin a common ground of centripetal and
centrifugal forces. Moreover, the implications of their respective theories,
each fostering a direction and emphasis lacking in the other, provide
complementary positions from which to read literature in Religious
Education that are rich and multifaceted, providing a variety of ways for
studying meaning, society, and the individual.
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